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ABSTRACT 
 
FORMATION AND REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS IN TURKISH POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: THE CASE OF MÜSİAD (INDEPENDENT INDUSTRIALISTS’ AND 
BUSINESSMEN’S ASSOCIATION) 
 
Murat Çemrek 
 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
 
Supervisor: Assistant Professor Hootan Shambayati 
 
June 2002 
 
This thesis examines the case of Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği- 
MÜSİAD [Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association] to evaluate the 
formation and representation of interests within transformation of the Turkish political 
economy in the last two decades. The relatively liberalization in Turkey with further 
integration into the global markets led the development of civil society but it has not 
meant the waning of the “strong state” tradition. Thus, MÜSİAD as other Turkish 
business associations has been very dynamic to develop strong adaptability vis-à-vis 
strong state. The study benefits from Truman’s “disturbance,” Olson’s “collective action” 
and Salisbury’s “exchange” theories to delineate the emergence, development and 
mobilization of the association as well as the theories of pluralism, corporatism and 
clientelism to explore the essence of interest representation in Turkey. 
 
The thesis analyzes the institutional framework and organizational structure of 
MÜSİAD and argues that the role of Islam for the association has been quite functional 
providing a common bond for its members, motivation to (re)gain the markets in the 
Islamic world captured by non-Islamic forces and a way of moderating the labor. 
MÜSİAD’s reference to the East Asian model was also parallel to its Islamic discourse 
blended with its emphasis on moral and communitarian values. 1997 has been a turning 
point for MÜSİAD in its de-emphasis of its ideological pillars as Islam and East Asian 
economic development model. Following the economic crisis in East Asian countries and 
the February 28 process, MÜSİAD retreated from its references to both factors. In short, 
the examination of MÜSİAD is illuminating in terms of illustrating the depth and extent 
of the Islamic business activity in Turkey as well as the rise of new business elite that 
could develop a challenging culture vis-à-vis the state. 
 
Keywords: Interest Group, Political Economy, Turkey, Islam, State 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİNDE ÇIKAR OLUŞUMU VE TEMSİLİ:  MÜSİAD 
(MÜSTAKİL SANAYİCİ VE İŞADAMALRI DERNEĞİ) ÖRNEK ÇALIŞMASI 
 
Murat Çemrek 
 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hootan Shambayati 
 
Haziran 2002 
 
Bu tez MÜSİAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği) örnek çalışmasını son 
yirmi yıldaki Türkiye ekonomi politiğindeki dönüşüm dahilinde çıkar oluşum ve temsilini 
değerlendirerek incelemektedir. Küresel pazarlara daha fazla eklemlenme ile 
Türkiye’deki göreceli liberalleşme sivil toplumun gelişmesine yolaçtıysa da, bu “güçlü 
devlet” geleneğinin sönmesi anlamına gelmedi. Bu nedenle, MÜSİAD Türkiye’deki diğer 
işadamı dernekleri gibi güçlü devlet karşısında güçlü adaptasyon geliştirmek de gayet 
dinamik oldu. Çalışma Truman’ın “kargaşa,” Olson’un “kollektif eylem” ve 
Salisbury’nin “mübadele” terorilerinden derneğin ortaya çıkışı, gelişmesi ve 
mobilizasyonunu; pluralizm, korporatizm ve klientelizm teorilerinden de Türkiye’deki 
çıkar temsilinin esasını tasvir etmek için faydalanır.  
 
Tez  kurumsal çerçevesi ve örgütsel yapısını inceleyerek, dernek için İslam’ın 
rolünün üyeler arası ortak bağ oluşturmak, İslam dünyasında gayr-i-Müslim güçlerce ele 
geçirilmiş pazarları (tekrar) kazanmak ve emeği ehlileştirmek gibi oldukça fonksiyonel 
bir anlamı olduğunu iddia eder. MÜSİAD’ın Doğu Asya modeline referansı da ahlaki ve 
cemaat değerlerine vurguyla harmanlanmış İslami söylemi ile parallelik arzetmekteyken,  
1997 yılı MÜSİAD için İslam ve Doğu Asya ekonomik kalkınma modeli gibi ideolojik 
dayanaklarına vurguyu kaldırdığı bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Dernek, Doğu Asya 
ülkelerindeki ekonomik kriz ve 28 Şubat süreci nedeniyle her iki referansından geri adım 
attı. Kısaca, MÜSİAD’ın incelenmesi Türkiye’deki İslami ticari faaliyetin derinliğini ve 
kapsamı ile devlet karşısında meydan okuyucu bir kültür geliştirebilen yeni bir işadamı 
seçkinler topluluğunun incelenmesi açısından aydınlatıcıdır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Çıkar Grubu, Ekonomi Politik, Türkiye, İslam, Devlet 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION: INTEREST GROUPS AND 
INTEREST GROUPS POLITICS 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
During the first half of the 1990s, the Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları 
Derneği- MÜSİAD [Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association] 
became popular in the public agenda, which came to its peak during the Refahyol 
-the coalition of Welfare Party-WP [Refah Partisi-RP] and True Path Party-TPP 
[Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP]- government led by Necmettin Erbakan during July 
1996-June 1997. When I decided to study MÜSİAD, the Refahyol government 
had just fallen down and this, in turn, affected MÜSİAD negatively. The secular 
media showed MÜSİAD and its members backing irtica, religious reactionism, 
financially, which undermined the legitimacy of the association. Thus, the 
examination of MÜSİAD is illuminating in terms of illustrating the depth and 
extent of the Islamic business activity in Turkey as well as the rise of new 
business elite that could develop a challenging culture vis-à-vis the state. In order 
to analyze MÜSİAD, one needs to understand the developments of the political 
economy of Turkey in 1980s and in 1990s.  
The political and economic developments in Turkey led to the emergence 
of MÜSİAD, in a response to the needs that originated with the transformation of 
the political economy during the 1980s. Moreover, Islamic business networks 
such as special finance houses and multi-share holding companies grew to be 
important actors on the economic scene. In fact, 1980 was a milestone in the 
history of Turkish political economy due to both the structural adjustment 
program introduced on 24 January and the military coup of 12 September. Until 
 2 
this period, Turkish state-business relations were shaped according to the 
directives of an interventionist state that could dominate and manipulate the 
business class. However, in the 1980s, the global economic and political 
developments necessitated a further integration of Turkey into the global 
financial and commodity markets. This integration process resulted in a shift 
from an import-substituting industrialization (ISI) model to export-oriented 
policies, which meant a relative liberalization of the Turkish economy.  
Following the transition to parliamentary democracy in 1983, the gradual 
liberalization of the Turkish society gave previously repressed identities a chance 
for public visibility.  Through the approach of the military rule to integrate Islam 
into Turkish nationalism -crystallized in the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS)- the 
Islamic identity increased its visibility in the public sphere. This public visibility 
came to fore with diversified activities such as public broadcasting, education 
networks, publications, holding companies and other civil society organizations. 
Moreover, the relatively free political atmosphere and the fragmentation of the 
center-right and center-left parties led to the incremental rise of Islamist politics, 
and of the WP.  This process of relatively liberal restructuration also increased 
the numbers and the intensity of civil society organizations and their activities, 
which became more dynamic especially after 1990. Thus, all these developments 
opened the path for the emergence of a new business elite organized in 
MÜSİAD. In short, this study is to evaluate the dynamics of this transformation 
of the Turkish political economy and the rise and fall of Islamist politics by 
examining the case of MÜSİAD.  
Twelve young businessmen with Islamist leanings in İstanbul founded 
MÜSİAD on May 5, 1990. MÜSİAD soon became the largest voluntary business 
 3 
association in Turkey with almost 2500 members, 27 branch offices and 45 
overseas focal points in 35 different countries. MÜSİAD’s ideological basis is 
rooted in Islamic religiosity and in the needs of Küçük ve Orta Büyüklükteki 
İşletmeler-KOBİs [Small and Medium Size Enterprises]. Originating from 
Anatolian towns, this new business elite led by MÜSİAD has challenged the 
established business elite and the existing institutions while preserving its own 
traditional and religious values. It also accelerated the globalization of 
production in Turkey facilitating the mobility of global capital through 
collaboration with the international system. 
MÜSIAD represents the “outsider” business class isolated from state 
incentives. Beside the political-economic dimension, there is a cultural aspect to 
the organization that is based on reinterpretation of Islam and Anadoluluk 
(Anatolianship). MÜSİAD reinterprets the popular religious norms and practices 
in accordance with the needs of free-market economy by emphasizing the 
importance of material wealth and hardwork. This attempt at reconciling 
capitalism and Islam has involved MÜSİAD in the construction and 
representation of this new type of bourgeoisie who benefited from being Islamic 
and oppositional within the rhetoric of general industrial progress and export. 
Thus, MÜSİAD referred to the East Asian countries that succeeded in developing 
their economic resources despite their traditional belief systems.  
For MÜSİAD, Islam is not an obstacle before economic development. 
However, MÜSİAD’s religious standpoint has not only been a rhetorical trope as 
the association has also formulated concrete projects for economic union among 
Islamic countries, e.g. Cotton Union Project. In Anadoluluk, Anatolia is more 
than a geographical location. It connotes the traditional attitudes fostered with 
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Islamic moral values as well as the isolation of the petite bourgeoisie from state 
resources. One has to keep in mind that MÜSİAD headquarter is in İstanbul 
where approximately the quarter of the membership is located. 
1997 happened to be a turning point for MÜSİAD forcing it to reevaluate 
its discourse about Islamic-orientation and East Asian model of development 
since both of them resulted in a disappointment. The close links of the 
organization with the Milli Görüş (National View) Parties; the WP and Virtue 
Party-VP [Fazilet Partisi-FP] in our study, has diminished since the February 28 
process both accelerated the end of the Refahyol government and brought a court 
file for the closure of MÜSİAD. Thus, MÜSİAD found itself isolated in the 
political arena. Moreover, the East Asian crisis forced the leadership of the 
organization to reconsider its enthusiasm for the East Asian model of 
development after these countries had fallen into heavy economic crises one by 
one. Despite all, MÜSİAD did not give up referring to Islamic moral values in 
shaping its communitarian approach.  
 Why was MÜSİAD established? How is MÜSİAD represented in the 
political economic order? Whom does MÜSİAD represent? How is MÜSİAD 
organized? How is the MÜSİAD-government relationship institutionalized? 
What are the aims of MÜSİAD? What are the priorities in the field of economic 
policy? Which channels of access does MÜSİAD utilize? How is MÜSİAD’s 
relation with other business associations? The present study addresses itself to 
these questions as the main ones.    
This PhD thesis on MÜSİAD is based on the following arguments:  
1. All social units emerge in relation with the social, political and 
economic structures encompassing them. These external 
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factors not only pave the path for the formation of social units 
but also shape them. As a result of mutual relation, in time 
social units shape these external factors. In this context, 
MÜSİAD poses an interesting case since it is in the 
intersection of Islamic politics and political economy of 
Turkey in 1980s and 1990s when Turkey was exposed to a 
noticeable transformation. This historical analysis also 
provides us the basis to develop an understanding about the 
hinterland of the organization. The emergence and historical 
development of MÜSİAD is quite meaningful since it is the 
result of the rising civil society organizations and their 
activities as well as the conflict between small and big 
businesses.  
2. We need a multi-theoretical approach to understand interest 
group formation and interest groups politics in Turkey due to 
the Turkish state’s dominance vis-à-vis the interest groups. 
This, in turn, oriented the Turkish business associations to 
recognize the historical legitimacy of the state and they adapted 
themselves according to this essential trait. However, in the 
establishment process of the business associations, we observe 
a challenging discourse vis-à-vis the state, which wanes in 
time. For example Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği-
TÜSİAD [The Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association] supported the military intervention in 1980 and 
stood beside the military bureaucracy in the fall of the 
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Refahyol government despite its heavy emphasis on 
democracy. MÜSİAD also started to underline state incentives 
more than Islamic ethics following the February 28 process.  
3. MÜSİAD appears as the product of a particular societal 
environment where the state has a very significant role in 
shaping economy and society, and of a particular historical 
period characterized by certain important changes in domestic 
and global patterns of production and trade. This period 
involved the questioning of the traditional role of the state in 
the economy and its significant revision. This liberal 
orientation in the economy also resulted in changes in the 
political front that came hand in hand with the increase of 
visibility of Islam in the public sphere.  
4. MÜSİAD has employed Islam functionally as a cultural-
ideological factor supported mostly with secular-economic 
communitarian notions like Anadoluluk to bind its members in 
a coherent community, to secure markets and moderate labor. 
At the last instance, economic aspirations are more significant 
than Islam since MÜSİAD is a business organization. Thus, the 
fragility and vulnerability, read flexibility, of this Islamist 
discourse challenging the state was mainly observed in 
MÜSİAD’s decreasing its emphasis on Islam following the 
February 28 period. 
5. MÜSİAD symbolizes both “traditional(ism)” and 
“modern(ity)” simultaneously and develops a synthesis of these 
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traits within an Islamist identity that is highly colored with 
Turkish nationalism and reference to the Ottoman imperial 
past. However, due to its association with political Islam –close 
links with the WP and VP- the legitimacy of the organization 
has been under question confronting various difficulties at 
political and legal levels. MÜSİAD’s functional Islamist 
identity represents the class interests within a revival of Islamic 
civilization and forms a network organization transforming 
traditional KOBİs’ economic mentality to globally integrated 
export-oriented business. 
6. MÜSİAD is the association of the rising new business elite 
trying to get recognition for the isolated business groups. Thus, 
the examination of this association is quite illuminating in 
terms of the depth and extent of Islamic business activity to 
understand the transformation in Turkish political economy in 
the last two decades.  
The first chapter outlines the theoretical framework of formation and 
development of interest groups and interest groups politics. The chapter 
delineates the interest groups from different aspects. The literature review section 
compares Truman’s “disturbance theory,”1 Olson’s “collective action theory”2 
and Salisbury’s “exchange theory”3 to comprehend interest groups’ formation 
                                                 
1 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). 
  
2 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
 
3 Robert H. Salisbury, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,’ Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, February 1969, Vol. 13 No. 1,  pp. 1-32. 
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and survival. The section on modalities of interest representation explores the 
literature on pluralism, corporatism and clientelism and compares them with each 
other to develop a better understanding of interest group politics.  
The second chapter uncovers both the historical-political framework of 
the business associations and the development of the legal framework in Turkey. 
The literature review section examines books of Robert Bianchi,4 Metin Heper5 
and Ayşe Buğra6 to comprehend Turkish state-business relations within a 
theoretical approach. The chapter also focuses on the voluntary business 
association formation in Turkey with reference to Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu-TİSK [Turkish acronym for the Turkish Confederation of 
Employers’ Unions], the Conference Board of Economic and Social Issues, and 
the emergence of TÜSİAD.   
The third chapter explores the emergence and the development of 
MÜSİAD in conjunction with Truman’s “disturbance theory” through two 
variables of disturbances- rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkey and 
transformation of Turkish political economy from different angles in the last two 
decades.  
The fourth chapter benefits from Olson’s “collective action theory” and 
Salisbury’s “exchange theory” to delineate the mobilization and development of 
MÜSİAD. Olson’s approach of exclusive material selective benefits to prevent 
the free-rider problem is obvious in MÜSİAD’s activities, publications, trips and 
                                                 
4 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
 
5 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: Eothen Press, 1985) and Metin Heper, 
ed. Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin and 
New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991). 
 
6 Ayşe Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study (Albany, N.Y.: State 
University of New York Press, 1994). 
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etc. Salisbury’s theory interrelating the group’s survival upon a mutually 
advantageous exchange of benefits between the leader and the members is also 
helpful to understand MÜSİAD as well as solitary benefits -social rewards 
deriving from participation in group activities- and purposive benefits -rewards 
associated with ideological or issue-oriented goals. The chapter also analyzes the 
institutional framework and organizational structure of MÜSİAD through the 
historical background and Anadoluluk as a cultural basis for network formation 
in the last two decades.  
The fifth chapter discusses the ideological background of MÜSİAD to 
understand the structure and the identity formation of the association. The 
chapter analyzes the transformation of the role and the function of Islam for 
MÜSİAD in conjunction with the Milli Görüş parties, especially WP-VP, and the 
consequences of the February 28 process. The chapter also focuses on the 
transformation of the emphasis on the East Asian development in relation to the 
economic crisis in East Asian countries. The chapter pays attention to TÜSİAD 
as the other in the identity of MÜSİAD and delineates MÜSİAD and interest 
group politics.  
The last chapter is the concluding chapter in which I discuss the findings 
and contributions of the thesis to theory through some generalizations based on 
the Turkish case and in particular on MÜSİAD. 
1.2. Theoretical Framework 
 
In this part, I will outline the theoretical framework of interest groups and 
modalities of interest representation. Firstly, I will evaluate the relations among 
state, economy, and interest groups focusing on the definition, functions, the 
differences between interest groups in different countries and their interaction 
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with the state. I will assess interest group power in relation to different variables 
of legitimacy, size, ability to form coalitions with other groups and financial 
resources influential in policymaking process. In the literature review section, I 
will compare Truman’s “disturbance theory,” Olson’s “collective action theory” 
and Salisbury’s “exchange theory” to understand the formation, mobilization and 
maintenance of interest groups. I will also pay attention to public interest groups 
to compare them with the economic interest groups in general, and business 
associations in particular.  
The chapter also explores the theoretical framework of interest groups 
politics through the literature on pluralism, corporatism and clientelism. I will 
also explore the comparison between neo-corporatism and authoritarian 
corporatism as well as the comparison between corporatism and pluralism to 
develop a better understanding of interest groups representation. I will delineate 
clientelism based on patronage-clientele relations to understand interest groups 
politics in transitional societies. Most fundamentally, there is consensus that 
these are ideal types and that no polity actually conforms to either model. Lastly, 
I will highlight MÜSİAD in relation to its formation and the interest group 
politics in Turkey in which it is embedded.  
 1.3. State and Interest Groups 
 
State is one of the essential preconditions for economic growth. 
Paradoxically, it is also the source of man-made economic decline.7 The 
increased importance of the state in the contemporary world, being the crucial 
                                                 
7 Douglass C. North, “A Framework for Analyzing the State in Economic History,” Economic 
History, 1979, Vol. 16, [pp. 249-259] in The State: Critical Concepts, Vol. 2, John A. Hall, ed. 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1994),  p. 325. 
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factor in the institutionalization of the market, necessarily brings us to evaluate 
its relations with private interests. In this context, the study of interest groups is 
one way in which political science could advance beyond the confines of studies 
of institutions and begins to explore the links between politics and society.  
Any effort to characterize the policy-making process must include at the 
same time an analysis of both the organization of the state and the organized 
factions, parties and interest groups that seek to influence the state. Both sides of 
the policymaking equation, the state and organized interests, are important 
determinants of policy outcomes, and each interacts with the other to produce a 
distinctive national system of politics and policymaking.8  
Interest groups and state agencies can be allies, and each provides the 
other with valuable resources. State policies may, naturally, have the effect of 
creating organized interests where none had existed before. Government activity 
may promote interest group formation, which in turn may produce interest group 
influence. Thus, governance can also be viewed in interest group terms and the 
ability of interest groups to influence government policies has certain 
implications on bureaucratic policy formulation, implementation and 
administration.9 
 Interest groups are generally defined as organizations separate from  the 
government, even though often in close partnership with it. They attempt to 
influence public policy by advancing a particular sectional interest or cause.10 
                                                 
8 Frank R. Baumgartner and Jack L. Walker, “Educational Policymaking and the Interest Group 
Structure in France and the United States” Comparative Politics, April 1989, Vol. 21, p. 273. 
 
9 Scott R. Furlong, “Interest Group Influence on Rule Making” Administration and Society, July 
1997, Vol. 29, No. 3,  p. 325. 
 
10 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990),  pp. 1-8. 
 
 12
Interest groups are often conceptualized interchangeably with “pressure groups” 
to reflect their activity of exerting pressure on governmental agencies. In this 
context, interest groups differ from a “lobby” that has the sole purpose of 
influencing legislation or the execution of policy.11 Conventionally, political 
parties seek to constitute the government, whereas interest groups try only to 
influence it. As a result, apparent purposes of interest groups are always narrower 
than that of political parties.12 On the other hand, interest groups like political 
parties constitute a form of political participation and they resemble political 
parties in many of their activities, i.e., political campaigning for candidates, 
making campaign contributions, screening appointments for public office, and 
formulating policy alternatives.13 
 Almost inevitably, all interest groups perform certain functions: (1) 
providing information to public officials to assist in designing policies; (2) 
seeking to persuade policymakers to pursue courses of action in the best interests 
of the organization and its members; (3) communicating with members, keeping 
them apprised as to what the government is doing, educating them about the 
political process, and refining support.14 The primary function of interest groups 
is no longer perceived solely as that of articulating and transmitting demands of 
the society into the political process; but also socializing citizens, organizing 
                                                 
11 Geoffrey K. Roberts and Alistairs Edwards, A New Dictionary of Political Analysis (London: 
Edward Arnold Inc., 1991), p. 66,  David, Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics 
(London; New York: Penguin Books, 1993), pp. 240, 396-397, Jack C. Plano, Robert E. Riggs 
and Helenan S. Robin, The Dictionary of Political Analysis (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio 
Inc., 1982),  p. 61.  
 
12 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups in the United States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 
1-6. 
 
13 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups,  p. 173. 
 
14 Joel Krieger and [et al.]  (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 433. 
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consensus, contributing to the policy-making process, implementing laws and the 
like.15 There are several tactics available to interest groups in democracy: control 
of information and expertise, electoral activity, use of economic power, public 
information campaign, violence and disruption, legal action and etc. Interest 
groups, to actualize their raison d’être, often resort to such direct actions as mass 
rallies, letters to politicians and press, committee negotiations, deputations to 
government agencies, campaigning for the election of sympathetic candidates or 
the recruitment of existing legislators, cooperation with official institutions and 
lobbying.16  
In short, there are also considerable differences in the acceptance of 
interest groups in different countries parallel to: (1) the attitude prevailing 
towards interest groups in the political culture; (2) the degree to which interest 
groups achieve a high density of membership; (3) the degree of unity or 
fragmentation of interest groups; (4) the degree to which interest groups play a 
prominent role in policymaking; (5) the tactics of interest groups; (6) the 
differences in constitutions and political institutions and (7) the institutional 
focus of interest groups.17 
 1.4. Interest Group Power Variables 
 
Interest groups need to be influential to survive and attract new members. 
In this context, Williams Keefe saw group power as a function of several factors 
including its size, its volume of financial resources, the cohesiveness of its 
membership, the skills of its leadership, its prestige, the geographical distribution 
                                                 
15 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups, p. 8. 
 
16 David Robertson, A Dictionary of Modern Politics (London: Europa Publications, 1993),  p. 
241.  
 
17 Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups,  pp. 18-23. 
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of its membership, the group’s determination and intensity, its ability to form 
alliances, and the compatibility of its purposes with the traditional values of 
society.18 Similarly, J. A. Thurber notes,  
The power of interest groups depends on their resources 
(such as money, total  membership, and the dispersion of 
members) and their ability to transform those resources (such 
as leadership and communication) into action toward an 
objective (such as passage of a law or regulations) without 
resistance from other actors (such as groups and government 
institutions).19 
 
 
One variable concerning a group’s ability to influence the policymaking 
process relates to the amount of emphasis it places on participating in 
policymaking through formal and informal ways. Financial capacity is one 
obvious variable that will demonstrate a group’s propensity to participate and 
subsequently influence policy.20 Financial resources offer advantages such as 
allowing interest groups to hire staff, develop expertise, participate on advisory 
committees, and pursue other efforts to influence policy. Therefore, an interest 
group’s budget dedicated to lobbying policymaking agencies is an important 
element in demonstrating a group commitment to this area of policy 
development.  
The ability to form coalitions with other groups also has an impact on the 
ability to influence the political agency. One would therefore expect that a group, 
more successful in forming coalitions, has a greater ability to influence rule 
making. Influence may vary because of the different amount of resources 
                                                 
18 William Keefe, Congress and  the American People, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1988), pp. 32-33. 
 
19 J. A. Thurber, “Dynamics of Policy Subsystems in American Politics” in Allan J. Cigler and 
Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics, (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 1983), p. 338.   
 
20 Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 14. 
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available, the opportunities to influence the executive branch, and the propensity 
for some kinds of groups to concentrate on the executive branch more than 
others.21  
The legitimacy of an organization also affects its ability to influence the  
policymaking process. Legitimacy serves as a measure of credibility and 
knowledge of the political arena and policy. Although legitimacy may be a 
difficult concept to operationalize, the age of an organization may represent a 
good substitute. One would expect that the older the group the more legitimate it 
is in the eyes of policy makers. Older groups have had more time to gather 
information, make contacts, understand the governmental process, and learn the 
ropes of policy making. Long life also suggests more influence on the rule-
making process.22  
The size of an interest group membership may also affect its influence. A 
large membership may provide substantial resources and a certain amount of 
legitimacy to the organization although a large membership may be difficult to 
mobilize. Therefore, larger membership will increase an interest group’s ability 
to influence the policymaking process. One would therefore expect that as a 
group’s access increases, so its ability to influence rulemaking increases.23 
However, the large group size may affect the cohesion among group members 
negatively, which increases the free-rider problem. Thus, in small size groups, 
members easily develop the causal relation between their individual contribution 
and the attainment of collective goods to be obtained. This provides the 
                                                 
21 Scott R. Furlong, “Interest Group Influence on Rule Making,”  pp. 327-328. 
 
22 Ibid.,  p. 329. 
 
23 Ibid.,  p. 330. 
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elimination of the free-rider problem and increases the attraction of the group for 
potential members. 
1.5. Literature Review on Interest Groups 
 
The US-American political scientists have mostly shaped the literature on 
interest groups. Moreover, interest groups have been significant throughout the 
history of US politics. Yet, political scientists have regularly debated the 
meaning of interest groups for understanding a country’s political processes. 
Writers such as Arthur Bentley,24 Elmer Er Schattschneider,25 David B. 
Truman,26 Earl Latham,27 Robert A. Dahl,28 Mancur Olson,29 Grant McConnell,30 
Theodore J. Lowi,31 Robert H. Salisbury,32 Norman Frolich, Joe Oppenheimer, 
Oran R. Young,33 James Q. Wilson,34 Jeffrey M. Berry,35 Terry M. Moe,36 Russel 
                                                 
24 Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1908). 
 
25 Elmer Er Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (New York: Arno, 1935) and 
Elmer Er   Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960). 
 
26 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). 
 
27 Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: A Study in Basing Point Legislation (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1952). 
 
28 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961). 
 
29 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
 
30 Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1966). 
 
31 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States  (New 
York: Norton, 1979). 
 
32 Robert H. Salisbury, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,’ Midwest Journal of Political 
Science, 1 (1969), pp. 1-32. 
 
33 Norman Frolich, Joe Oppenheimer and Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and Collective 
Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). 
 
34 James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
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Hardin37 and Jack L. Jr. Walker38 conceptualized interest groups to be at the core 
of the political system in their studies.39  
Traditional studies on interest groups basically derived from the “group 
theory of politics.”  This approach conceived politics as a process of allocation of 
social values and resources. Thus, this process could be separated through 
examination of the groups taking part in and potentially influencing the decision-
making process.40  
Interest groups were conceptualized as providing a mediating structure 
standing between the state and the citizen. Bentley’s studies opened up a new 
chapter in group theory of politics and were later elaborated by Truman and 
Latham. Ultimately, their attempts aimed at understanding politics from the 
perspective of interest groups rather than developing theoretical arguments on 
interest groups. Thus, Truman defined interest groups as “any group that on the 
basis of one or more shared attitudes makes certain claims upon other groups in 
society for the establishment, maintenance or enhancement of form of behavior 
that are implied by shared attitudes.”41  
                                                                                                                                    
 
35 Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying  for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
 
36 Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamics of Political 
Interest Groups (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980). 
 
37 Russel Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
 
38 Jack L. Jr. Walker, “The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America” American 
Political Science Review, 1983, Vol. 77, pp. 390-406 and Jack L. Jr. Walker, Mobilizing Interest 
Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1991). 
 
39 Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, “The Multiple Ambiguities of ‘Counteractive 
Lobbying’” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 40, No. 20, May 1996, p. 521. 
 
40 Ibid.,  p. 520. 
 
41 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process,  p. 33. 
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The literature on social movements developed along a parallel path. In the 
1950s and 1960s, analysts generally attributed the emergence of social protest 
movements to some kind of societal dysfunction paving the path for the 
emergence of interest groups. Social protest, a form of expression seen as 
entirely distinct from conventional interest group participation, was the product 
of some kind of social breakdown, a function of anomie, of society’s failure to 
provide “intermediary associations” “relative deprivation,” or some kind of 
“aggregate psychological disorder.”42  
Truman related the creation of organizations and participation of people 
with their desire to protect their interests vis-à-vis disturbances and changes in 
their social environment.43 Then, such disturbances and changes in the socio-
economic medium will consequently result in the disequilibria in the set of 
organized groups as well as the emergence of new organizations to re-establish 
the balance. Truman’s disturbance theory, suggesting that interest groups are 
organized to protect a threatened interest, has received the most extended 
attention.  
Truman exemplified “disturbances” rather than giving a clear-cut 
definition of the concept. He cited recessions, wars, inflation, discrimination, and 
increased governmental activity as phenomena that have generated group 
formation. To demonstrate his theory, Truman examined the history of major 
farm groups in the Untied States. He argued that the National Grange, the 
Farmers Alliance, the Farm Bureau, and the Farmers Union all emerged between 
                                                 
42 Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1963); Eric Hoffer, The 
True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper & Row, 1951); 
William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959); Ted 
Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24. 
 
43 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process,  pp. 57-61. 
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1867 and 1900 “out of the increased interaction of farmers in response to intense 
disturbances of their accustomed behavior.”44  
Truman specifically gave voice to the post-war pluralist notion that 
interest group participation in the political process is an inherent characteristic of 
the US-American system and he traced the origins of interest groups to their 
external political environment. Truman argued that two interrelated processes 
lead to group formation. The first was “societal change” meaning that society 
evolves and becomes more complex in which new interests emerge while others 
fade. However, societal change alone cannot account for group mobilization. The 
unorganized constituencies become organized as a result of general societal 
change and specific “disturbances” derive individuals to support group 
endeavors. In short, Truman argued that individuals reacting to social change 
and/or disturbances with shared interests band together to stabilize relations 
among themselves when these interests are threatened. In this framework, 
Truman took an optimistic view of the natural wisdom of society that competing 
groups will spontaneously arise and an “invisible hand” will secure social checks 
and balances, stability, reasonable share for all.45 
In this context, Truman’s disturbance theory helps us partially to 
understand the emergence of MÜSİAD. The transformation of Turkish political 
economy during the 1980s brought several disturbances resulting in a societal 
change and prompted new interests and their organizations. The implementation 
of liberal policies in the economic field paved the path for the emergence of new 
entrepreneurs of small and middle size firms prospering in this decade. Despite 
the liberalization policies, the state kept its importance in the economy. These 
                                                 
44 Ibid.,  p. 87.  
 
45 Ibid.,  p. 33. 
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new entrepreneurs were not given access to state resources, which oriented them 
to organize in a new business association, MÜSİAD, at the beginning of the 
1990s.  
In the 1960s, scholars began questioning Truman’s disturbance theory 
prompted by Clark and Wilson’s decisive study “Incentive Systems: A Theory of 
Organizations,” 46 and Mancur Olson’s Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods 
and the Theory of Groups, began to examine how groups overcome the 
substantial barriers to mobilization. Political scientists increasingly turned their 
attention to the internal dynamics of interest groups rather than Truman’s 
external factors. A number of scholars began to push the field back to the study 
of lobbying and other influence-seeking activities47 since Truman’s disturbance 
                                                 
46 Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations” 
Administrative Studies Quarterly, 1961, Vol. 6. No. 2,  pp. 129-166. 
 
47 Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People; J. David Gopoian, “What makes PACs Tick? An 
Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups” American Journal of Political 
Science, 1984, Vol. 28, pp. 259-281; Andrew S. McFarland, Common Cause: Lobbying in the 
Public Interest (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1984); Richard Smith, “Advocacy, Interpretation, 
and Influence in the U.S. Congress” American Political Science Review, 1984, Vol. 78, pp. 44-
63; John R. Wright, “PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective” 
American Political Science Review, 1985, Vol. 78, pp. 400-414; John R. Wright, “Contributions, 
Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives” American Political 
Science Review, 1990, Vol. 84, pp. 417-438; Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, 
Organized Interests and American Democracy; Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, 
“Organized Interests and Agenda-Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court” American Political Science 
Review, 1988, Vol. 82, pp. 1109-1127; Janet M. Grenzke, “PACs and the Congressional 
Supermarket: The Currency is Complex” American Journal of Political Science, 1989, Vol. 33, 
pp. 1-24; David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: the Political Power of Business in America (New 
York: Basic Books, 1989); William P. Browne, “Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches: A 
Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain” Journal of Politics, 1990, Vol. 52, pp. 477-509; 
Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, “ ‘Buying Time’ Moneyed Interests and the 
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees” American Political Science Review, 1990, 
Vol. 84, pp. 797-820; John Mark Hansen, Gaining access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-
1981 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991); Jack L. Jr. Walker, Mobilizing Interest Groups 
in America; Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at 
Common Cause (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Ainsworth, “Regulating 
Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence” Journal of Politics, 1993, Vol. 55, pp. 41-56; Scott 
Ainsworth and Itai Sened, “The Role of Lobbyists: Entrepreneurs with Two Audiences” 
American Journal of Political Science, 1993, Vol. 37, pp. 834-866; William P. Browne and Won 
K. Paik, “Beyond the Domain: Recasting Network Politics in the Post-reform Congress” 
American Journal of Political Science, 1993, Vol. 37, pp. 1054-1078; Kevin B. Grier and 
Michael C. Munger, “Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate 
Incumbents, 1980-1986” Journal of Politics, 1993, Vol. 55, pp. 615-643; John P. Heinz, Edward 
O. Lauman, Robert L. Nelson and Robert Salisbury, The Hollow Core: Private Interests in 
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theory was a demand-side theory focusing on the conditions under which 
individuals will join in a collective action. Supply was not an issue due to the fact 
that societal conditions would produce a demand for group formation to 
materialize which formed the skeleton of these studies.  
Olson emerged as a devastating critique of Truman’s disturbance theory 
and reasoned that individuals are not to organize for their collective interests 
unless problems of collective action are properly solved through “selective 
benefits.” Olson argued that selective -mainly material incentives exclusively 
available to members- benefits are the most critical resource that a political 
organization could have. Olson also reasoned that there are significant barriers to 
group formation. Primary among them is the “free-rider” instinct among 
individuals. Rational individuals often will not participate in collective activities 
if they can enjoy the benefits without doing so.48 In short, he observed the 
availability of the common good for free-riders as the obstacle to participation in 
collective action. 
Olson basically disagreed with Truman’s correlation between the 
proliferation of associations and the social disturbances because he found 
subordination of individual interest to group interest insufficient to explain 
voluntary associations. Moreover, Olson criticized the overemphasis of the 
commonality of individual interests in the formation of collective action, which 
de-emphasizes the act of a rational individual to obtain collective goods. In sum, 
                                                                                                                                    
National Policymaking; Lucig H. Danielian and Benjamin I. Page, “The Heavenly Chorus: 
Interest Group Voices on TV News” American Journal Of Political Science, 1994, Vol. 38, pp. 
1056-1078; Kevin B. Grier, Michael C. Munger and Brian E. Roberts, “The Determinants of 
Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986” American Political Science Review, 1994, Vol. 89, pp. 
797-820. 
 
48 Anthony J. Nownes and Grant Neeley, “Public Interest Group Entrepreneurship and Theories 
of Group Mobilization” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 49, No.1 March 1996, p. 120. 
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he argued that it is foolish to assume that disturbances will stimulate group 
formation without taking the cost of participation in a group for an individual 
into consideration whether in time, money or labor.  
Olson argued that no rational individual would assume these costs unless 
two conditions are met: (1) the likely benefits resulting from participation exceed 
benefits achieved without participation and (2) benefits exceed the costs of 
membership and participation. The precise reason behind these two constraints 
proved is the so-called free-rider problem that occurs when a collective good is 
sought. Because such goods are non-divisible, all regardless of whether or not 
they participated can share them equally. In addition, since collective goods 
appeal to such a potentially broad population, the perceived advantage to the 
group by any single individual’s membership will likely be calculated as 
insignificant. Thus, the costs of membership would most often be seen as 
outweighing benefits.  
For interests seeking collective goods, therefore, neither of the 
aforementioned conditions for participation are likely to be met. The only way in 
which a potential group could get around this dilemma and attract members, for 
Olson, was if: (1) exclusive selective benefits -available only to members, such 
as magazines, discounts, travel, insurance and etc.- are offered in addition to the 
group’s collective goals; (2) memberships is made compulsory, or (3) the group 
is small enough to allow any individual’s impact upon the achievement of the 
group’s objectives seem sufficiently noticeable so that the benefits of 
participation would be seen to outweigh the costs. 49 Parallel to Olson, MÜSİAD 
offered exclusive selective benefits such as periodicals, mass travels to foreign 
                                                 
49 Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action,  pp. 1-52. 
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countries, conferences, panels and karz-ı-hasen, a special interest-free lending 
system, to overcome the free-rider problem. 
Olson’s theoretical success was based on its significance on initiating an 
ample literature on the collective action problem formulating significant barriers 
to interest group formation, ignored in Truman’s disturbance theory. His theory 
also stressed incentive structure as an important determinant of interest group’s 
ability to mobilize and survive while appealing to supporters.50 
In the aftermath of Olson’s famous book, the scholarship on interest 
groups has developed by both assuming that an inherent link exists between the 
external purposes of a group and the means by which it attracts members. 
Rational choice theorists conceived of interest groups as working for policies that 
enable them to provide selective benefits to their members, typically at the 
expense of non-members. At about the same time, however, another group of 
scholars, struck by the rapid growth of public interest groups, focused on the 
tendency of some groups to pursue collective goods that did not selectively 
benefit their members. Rather, members joined because they agreed with the 
public goods preferences of the group. At the very least, the absence of the 
members’ insistence on selective material benefits enabled such organizations to 
pursue policies involving larger public goods.51 Subsequent studies have 
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demonstrated that individuals also respond to a variety of “extra-rational” 
incentives including efficacy, fairness, civic duty and morality52 as well as 
solitary benefits -social rewards that derive from associating in group activities. 
Thus, purposive benefits -rewards associated with ideological or issue-oriented 
goals- also play an important role in motivating group membership.53 Moreover, 
empirical studies have shown that many individuals join groups to receive non-
economic benefits such as fun, camaraderie, and a good feeling derived from 
promoting a worthwhile cause.54 
We can observe the importance of purposive benefits in the development 
of MÜSİAD, with reference to Islam and locality. MÜSİAD referred to Islamic 
morality and Anadoluluk to develop the group identity as “outsiders” that could 
not get close to state resources. This approach shaped the name of the 
organization as “independent” and MÜSİAD leader cadre claimed that the great 
tycoons of Turkey have been dependent on the Turkish state. MÜSİAD also 
benefited from a reinterpretation of Sufism with its market-oriented comment of 
Islam. This interpretation was heavily blended with reference to communal 
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bonds similar to the East Asian development model as well as issue-oriented 
goals of more export and developing their own business. MÜSİAD also provided 
friendship among members by organizing picnics, pilgrimage and umre tours. 
Critics of Olson approached the world of interest groups as a far more 
diverse and complex place, full of varied and multi-dimensional group structures 
and incentives, to organize. Perhaps the starkest evidence of the deficiencies of 
Olson’s model, according to critics, has been the massive proliferation of interest 
groups since the political, social and economic conjecture of 1970s, what 
Mahood calls the “participation revolution.”55 Olson’s portrait of the individual 
as “a fully rational actor” with a near-perfect knowledge of costs and benefits has 
been quite suspicious for his critics. A number of influential studies have 
challenged this assumption in fields ranging from voting behavior to bureaucratic 
behavior and public policy.56 Rather than the fully “rational minimizer of costs” 
and “maximizer of benefits,” William Kelso wonders if man, as a “social animal 
of limited rationality and limited knowledge,” is a bit more prone to the 
influences of emotion, ideology, fear, spite, altruism, or obligation than Olson 
would allow.57 This is why people also organize in public interest groups 
although they get nothing as benefit. 
Critics of Olson also observed that there are obvious structural changes in 
interest group organization that Olson did not foresee such as agents, alliances, 
patronage, and etc. Beyond these, the theory of selective incentives could be 
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more useful in understanding only certain types of organizations in certain 
situations, namely those which feature a clear free-rider problem such as trade 
unions on behalf of better wages. However, organizing on behalf of ecological 
goals has far less visible and quantifiable benefits. Their advocates also see these 
goals and benefits as being crucially important. As a result, the free-rider 
problem may not emerge since e.g. environmentalists would not mind sharing the 
benefits of clean air with the ones who did not contribute towards that goal. 
Thus, the intangibility and perceived overwhelming significance of such benefits 
are probably enough to convince concerned individuals that their small share on 
behalf of the cause is worth making.58  
Critics continued that rather than merely being aggregations of co-equal 
individuals seeking a given benefit; interest groups can be seen as having 
considerable differentiation among their membership, with some members 
significantly more important than others. For example, scholars have long 
stressed the role of the entrepreneur whose skill, risk-taking, and dedication to a 
cause or goal is said to have the potential to add a huge and crucial element of 
support.59 Some also focused on the group’s leader, whose job it is to design and 
administer a group’s founding structure.60  Students of interest groups also noted 
that groups are increasingly reliant upon professional agents such as lawyers, 
lobbyists, or consultants who are often quite skillful at achieving influence or 
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effective mobilization.61 In many cases, it is the skill of such agents rather than a 
group’s overall membership or resources, which determines group success. 
Where do(es) an interest group’s incentive structure(s) come from? Who 
makes decisions regarding the mix of benefits offered to members? Robert H. 
Salisbury answered, “the group entrepreneur … [who] invests his capital to 
create a set of benefits which he offers at a price to a market.”62 Instead of 
focusing on what motivates members to support interest groups, Salisbury 
focused on the entrepreneur who administers and designs a group’s incentive 
structure. Salisbury argued that the group’s survival rests upon a mutually 
advantageous exchange of benefits between the group leader and group 
supporters. Thus, Salisbury’s exchange theory acknowledged that a successful 
group needs a leader able to choose that “right” mix of benefits to offer 
supporters.  
Salisbury centralized the entrepreneur and conceptualized interest groups 
as exchange relationships between entrepreneurs and members. The entrepreneur 
invests group resources as benefits offered to the members.63 The group 
entrepreneur obtains a good job at a good wage, power, prestige and personal 
fulfillment while group members receive three types of benefits: material, 
solitary, and purposive. Material benefits are tangible rewards such as goods or 
services that have monetary value, solitary benefits are social rewards that derive 
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from associating in-group activities and purposive benefits are rewards that stem 
from involvement in a group that pursues collective goods.64  
The entrepreneur determines group constituency and increases the 
awareness of group members’ collective identity. The construction and 
perpetuation of group identity is dependent on the relations of power, distribution 
of resources, and dominant norms within the group. This identity including 
common mentality, behaviors, and ceremonies alleviates the free-rider problem 
and mobilizes collective action.  Social identities based on religion, norms and 
ideology form the basis of interest group organization. This understanding is 
quite valid in the identity formation of MÜSİAD shaped with reference to 
Islamic moral values. In short, Salisbury stated that the quality of the 
entrepreneurship/group leadership is the crucial variable in determining the 
interest group formation. Ultimately, group survival depends upon a mutually 
beneficial exchange between a group entrepreneur and group members as Wilson 
stated: “whatever else organizations seek, they seek to survive.”65 Thus, an 
entrepreneur’s primary goal is to ensure group survival. 
But what else do entrepreneurs seek? First, the typical entrepreneur wants 
the organization to exercise policy influence. Second, entrepreneurs value 
autonomy from members. Thus, investing resources for a maximum return does 
not necessarily mean seeking support designed to yield a maximum monetary 
return. The rational calculus of maintenance of the entrepreneur includes more 
than simply survival. It balances the desire to ensure group survival with the 
desires to maintain autonomy and to exercise policy influence. In the search for 
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income maintenance and in expenditure decisions, entrepreneurs are careful to 
consider how a given decision will affect the group’s policy influence. Thus, they 
seek out sources of support that do not threaten or harm the group’s policy 
influence. Salisbury suggested that the roles of the organizer and the entrepreneur 
might be conceptually identical. Thus, it is the job of both the organizer and the 
entrepreneur to adjust an incentive structure to attract financial support for group 
mobilization and survival.66 However, some studies of group development 
argued that group mobilization and group maintenance are radically different 
processes.67  
The basic exchange theory framework had a critical defect in 
underestimating the role of external patrons within group formation. Empirical 
studies of group formation suggested that many groups, especially public interest 
groups, rely heavily upon patron’s “seed money.” Exchange theory was 
appealing because it focused on overcoming the barriers to group formation, 
which relies heavily upon the effort and abilities of the group entrepreneurs.  
In short, when we compare these three theories we observe that Truman’s 
disturbance theory had argued that societal change creates conditions for interest 
group formation. However, Olson’s collective action theory underlined the 
importance of exclusive selective benefits to overcome the free-rider problem in 
the emergence of interest groups. Salisbury’s exchange theory suggested the 
examination of group incentive structures and entrepreneurial activity to explain 
interest group formation and mobilization. 
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Beside the theoretical framework delineated above, interest groups could 
be basically classified into two categories of public and economic interest 
groups. Interest group scholars theoretically support the advantage of economic 
oriented interest groups, particularly business associations, in obtaining 
influence. They believe that the limited scope associated with business groups 
facilitate efforts to influence policy68 since every policy is weighed by its 
anticipated impact on economic development.69 Economic interest groups are for 
particular economic interests. Business associations and labor unions are the 
main examples of economic interest groups that depend on membership fees for 
mobilization and survival. Thus, economic interest groups need to satisfy their 
members in order to attract new ones. The economic theory of regulation 
maintains that political processes can be analyzed as the interaction of rational 
utility maximizing politicians and constituents who exchange wealth transfers for 
votes and money. The politicians allocate benefits across interests so as to 
maximize votes or net wealth.70 Therefore, interest groups associated with 
business interests will have more influence on rulemaking than citizen groups.  
Public interest groups, on the other hand, are organized to demand a 
public good for the benefit of all people rather than group members. They might 
be dependent upon patron support for mobilization but they have to develop a 
membership basis for survival. At the below, I will discuss public interest groups 
and try to explore if MÜSİAD carries public interest group characteristics.  
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1.6. Public Interest Groups 
 
Jeffrey Berry notes that public interest groups “seek a collective good, the 
achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership 
or activists of the organization.”71 Although Olson’s “free rider” seems to annul 
possibilities for emergence of groups explicitly concerned with collective goods, 
public interest groups form, survive, and advocate policy change.72 Indeed, 
members of such groups derive satisfaction from participating, often even in the 
absence of selective benefits. This suggests that some individuals are willing to 
make personal sacrifices in order to participate in public interest advocacy. They 
may indeed view political participation not as a cost, but as a benefit in itself. 
The circumstances under which large numbers of people are willing to take this 
view, however, are limited both in occurrence and duration.73  
For most public interest groups, Walker argued, mobilization is 
dependent upon attracting patronage, not members. Downplaying the role of 
entrepreneurship Walker concluded “…a successful set of political organizations 
representing a constituency will not come into being, no matter how energetic the 
leaders of the movements may be, unless institutions can be identified that will 
serve as sponsors or patrons for their efforts.”74  
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Walker found that most of the public interest groups in the US received 
large donors in the form of seed money from foundations, the federal 
government, or corporations.  He also found that many public interest groups rely 
heavily upon patrons for maintenance income.75 Group founders, whether they 
are recruited by patrons or activated by disturbances, are high-status individuals. 
Thus, anything that expands the entrepreneurial pool indirectly stimulates group 
activity. Patrons are responsible for some group formation. Thus, Walker states 
that the proliferation of public interest groups is attributable partially to patron 
activity.76  
Patrons are crucial for initial mobilization for public interest groups. 
However, the key to long-term survival is the ability to maintain a large 
membership base that can be drawn on dues and large contributions.77 Walker 
argued that most public interest groups depended more on patrons than on 
members for survival. He indicated that without patrons they would consist 
solely of a “small set of highly unstable insurgent groups.”78 Thus, studies of 
group mobilization continued to focus on group supporters -the patrons and 
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members who provide groups with the resources they need.79 Similarly, Walker80 
suggested that while virtually all public interest groups receive substantial patron 
support in the earliest stages of their development, many older, more established 
groups receive little or no patron support. Finally, there is no compelling 
theoretical reason to believe that the mobilization and maintenance processes 
resemble one another. For example, decisions that make sense at the earliest 
stages of group development such as not to seek members or to abstain from 
lobbying may not make sense later.81 Thus, there is a gap in the literature on 
group development. While the importance of patrons in group formation and 
maintenance is universally accepted, there has been little attention focused upon 
the increasingly relevant group-patron exchange.  
What can threaten a group’s policy influence? One possible answer is 
loss of credibility. Credibility could be threatened when a group becomes too 
dependent on patronage that does not represent real constituents. Credibility 
could be lost when the group takes money from patrons that are unpopular with 
its members and primary patron supporters.82 
Walker approaches the question of group formation from a novel 
perspective. While he accepts the exchange theory framework and all it implies 
about the importance of the entrepreneur, he breaks rank with other scholars 
when he argues that it is the patrons, not the members, upon which entrepreneurs 
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rely for funds.83 However, he dismisses the impact of disturbances when he 
states: “Political action is seldom a spontaneous outburst growing out of 
frustration, anxiety, or personal tension.”84 Patronage is absolutely crucial to 
group mobilization, however, it is less important for interest group maintenance. 
In short, not patronage but membership is the key to successful long-term 
maintenance for most public interest group. Thus, it is a mistake to conclude that 
a public interest group cannot survive without patron support.  
Most public interest groups believe that members are the key to 
influencing public policy rather than leaning on patron and thus spend an 
inordinate amount of group resources on seeking member support. Patronage is 
an important part of many public interest groups’ long-term survival strategy. 
But members are absolutely critical to long term survival because they provide 
the most stable and dependable source of long-term financial support especially 
during financially rough times. Government patronage is not dependable either, 
because of the volatile nature of politics. In short, the trendy nature of external 
patrons makes entrepreneurs reluctant to rely too heavily on them. A membership 
base, however, is more stable, dependable and reliable.85 Finally, any compiling 
explanation of public interest group mobilization must take patronage into 
account. They also need to develop a membership base for group survival in the 
long run. 
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Consequently, MÜSİAD being an economic oriented interest group has 
shown some public interest group characteristics, e.g. seeking the revival of 
Islamic civilization as a collective good. Some prominent MÜSİAD members 
have functioned as patrons sponsoring activities such as international fair 
organizations. Moreover, MÜSİAD like most public interest groups paid 
attention to develop a large membership basis in order to survive.  
1.7. Modalities of Interest Representation   
 
In this section, I will highlight interest groups politics through the 
comparative literature of modalities of interest representation as pluralism, 
corporatism and clientelism to understand the relations of state and economic 
interest groups in general, and business associations in particular. 
 
1.7.1. Pluralism 
 
Pluralism is conceptualized as a condition in which political power is 
dispersed amongst a wide variety of social groups. Schmitter defines pluralism 
as: 
A system of interest representation in which the constituent 
units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, 
voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-
determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which 
are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or 
otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest 
articulation by the state and which do not exercise a 
monopoly of representational activity within their respective 
categories.86 
 
According to the pluralist model, interests groups are numerous and 
autonomous. Pluralist interest group politics is relatively permeable to the entry 
of new groups, and groups arise and get involved in politics at their own 
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initiative rather than at the command of the state. In pluralism, interest groups 
have the freedom of choosing political battles and political arenas to fight 
against.  
Pluralism pictures politics through the interaction of interest groups based 
on individual members’ interests. However, pluralists do not develop a clear-cut 
conception of collective good and are skeptical about the state’s ability in 
generating collective goods. The role of the state is to maintain the market 
process without interfering87 while functioning as a mediator/arbiter among 
organized interests as the “helpless victim of interest groups.” Pluralism idealizes 
“a sociopolitical system in which the power of the state is shared with a large 
number of groups, interest organizations and individual members represented.”88 
Thus, the state is not a constituent part of interests but it rather remains external 
to those interests, setting boundaries, rules and incentives. Briefly, pluralism puts 
forward that a socio-economic equilibrium could be achieved through freely 
competing interest groups without state intervention in distribution of collective 
goods and thus largely reduces the role of the state.  
Pluralists admit the influence of business associations on policy decisions 
in capitalist democracies. However, interests of politicians and bureaucratic 
cadres and counter-groups could counterweigh in restraining the domination of 
business.89 Dahl defined a dynamic pluralist society based on the dispersion of 
political resources, strategic locations, and finally bargaining positions. Then, the 
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numerical and/or financial power of interest groups is not sufficient to explain 
indeterminate policy outcomes if environmental conjecture providing 
opportunities and constraints are not taken into account.90  
 
1.7.2. Corporatism 
 
Corporatism is the institutional fusion of political representation and 
economic intervention.91 Corporatism is applied to the structured representation 
of functional interests in the process of policymaking and this refers to the 
interdependence of the interest groups and the state. Schmitter defines 
corporatism as: 
A system of interest representation in which the constituent 
units are organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed 
(if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories 
in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection 
of leaders and articulation of demands and supports.92 
 
As to the emergence of corporatism, Philippe C. Schmitter proposes that  
“corporatism (in its ‘societal’ or ‘state’ varieties) seems to be related to certain 
basic imperatives or needs of capitalism to reproduce the conditions for its 
existence and continuity to accumulate further resources.”93  
Individuals in the corporatist paradigm are only allowed to pursue their 
own interests and enjoy the right and guarantee of private property as long as 
they serve social solidarity and do not violate public interest. In such context, 
state occupies a central place vis-à-vis interest groups as the “[s]tate may not be 
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an arena for which they [interest groups] compete but a constitutive element 
engaged in defining, distorting, encouraging, regulating, licensing and/or 
repressing the activities of associations.”94 This relationship between the state 
and the interest groups determines the dominant authority and relative autonomy 
of the former over the latter. The structuration of interest groups is partly if not 
completely determined by  
[t]he public policy towards associations and political culture. 
This means the direct impact of the state in shaping or 
initiating group development and the importance of certain 
enduring attitudes and values, particularly among the political 
elite and the associational leadership in influencing the group 
behavior.95 
 
In corporatist theory, society should consist neither of isolated individuals 
nor of hostile classes but rather of corporations. These vertically organized 
bodies would structure the social order on the basis of their own economic and 
social functions. Each corporation would represent a group with a common 
function in the social division of labor, and individuals would act socially and 
relate to each other through the corporations to which they belonged. At the level 
of politics the state should be organized on a corporate basis with the 
representation of citizens indirectly through the corporations, but not as 
individual electors. These corporations would also exercise controlling and 
regulatory functions on their individual members in addition to their 
representational role. Moreover, theorists of corporatism such as Schmitter and 
Drucker argue that the corporations are the primary actors in the political 
process. Thus, in some states, e.g. Austria and Sweden, corporations are granted 
                                                 
94 Philippe C. Schmitter, “Reflections on Where the Theory of Neo-Corporatism Was Gone and 
Where the Praxis of Neo-Corporatism May Be Going” in Patterns of Corporatist Policy Making, 
Gerhard Lechmburch and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982),  p. 260.  
 
95 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey,  pp. 28-29. 
 
 39
institutional recognition with corporate interests involved in both the formulation 
and the execution of policy, so combining representative and administrative 
roles.96 
In sum, corporatists advocate a system, combining private property with  
the rejection of socially disruptive market forces. Thus, corporatism was 
presented as a third way, an alternative to both capitalism and socialism.  
The corporatist institutions were invariably associated with fascism in 
Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. However, current usage identifies a 
distinction between state or authoritarian corporatism -found in such systems as 
Salazar’s Portugal or Franco’s Spain- and liberal/societal or neo-corporatism -
emerged increasingly within capitalist democracies. Neo-corporatism in 
advanced capitalist societies develops as a consequence of the growing 
monopoly power of interest organizations. However, authoritarian corporatism is 
a design imposed by the state.  
Neo-corporatism arises from the tendency for interest organizations in 
mature capitalist countries to develop representational monopolies. Its 
preconditions include centralized interest organizations representing both capital 
and labor. These organizations have the capacity to apply coercive sanctions 
against members who break the terms of collective agreements. Where neo-
corporatism has developed most fully, it is often under social democratic 
governments. These governments have compensated for the structural weakness 
of labor compared to capital by ensuring some form of parity for labor 
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organizations in corporatist institutions.97 Thus, we often label countries neo-
corporatist in which single interest groups -licensed, recognized or encouraged 
by the state- enjoy the right to represent their sector of society. These interest 
groups work in partnership with the government in both the formulation and 
implementation of public policies.  
Neo-corporatism should be distinguished from the traditional corporatism 
of pre-industrial Europe, the authoritarian corporatism of the fascist type. In 
fascist regimes, like Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, the state regulated 
and controlled the political and economic life through the medium of 
occupational groups, by placing itself above them. The occupational groups, 
which were hierarchically ordered and nationwide in character, had no legal 
independent personality. The officers of these corporations had to provide a 
guarantee of loyalty to the state. Hence, the occupational groups, unlike in neo-
corporatism, were not empowered to protect the rights of individuals indirectly.  
Authoritarian corporatism describes a number of political regimes in 
Latin America, including post-1964 Brazil, Mexico and Peru, and also the 
dictatorships of Mussolini and Salazar. The limited extent of liberal democracy 
and popular participation, the dominance of a ruling elite and their relatively 
undeveloped industrial economies mark these systems. Corporatist institutions 
permit the disciplining and control of the labor, while allowing relatively 
inefficient and backward industrial interests a considerable degree of protection 
from international competition. Licensed associations are created as 
intermediaries between the state and economic producers, which have the effect 
of restricting the independent organizational activities of producer groups. 
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In authoritarian corporatism, it is the state that controls or grants 
recognition to occupational groups. Thus unlike neo-corporatism, the state’s task 
is not to regulate, but organize, even impose, cooperation in its relations with 
interest groups. Theoretically, in authoritarian corporatism the state controls both 
business associations and trade unions. However, the state, in practice, 
subordinates and controls only trade unions for the market process to work and 
for a solution to industrial conflicts. This is because, no matter how much the 
state intervenes in the economy of a country, it has to protect and support the 
entrepreneurs for the perpetuation of capitalism.98 In short, state 
regulates/imposes labor in the interest of capital.  
The emergence of neo-corporatism is traced to the post-World War II era, 
when the task of reconstruction of war-wrecked Europe imposed the need for the 
development of effective forms of cooperation among labor, capital and the state. 
The imperative of reconstruction and development led to a situation in which the 
gap between the pursuit of class interests and its social implications was largely 
bridged.99  
The concept of neo-corporatism also went hand in hand with another 
concept called welfare state. This implied the provision of economic security for 
the overwhelming majority of the population through a large public sector and a 
considerable sense of social solidarity. Welfare state is the result of demanding to 
manage the capitalist economy through achieving steady economic growth and 
maintaining full employment within an interventionist but democratic form. As 
the burden on the government grows, its intervention in economy increases 
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accordingly while interest groups become more influential in the politico-
administrative process. Thus, the neo-corporatist models arouse interest and 
admiration during the economic and political crisis of the 1970s for their 
potential ability to cope effectively with oil shocks and inflation. 
The conditions for the existence of a neo-corporatist interest group 
system are depicted as: (1) societies in which social class has constituted an 
important division; (2) relatively few and centralized interest groups representing 
the major economic interests; (3) the willingness to compromise among interest 
group leaders and government officials; (4) the widespread acceptance of 
functional representation, i.e. the belief that people’s interests can be represented 
legitimately by economic organizations such as unions or employers’ 
organizations as well as by elected politicians and (5) a relatively centralized 
state. Such conditions for neo-corporatism are met sufficiently in relatively a few 
countries, although neo-corporatism has been a relative tendency not an absolute 
one.100 Cawson views the internal cohesion and the discipline of the business 
association in neo-corporatism through their relationship with the state because 
legitimacy and authority come from the state that the association depends on 
rather than their internal constituency.101  In this context, the centralization of 
interest groups with the state’s supervision on them emerges as a precondition for 
the emergence of neo-corporatism. 
Similarly, the presence and absence of neo-corporatism has been closely 
tied to the degree of stateness; neither a too strong nor a too weak state furnishes 
an appropriate environment for the emergence of neo-corporatism. The state 
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should be strong enough to maintain its autonomy from interest groups, yet it 
should not be so strong that the state elites can impose their own notion of public 
interest to be imposed upon society.102 In this context, the Turkish state with its 
historical legitimacy has been too strong, which provided the state elite to 
explore their own understanding of public interests. They also did not permit the 
development of particular sectoral interests. This, in turn, blocked the 
development of neo-corporatism and pluralism in Turkey. 
The state in neo-corporatism is merely the society politically organized as 
the product of social solidarity. Besides being a political agency, the state has 
also a moral and economic role. As a moral agency, the state promotes the public 
interest by guarding the overall collective conscience. Thus, this guardianship 
exists beyond and above the several occupational interests and the state keeps its 
legitimacy by serving the public interest in its daily functioning. The state does 
not hand the regulation of the economy totally in relation to its role in economy. 
The state, on the other hand, as an economic agency, has certain regulatory 
functions that it shares with occupational groups. Thus, the relations between the 
state and these groups develop on the basis of reciprocity but not subordination. 
In other words, in order to protect the public interests, the relations between the 
state and these groups emerge as the norm of cooperation on the basis of mutual 
interdependence. For instance, the state generally plays an active role in shaping 
the economic development by planning the economy as a whole or for individual 
sectors.103  
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The state also judges its decision on inter-occupational disputes. 
However, the positioning of the occupational groups between the state and the 
individuals provides the stability of the system despite disputes. The system 
might result in authoritarian corporatism when the weakly development of these 
occupational groups allows the repression of the state.104  
Public policy, in neo-corporatist countries, is made through close 
consultation with occupational groups enjoying a monopoly of rights to represent 
their constituent members. These generally highly centralized groups are 
provided with responsibilities to contribute and implement government policies. 
Thus the political decision-making process does not function according to the 
supremacy of the parliament, even parties and parliament exists. The ruling party 
or parties may be taking its decisions through approval of formally represented 
organized interest groups. 105  
Neo-corporatism, for Streeck and Schmitter, is both an effort to discipline 
the inevitable factions arising in a market economy and to arrange interest groups 
more convenient with the requirements of this market economy.106 Neo-
corporatism has become most strongly institutionalized in Austria and/or Sweden 
where a powerful labor movement has become a social partner with the peak 
employers’ association and the state in negotiating economic and social policies. 
On the other hand, authoritarian corporatism tends to be associated with 
peripheral or dependent capitalist regimes in which the state is powerful vis-à-vis 
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the labor and bourgeoisie, such as those in Latin America. In neo-corporatist 
countries, unlike the authoritarian countries, liberal political culture is still 
preserved. These countries form governments on the basis of free elections, 
enjoy democratic rights and have interest groups, which are free to withdraw 
from their partnership with the government. 
 
1.7.3. Comparison of Pluralism and Corporatism 
 
In Schmitter’s view, pluralism and corporatism share a number of basic 
assumptions: (1) the growing importance of formal associational units of 
representation; (2) the persistence and expansion of functionality differentiated 
and potentially conflicting interests; (3) the interpenetration of public decision 
areas; (4) the decline in importance of territorial and partisan representation; (5) 
the secular trend toward expansion in the scope of public policy and (6) the 
mushrooming role of permanent administrative staffs, of specialized information, 
of technical expertise and, consequently, of stable oligarchy.107 There are also 
differences between pluralism and corporatism. In a pluralist system a large 
number of voluntary associations compete with each other for members, 
resources and access to government in order to influence the direction of public 
policy. However, in a corporatist system there are a limited number of non-
competitive organizations with compulsory or semi-compulsory membership. 
These organizations have a privileged status and they co-determine public policy 
with the government. They are also responsible for its implementation by 
disciplining their members to accept bargained agreements.  
Three key features of corporatism distinguish it from pluralistic processes 
of interest group politics. The first is the monopoly role played by corporatist 
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bodies; the second is the fusion of the representative role with that of 
implementation; and the third is the presence of the state both in licensing 
monopoly representation and in co-determining policy. In pluralist theory 
interests are seen as existing before organization and political mobilization, 
whereas in corporatist theory the state is identified as a crucial agent in shaping 
interests and affecting the outcome of group processes. Pluralist theory draws a 
sharp distinction between the public and the private and interprets society as an 
aggregation of individuals. In contrast, corporatist theory focuses on 
organizations and social groups, and highlights the extent to which formally 
private bodies perform public tasks. The corporatist organizations take their 
identity from the function that they perform in the social division of labor. Thus, 
a mutually interdependent relationship between the state and certain 
organizations develops to the extent that the latter can mobilize their constituent 
membership in exchange for favorable public policy decisions.  
In neo-corporatism, the occupational groups are re-established as legally 
constituted groups. They play a social role instead of expressing only various 
combinations of particular interests like in pluralism. These occupational groups 
are positioned between the individuals and the state. They have a high degree of 
internal autonomy in the form of authority to resolve conflicts both within their 
own members and in relation to other occupational groups. They also check and 
restrain the state’s interference in their autonomy, thereby, protecting the rights 
of individuals. Thus, neo-corporatist systems of interest representation contrast 
with pluralist systems in which a multiplicity of groups often competes with each 
other to represent the same interest. These interest groups also compete with each 
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other for influence and form temporary alliances with other interest groups or 
government agencies on an ad hoc basis.  
Many democracies display mixed patterns, with some issue areas 
relatively neo-corporatist and others more pluralistic. In most countries no single 
pattern obtains for the making of policy in all issue areas. The formulation of 
foreign policy, i.e. is less likely to entail regularized bargaining with interest 
groups than is the making of agricultural policy. Hence, there may be pockets of 
pluralism or corporatism within a country that cannot be placed easily into either 
category. Whatever the variations within and across democracies, however, it is 
clear that no contemporary democracy functions without some form of private 
associational life.108 
Briefly, corporatist theory has launched a strong challenge to pluralism as 
a model of interest group politics. Moreover, it is becoming clear that 
corporatism and pluralism should not be seen as exclusive alternatives, but as 
end points on a continuum according to the extent to which monopolistic and 
interdependent relationships have shaped the interest organizations and state has 
become established.109 
1.7.4. Clientelism 
 
The clientelistic relationship is mainly based on a reciprocal exchange of 
economic and political resources with support, loyalty, votes and protection in 
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“democratic” politics.110 This reciprocal basis of the patronage-clientele relation 
provides the “voluntary” character through the expectations of mutual benefits. 
However, the patron gets more due to the inequality of the relation.111 According 
to Robert R. Kaufman,  
clientelist power relations have both an instrumental and a 
particularistic quality, which distinguishes them from a 
number of other types of authority relationships. For instance, 
there is no contractual component in the relationship as in the 
feudal authority.112  
 
In this framework, the scope of governmental activities determines the extent of 
clientelistic relationships in a society. Moreover, clientelistic distributions are 
essentially particularistic distributions, not universally accessible as the essence 
of patronage-clientele network.  
Clientelism describes informal power relations between individuals or 
groups in unequal positions, based on the exchange of benefits. Clientelism, then, 
refers to  
a personalized and reciprocal relationship between an inferior 
and a superior commanding unequal resources, moreover in 
contrast to the ideal type of bureaucratic relationship the 
norms of rationality anonymity and universalism are largely 
absent from the patron-client nexus.113  
 
Kaufman views clientelism as a special type of dyadic exchange, 
distinguishable by the following characteristics: (1) the relationship occurs 
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between actors of unequal power and status; (2) it is based on the principle of 
reciprocity - a self-regulating form of interpersonal exchange- the maintenance of 
which depends on the return of each actor’s expectations to obtain by rendering 
goods and services to the other; (3) the relationship is particularistic and private, 
anchored only loosely in public law or community norms.114 Basically, patron -a 
person with higher status- takes advantage of his/her authority and resources to 
protect and benefit client -somebody with an inferior status- who reciprocates 
with support and services. In complex societies, clientelist networks allow for 
more complex multilateral relationships. Patrons are the “gatekeepers” who 
establish the connection between the central power distributing resources to the 
masses to the extent they reciprocate. 
Political scientists distinguish between a traditional clientelism involving 
notables and a new clientelism involving organizations.115 The old clientelism is 
of a personal and affective nature. The patron relies upon his/her prestige and the 
client shows devotion and gratitude. However, the new clientelism involves only 
tangible benefits. Patrons control political organizations and use public resources 
such as employment, pensions, social benefits and etc. while clients, professional 
associations i.e., reciprocate with the vote. In each type of clientelism, 
relationships are both voluntary and coercive, based not upon collective 
solidarity, but upon particular interests. Decolonization and problems of national 
integration in developing countries increase the need for patronage of both the 
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old and new types. Clientelism also results from urbanization and immigration in 
industrial countries, leading to the destruction of traditional institutions, ethnic, 
linguistic and religious fragmentation and arbitrariness in the distribution of 
resources.116    
Patron-client systems are guided by a common logic despite variations in 
setting. They arise in hierarchical societies, where individuals and groups 
compete at each level of the hierarchy. However, there is a scope for 
collaboration between those at different levels. The link between patron and 
client is often expressed in terms of personal obligations, such as godparenthood 
and/or communal solidarity. Ethnicity in its myriad forms provides a powerful 
vehicle for clientelism because it reinforces cross-linkages as a basis for political 
action. Underlying it all, however, clientelism is an eminently rational struggle 
for control of political and economic resources that can also cut across ethnic 
barriers when the logic of competition requires.  
Clientelism nonetheless suffers detrimental defects. It is inherently 
inefficient because it is devised to meet particularistic rather than universal goals. 
It emphasizes distribution rather than production and is often “parasitic” on the 
productive economy. It erodes any appeal to common values while encouraging 
ethnic conflict and often leading to pervasive cynicism. Such political stability 
depends more on buying the support of key groups than on establishing any basis 
for legitimacy. Ultimately, clientelism must be seen as a barrier to political 
development.117  
Consequently, clientelism by definition is hierarchical, based on the 
dyadic, informally organized and particularistic relations between 
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superiors/subordinates. When clientelism integrates people in the social and 
political systems, it does so in a dyadic way, which prevents the restructuring of 
society along associational lines. A clientelist collectivity tends to be less stable 
and more fluid than other forms of association.  In corporatist and pluralist forms 
the relationship between groups and the state is controlled by the formal 
requirements of the law. On the contrary, clientelism manifests informality and 
flexibility. In sum, clientelism performs fragmented, personalized and most 
importantly uninstitutionalized forms of interest representation at different levels 
such as at government, party and/or bureaucracy. 
1.8. Conclusion 
 
This study has been framed narrow to provide an analytical framework to 
explore Turkish political economy and Turkish business associations as interest 
groups, especially MÜSİAD. Through the literature review on interest groups 
and interest groups politics above, one can easily observe similar paradigms 
among rival theories. Therefore, this study argues that formation, functioning and 
institutional relations of interest groups with each another as well as with the 
state are the results of the political-economic structure in which interest groups 
are located. Then, the state keeps itself as the most important variable to 
determine the institutional framework of interest groups. This is especially valid 
in the Turkish context due to the historical framework in which the state kept its 
strong hand on interest groups and state elite defined public interest without 
taking particular interests into consideration. 
Truman’s disturbance theory is very helpful to understand the formation 
of MÜSİAD that emerged and developed as a result of the disturbances created 
within the transformation of Turkish political economy in the 1980s and the 
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1990s. These two decades were the years of rapid change in Turkey: further 
integration into the world economy via globalization on the one hand, and 
enactment and implementation of liberal policies to form a more free-market 
economy on the other. Moreover, the emergence of Islamic politics hand in hand 
with urbanization and industrialization could be depicted as other disturbances. 
All of these opened the path for the emergence and development of new 
entrepreneurs of KOBİs organized under MÜSİAD. 
 Olson’s collective action and Salisbury’s exchange theories permit us to 
explain the remarkable development of MÜSİAD. Parallel to Olson’s arguments, 
MÜSİAD overcame the free-rider problem by exclusive selective benefits such 
as periodicals, mass travels to foreign countries, conferences, panels and special 
interest-free owning system, karz-ı-hasen, explained in detail in chapter 4. In 
addition to these material benefits, MÜSİAD largely used extra-rational benefits 
as Islamic morality, locality and the group identity as “outsiders” which could 
not get close to state resources. This approach shaped the name and ideology of 
the association strictly underlining that the great tycoons of Turkey have been 
dependent on the Turkish state. Moreover, MÜSİAD also used purposive 
benefits such as the reinterpretation of Sufism with a market-oriented 
understanding of Islam and heavy reference to communal bonds similar to the 
East Asian development model.  MÜSİAD paid attention to issue-oriented goals 
of more export and developing their own business. MÜSİAD also provided 
social opportunities among members by organizing picnics, pilgrimage and umre 
tours. MÜSİAD leadership cadre and the headquarter professional employees 
have been quite successful in exchanging these material and non-material 
benefits with members in the survival and development of the organization.  
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I have also dealt with the theories of pluralism, corporatism –its varieties 
of “neo” and “authoritarian” corporatism– and clientelism as well as their 
comparisons to identify modalities of interest group representation politics in 
general. Pluralism entails a system of interest representation in which political 
power is dispersed amongst unspecified number of voluntary, competitive, non-
hierarchically ordered social groups. Thus, the state is to function as a 
mediator/arbiter among freely competing organized interests without interfering. 
In the Turkish context, the formation of TÜSİAD in 1970s opened the path for 
the development of pluralism. However, the historical legacy of the Turkish state 
over interest groups did not provide viable options to foster pluralism in Turkey 
since the civil society has always been weak and oppressed vis-à-vis the highly 
centralized state since the Ottoman period., discussed in chapter 2. The 
implementation of liberal policies and transition to free-market economy in the 
1980s resulted in a mentality change encouraging private business activities 
rather than state interference in economy. Thus, the establishment of MÜSİAD 
was the result of increasing pluralist tendencies in Turkey. Parallel to TÜSİAD’s 
establishment to voice the demands of Turkish big industrialists, MÜSİAD 
emerged to represent Anatolian petite bourgeoisie isolated from state resources 
as “outsiders” previously. 
Corporatism necessitates the institutional fusion of political 
representation of functional interests in the process of policymaking and the 
interdependence of the compulsory, non-competitive and licensed interest groups 
and the state. In this framework, the state organized on a corporate basis occupies 
central place and the corporations exercise controlling and regulatory functions 
on their individual members in addition to their representational role. The main 
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difference between the varieties of corporatism -neo-corporatism and 
authoritarian corporatism- is that: the former develops as a consequence of the 
growing monopoly power of interest organizations, both capital and labor, in 
advanced capitalist societies. However, authoritarian corporatism is imposed by 
the state to regulate and control political and economic life through occupational 
groups. In the authoritarian model, state regulates labor in the interest of the 
capital. In the Turkish context, the historical over strength of the state permitted 
the state elite to explore their own understanding of public interests blocking the 
development of particular sectoral interests. This, in turn, blocked the 
development of neo-corporatism. The establishment of Türkiye Ticaret, Sanayi, 
Deniz Ticaret Odaları ve Ticaret Borsaları Birliği-TOBB [The Turkish Union of 
Chambers and Stock Exchanges] in 1950 was a step to form an authoritarian 
corporatist model imposing the creation of compulsory-membership-based 
business associations through law. However, the political elite manipulated 
TOBB rather than taking their demands into consideration. These developments 
prevented the development of corporatism in Turkey, delineated in chapter 2. 
Clientelism needs reciprocal exchange of particularistic economic and 
political resources with support, loyalty, votes and protection within a patronage-
clientele network. Following the transition to a multi-party system and further 
urbanization process in Turkey, governing parties employed political patronage 
in personal links despite the establishment of either compulsory or voluntary 
business organizations.  
In short, Turkish interest group politics represent a unique mix of 
pluralism, corporatism and clientelism. MÜSİAD has emerged and has become 
the largest Turkish voluntary business association with various branches in 
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Turkey and overseas offices in many countries in such a framework of interest 
group politics. Despite this organizational success, MÜSİAD could not show the 
expected influence on governmental policies especially due to two reasons. First, 
the Turkish state historically did not take interest groups into consideration in 
policymaking. Second, the February 28 process, as famous in the society, put 
MÜSİAD into a position of the financial castle of reactionism in Turkey. This 
image of the organization converted the state’s elite suspicion to enmity, which 
blocked its lobbying power. Moreover, political elites also did not want to get in 
the same picture with MÜSİAD members erosing the association’s credibility.        
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CHAPTER II 
STATE- BUSINESS RELATIONS IN TURKEY 
2.1. Introduction 
In Turkey, “the high level of stateness”1 resulted in such an interest 
representation that was shaped by the confrontations and conflicts between state and 
political elites. Political elites’ understanding of public good has been sometimes in 
conflict with the conceptualization of the state elites. The state elites also regarded 
themselves as the guardians of the state and always saw group solidarity as a threat 
of “a potential cause for the disintegration of the state.”2 This approach was a 
residue of the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Turkish business 
community that preferred to remain opportunistic rather than entrepreneurial and 
constructive3 could not transform into a “class” having a culture of autonomous 
economic power and norms.  
The state-business relations in Turkey have not been institutionalized to the 
extent that the political elites’ accepting business community as a partner in the 
policy-making process. This is partly due to the “strong state tradition” inherited 
from the Ottomans in which the state was almost completely sovereign and 
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autonomous vis-à-vis civil society4 and the concomitant role of the civil and military 
bureaucracies in the Turkish political life. The Turkish state has controlled business 
associations rather than being responsive to their demands.   
Historically, Turkish interest groups have been regulated by the categories of 
legislation as dernekler (ordinary voluntary associations), kamu kurumu niteliğindeki 
meslek kuruluşları (professional organizations in the form of public institutions or 
public professional organizations), and sendikalar (trade unions).5 Moreover, the 
Turkish legislation limited the representation of the associational life due to an 
excessive institutionalization from above. This resulted in ineffective and inefficient 
associations. In sum, a large number of individual businessmen applied personal ties 
to influence the political process indirectly.6 
 In this chapter, I will explore both the historical-political framework of the 
business associations and the development of legal framework. In the literature 
review section, I will compare books of Robert Bianchi, Metin Heper and Ayşe 
Buğra7 on the state-business relations in Turkey. The historical framework will 
cover both the Ottoman period and the Republican era in which I will also delineate 
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the legislative framework of associational activity in Turkey. I will first discuss the 
formation of TİSK and the Conference Board of Economic and Social Issues that 
paved the path for the emergence of TÜSİAD. TÜSİAD is important since it 
functioned as a reliable model for the succeeding of voluntary business associations 
as MÜSİAD. In the concluding section of this chapter, I will explain why the 
Turkish historical, politico-economic context and legal framework have not been 
adequate for neither pluralist nor neo-corporatist strategies. This chapter will provide 
a comprehensive historical outline of interest group politics in which MÜSİAD is to 
emerge.  
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
Robert Bianchi, covering the Republican period until 1980, discusses the 
emergence of interest groups in Turkey with a comparative study of Western 
Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia in which he questions the role of interest 
groups at different stages of modernization. He examines both pre-modern Ottoman 
social organization and Republican practices of ruling elites regarding legitimate 
interest representation.  
According to him, the Ottoman-Turkish polity historically encouraged the 
basis for the emergence of corporatist policies and structures while inhibiting 
pluralist ones. Bianchi views the Turkish state’s attempt to corporatize the 
associational life in the early 1950s as conceptualization of neither state nor societal 
corporatism of Schmitter’s typology but as an unusual and unstable mix of these two 
types. The leading role of the state initiatives and political party strategies in 
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restructuring interest representation and political participation was influential in this 
process. The motivation was the desire to develop “organized democracy”8 amidst 
uneven but rapid economic development. Thus, Bianchi attributes a degree of 
industrial planning based on perceived objective interests, which ignores the 
“irrational” dimensions of political behavior.  
Bianchi relates the emergence of competing means for structuring interest 
representation with the historical shifts in the relative importance of interest groups 
and tensions in Turkish politics. He examines political culture and public policy to 
account for variance in their influence and strategies, which includes comparative 
analysis of interest group activity and leadership in different sectors. According to 
Bianchi, Turkish interest groups operate primarily as channels of expanded political 
participation or as agents of greater social control. In sum, Bianchi suggests that 
party politics, associational legislation, and military interventions shaped the 
patterns of associational life in Turkey.9 
He notes that the public policy in regard to interest groups has been eclectic 
and has in various ways contributed to representational dualism. This provided 
opportunities for dissatisfied group leaders to turn to alternative voluntary 
associations to attain their specific interests that they could not get through 
corporatist organizations.10 After the transition to multi-party politics in the 1950s, 
large membership-based, weak, competing, and easily manipulated interest groups 
                                                 
8 Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, p. 338. 
 
9 Ibid.,  p. 193. 
 
10 Ibid.,  p. 115. 
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came to the stage within a policy of “debilitating pluralism.”11 From 1960 to 1980 a 
series of weak governments pursued neo-corporatism by extending privileges to 
certain groups, thus fostering their dependence. These governments simultaneously 
imposed restrictions on the uncooperative groups. This dualist environment of 
interest representation intensified demands for participation and distribution. The 
governments shifted the demands of those who opposed results in the corporatist 
arena into an expanded pluralist arena. This in turn functioned as the hotbed of the 
political opposition. In addition, as Bianchi noted: 
In modern Turkey the ongoing competition between pluralist and 
corporatist modes of representation has been a recurrent source of 
conflict in the relations of differentially organized interests with 
the state and with one another. But the intensity and broader 
implications of these conflicts have varied substantially in 
different historical periods depending on the degree and nature of 
linkages between associations and political parties.12  
 
Bianchi argued that, in modern Turkey no comprehensive system of interest 
representation either pluralist or corporatist has ever arisen. Pluralist and corporatist 
structures co-existed while competing for predominance in each historical period 
and in all major interest sectors.  According to him, however, corporatist rather than 
pluralist interest representation has been the main model since  
in terms of organizational strength, financial soundness, control 
over rewards and sanctions against members, and effective access 
to authoritative decision-makers, the corporatist network enjoys a 
clear superiority over the still sprawling and fragmented pluralist 
network.13  
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12 Ibid.,  pp. 356-357. 
 
13 Ibid.,  p. 350. 
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Turkey’s emerging system of corporatism relied heavily on the initiative and 
coercive power of the state. He found this development quite compatible with the 
étatist tradition of Turkey where there have been strong cultural inhibitions to 
private interest articulation and representation. This prevented strong and competent 
articulation of business interests and enabled governments to manipulate the 
business community. Moreover, the corporatist arrangements were also valid for 
business groups since their creation by the state was not a new phenomenon for 
Turkey but also the general tendency of the Turkish political culture.14 
Like Bianchi, Metin Heper argues that the interest group politics in Turkey 
fits neither pluralism nor corporatism in a comprehensive manner. Each pattern of 
interest group politics has a particular logic behind the type of business-
state/government relations. Pluralism depends on a type of government basically 
responsive to civil society and neo-corporatism necessitates a harmonious 
relationship between the state and civil society. Thus, none of the cited patterns of 
interest group politics would be encountered in a frame dominated by a strong state 
as in Turkey.15  
Heper essentially characterizes Turkish politics as a strong state tradition vis-
à-vis a weak periphery inherited from the Ottoman Empire. He asserts that the 
Ottoman-Turkish state tradition differs significantly from the various modalities of 
European feudalism in the degree of “stateness” and the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft 
continuum. There was no estate tradition in the Ottoman Empire like those found in 
                                                 
14 Ibid.,  p. 73. 
 
15 Metin Heper, “The State and Interest Groups with Special Reference to Turkey” in Strong State 
and Economic Interest Groups, p. 4. 
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France and Germany, which constituted a countervailing power against the center. In 
Heper’s approach, the degree of stateness shapes the political development process 
and the place of interest group activity in this process.16  
However, in the Ottoman state “the periphery is almost totally subdued by 
the center … [which] on its own set the norms of the polity … keeping everybody in 
its place and protecting the subjects.”17 This, in turn, shaped the Ottoman political 
culture and created a “ever-present tension … derived from the bureaucratic center’s 
nervousness toward the periphery and the periphery’s effort to circumvent the center 
whenever it could.”18 This structural tension between the center and the periphery 
continued during the Republican period. The new bureaucratic elite of the Republic 
followed the path of their late Ottoman predecessors in keeping the state central for 
transforming the community. In the early Republican period, public policy formation 
did not result from an aggregation of interests. It was imposed by the state on people 
in the name of “enlightening them”19 since politics was to be guided by rational 
ideas formulated by the bureaucratic elite instead of interests.20  
Heper argued that state-business politics in Turkey has been characterized by 
the regulation from above. During the early Republican period, although business 
associations were licensed, the purpose behind this arrangement was not to enable 
them to play an intermediary role but to control them politically. The governments 
                                                 
16 Ibid.,  p. 6. 
 
17 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, pp. 14-15. 
 
18 Ibid.,  p. 16. 
 
19 Ibid.,  p. 50. 
 
20 Ibid.,  pp. 77-79. 
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were not very responsive to businesses associations. Thus, Turkish associational life 
had little influence on decision-making process, even in the preparation of five-year-
plans aiming to help business in developing strategies for future investments. This 
led businessmen to behave in a pragmatic manner and they by-passed their business 
associations to establish personal relations with the government authorities and to 
co-opt top-level bureaucrats. In short, in Heper’s view, neither state corporatism, 
neo-corporatism, nor pluralism but clientelism or rather paternalism explains state-
business relations in Turkey.21  
Ayşe Buğra developed a new perspective and analyzed Turkish business 
formation with reference to the political determinants of interest group activity. She 
viewed the difference between Bianchi’s analysis and Heper’s emphasis on the state 
tradition as not too significant. She sympathized with Heper about the pattern of 
interest group politics to be shaped by the historically established configuration of 
state-civil society relationship.22 However, she did not assign a passive role to civil 
society in its interaction with the state as Heper had done.  
In societies where both state authorities and business leaders cooperate, 
business associations acquire a quasi-public role in addition to the simple pursuit of 
material gain. However, in Turkey, the weakness and vulnerability of the private 
business associations vis-à-vis the state is likely to hamper the development of 
voluntary business associations. Thus, Buğra argued that the emergence of a 
European type neo-corporatism in Turkey is unlikely due to the differences between 
the Turkish history of associational activity and the European history. The reluctance 
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22 Ayşe Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey, p. 227. 
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of Turkish political authorities to accept business associations as the legitimate 
medium of interest representation is the main characteristics of state-business 
relations in Turkey. Even the governments accepting the private interests as the 
engine of economic growth and development regard the organized pursuit of 
interests along class lines as socially disruptive and politically dangerous.23 
Buğra asserted that the oscillations between pluralism and corporatism, 
highlighted by Bianchi, reflect the nature of the political progress in Turkey. The 
absence of a clear strategy defining the legitimate domain of state intervention and 
the private pursuit of interest brought ambiguity in the relations between state and 
business community in Turkey. She evaluated these oscillations as perfect 
manifestations of the Turkish legal system as a mechanism of inter-mediation in 
state-business relations and its failure to contribute to the emergence of a stable 
policy network. She is in conformity with Heper that the dominant pattern of interest 
group politics is shaped by the Turkish state tradition. However, Heper determined 
the “extent” of state intervention as the major factor shaping the character of 
associational activities while Buğra’s emphasis shifted toward the “form” of state 
intervention as the main determinant of societal differences in interest group politics 
and its social implications.24   
Historically, the Turkish state has been the dominant force over the evolution 
and the structuring of the private business community since “[A]fter the foundation 
of the Republic, the state continued to occupy a central place in the business life of 
                                                 
23 Ibid.,  p. 229. 
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the country.”25 Thus, Turkish business community did not emerge as an independent 
socioeconomic class driven to influence the overall political decision-making 
process but it evolved as a state-dependent economic agent. Buğra argued that while 
the Democrat Party-DP [Demokrat Parti-DP] favored private enterprise, “their 
efforts in this direction were of a nature to foster not ‘the spirit of entrepreneurship’, 
but rather the ‘spirit of profit.’”26 Buğra also mentioned the lack of self-confidence 
in the Turkish business community in terms of their economic mission.  The low 
prestige of business as an acceptable economic activity shaped the role of business 
organizations to be channels for state-economic alliances rather than institutional 
representation of specific business interests. The macroeconomic and financial 
policies perpetuated this dependency, which shaped the attitudes of the Turkish 
businessman. As Buğra argues: 
  
the stereotypical Turkish businessman is a nonspecialized, 
shortsighted rent-seeker... [who] tr[ies] to maximize the 
opportunities and avoid risks that stem from the policy process, 
relying more on relationships of personal trust than on their 
professional organizations to overcome their difficulties.27  
 
Given the economically and politically unstable environment in Turkey, Buğra 
evaluated Turkish businessman as a “rational entrepreneur” who diversifies 
investment activities and maximizes short-term profits as possible. In this context, 
the absence of the well-established financial markets and financial instruments until 
the 1980s oriented businessmen to invest in real estate purchases. This was a rational 
portfolio investment choice although it was a speculative activity rather than 
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27 Ibid.,  p.169. 
 66 
production. However, Buğra  argues that since the 1980s, Turkish business 
community has emerged as a more organized socioeconomic unit that contests the 
power of the state when its interest is at stake.  
In short, Buğra believes that, unlike their Western and some late-
industrializing Asian counterparts, business associations in Turkey have remained 
dependent on the state that has been the major factor determining business outlook 
and behavior. This prevented business community to gain any autonomy.  
Consequently, MÜSİAD emerged in such an environment where interest 
representation is mainly determined by the strong hand of the state that controls the 
business community. Thus, MÜSİAD underlined the autonomy of the business 
community and it was a challenge to the long historical tradition of Turkish state-
interest groups relations. However, this challenge was short-lived due to weak 
positioning of the association vis-à-vis the state, which became evident following the 
February 28 process. Following this theoretical explanation of Turkish state-business 
relations, I will explore the historical-legislative framework in which this set of 
relations developed since the Ottomans.    
2.3. Historical Background 
 2.3.1. Ottoman and Early Republican Era 
The Ottoman lonca (guild) system, based on ahi (brotherhood) solidarity, 
functioned as an administrative link between the state and the Muslim artisan 
community rather than the representation of their interests in Ottoman society. The 
chief officers of the guilds, the kethüdas or kahyas, were the agents of the state, 
commonly recruited from retired officers, but not the spokesmen of their guilds, 
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who kept the guilds under state domination.28 It is important to note that, in 
MÜSIAD’s publications, the organization traces its cultural roots back in the ahi 
culture as a historical model.29  
In the Ottoman state the modern types of interest groups started to emerge as 
modified versions of traditional guilds within the new legal framework of the 
Tanzimat (Reform) period (1839-1876). These professional associations and 
consultative bodies to government were supposed to work in close cooperation with 
the Ministry of Trade. Their role was to promote trade, and later industry, and to 
organize their members.30 The second constitutional period (1908-1918) witnessed 
an extraordinary proliferation of organizational activity31 thanks to the liberal Law 
of Association of 1909. This law even permitted associations founded by minorities 
for cultural, literary, or philanthropic purposes to express demands for greater 
autonomy.32 This resulted in the establishment of 12 political parties, 37 political or 
social associations, 157 chambers of commerce in various provinces and 51 
associations of small businesses, and sale-credit cooperatives.33 Then, the 
Committee of Union and Progress-CUP [İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti-İTC] 
government attempted to regulate the activities of these Chambers through a law 
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enacted in 1910 in accordance with their policy of creating a national bourgeoisie 
under state control.34  
In short, the semi-official business associations in the Ottoman period were 
weak and under government control. The state created associational groups to be 
controlled and rewarded materially by the state in turn for their support. This 
resulted in the increase of state’s autonomy vis-à-vis these associations, which 
would continue in the Republican period.  
The intensity of interest representation has varied substantially in the 
different historical periods of the Republican era. During the single-party period, 
1923-1946, all types of associations were clearly subordinated to the single-party-
centered authoritarian state. This, in turn, suppressed the expression of interest 
representation through either pluralist or corporatist structure.  
The founding fathers of modern Turkey led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk chose 
to catch up with the “contemporary civilization,” namely Western civilization, 
through rapid industrialization and the creation of a national bourgeoisie. Corporatist 
arrangements seemed the most suitable path to reach this aim without activating 
class conflict.35  
The first Law of Chamber of Commerce and Industry was enacted in 1920. 
About fifty existing Chambers of Commerce gained the legal status of public 
corporate bodies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce. Membership 
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was compulsory for the Muslim tradesmen and non-Muslim citizens’ membership 
was possible if they volunteered.  
Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkish 
associational life was transformed in accordance with the consolidation of the 
single-party hegemony of the Republican People’s Party-RPP [Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi-CHP].36 The first Republican legislature implemented a law in 1924 defining 
the Chambers of Industry and Trade as public associations serving the public interest 
by promoting trade and industry under the tutelage of the Ministry of Trade. The 
Secretary General of the Chamber of Industry and Trade was to be a civil servant 
from the Ministry of Trade.37 The chambers based on compulsory membership were 
established to regulate industrialists and merchants (1925), craftsmen (1925), 
exporters (1936), lawyers (1938), and journalists (1938-46). In these chambers civil 
servants mostly populated administrative committees and managerial staff. 
Foreigners were excluded from membership.38  
The associational life was more limited under the étatist policies of the 
1930s. The enactment of the Law 3512 in 1938 made the formation of associations 
almost impossible, except the apolitical associations whose activities were limited to 
charity or beautification.39 The main associations of this period were halkevleri 
(people houses) and köy enstitüleri (village institutes) that were formal extensions of 
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the RPP and disseminated nationalist and secularist propaganda among the urban 
and rural masses.40  
In 1943, new regulations came to fore to control and regulate activities and 
financial resources of associations. The Turkish state extended its control over the 
activities of the Chambers of Trade and Industry and Commercial Exchanges. This 
was justified by reference to the absence of professional morality and discipline 
manifested in the business community, as evidenced black-market activities in the 
World War II years. This Law of 1943 enabled the Ministry of Trade to set up 
chambers as well as to expand or narrow down the jurisdictions of the chambers or 
dissolve and re-establish them. Both the associational laws of 1938 and 1943 
reflected the atmosphere of the étatist period marked by a strong suspicion of any 
social initiative undertaken autonomously from the state.  
The end of the World War II and transition to a multi-party politics in Turkey 
in 1946 brought liberalizing winds and a new Law of Associations was enacted in 
1946. According to this law, associations could be established without state 
permission. The courts were recognized as the sole authority to dissolve 
associations. Interest groups increased rapidly both in number and in variety. Their 
interaction with each other, with political parties, and with different governmental 
institutions brought the important new dimension to the politics. This emergence and 
diffusion of interest group politics implied the development of Turkish society 
through “the art of association.”41  
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Consequently, during the Republican period, especially the single party years 
(1923-1945), the chambers were expected to play a semi-official role through 
serving the public interest, defined by the state elite, as the chambers of the late 
Ottoman era had done. 1946-1950 period was a transition to a relatively liberal 
medium from repressive authoritarian politics. Thus, in this period activities of the 
chambers were liberalized following the termination of the Ministry of Economy 
and Commerce tutelage.  
 
2.3.2. 1950-1980 
 
The advent of the DP to the government in 1950 was a turning point in 
Turkish politics, which symbolized the emergence of relative liberalism. The 
government’s formal control over the chambers was somewhat released. The 
chambers could appoint their own General Secretary while the government kept its 
authority to postpone elections of chambers.42 During the 1950s, the Chambers 
flourished, both in number and in social significance because of the recognition of 
social and market forces by the government.  
The legislation of the Chamber Activity Regulation declared in 1950 
replaced the 1938 Law. Despite several subsequent changes related to the rights and 
responsibilities of the Chambers, the 1950 Law formed the legal basis of interest 
group activity to a large extent. Through the Law 5590 in 1950, TOBB was 
established as the umbrella organization of compulsory-membership-based business 
associations. TOBB was “to function in an advisory capacity on economic affairs as 
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may be requested by the Commissions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly or 
Ministries [and] to fulfill such other functions as may be assigned by the Ministry of 
Economy and Commerce.” 43 The law largely eliminated the tutelage of the Ministry 
over the Chambers. TOBB functioned as a public body while representing specific 
industrial and business interests under close surveillance of governments. 
In 1958, TOBB began allocating import quotas to individual importers and to 
register and control the imported goods. These functions naturally enhanced the 
significance of TOBB for its individual members. On the other hand, this 
development did not bring political autonomy to TOBB. In 1958, a new law to 
postpone the elections of governing bodies of the TOBB was enacted which 
empowered the DP government to interfere in the TOBB electoral process. This 
interference became a tradition if the governments regarded the opposition in the 
chambers as a challenge to the authority of the government.44 
In the 1950s, the DP governments increasingly engaged in patronage politics 
using a carrot-stick model in relation to chambers. The governments rewarded the 
members of the chambers in return for their support of the government and harassed 
the ones who opposed it. The businessmen were made to understand that their 
associations’ governmental support depended on their conformity with the outlook 
of the government policy. It was clear that an independent orientation of interest 
articulation and representation simply would not be allowed. Toward the end of the 
1950s, as DP grew politically weaker, it made certain attempts to reconcile with the 
Chambers by increasing their powers.  
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In sum, the leadership of the TOBB, until the very end of the DP rule, 
carefully avoided any manifestation of sympathy or even interest in the views of 
other parties. However, this resulted in the abolition of all the governing bodies of 
the TOBB and local chambers following the coup of 1960 since military authorities 
evaluated them as the extensions of the defunct DP.  
The 1961 Constitution, a product of the 1960 military intervention, expanded 
the scope of basic rights and liberties, e.g. trade unions got the right to strike, 
including the freedom to form associations. This empowered TOBB and the 
individual local chambers against the government.45 Despite the considerable 
uncertainty within the business community about the attitudes of the new regime vis-
à-vis business, the role of TOBB increased through participating in the establishment 
and the functioning of the State Planning Organization (SPO). TOBB also 
participated in the preparation of the First Development Plan. Nevertheless, with the 
advent of the Justice Party- JP [Adalet Partisi-AP], the successor of the DP, to 
power, TOBB gradually returned to previous situation in which its social strength 
was determined through its identification with the government in power. The JP 
governments held summit meetings with TOBB to get consultation on economic 
matters with respect to their semi-official status. However, the pro-business stand of 
the government did not necessarily mean its respect for business associations and 
their advises.46  
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The JP’s approach to TOBB was clarified when Necmettin Erbakan won 
TOBB elections in 1969 through a campaign against JP candidates.47 Erbakan’s 
success was based on his enthusiastic mobilization of the alienated Anatolian petite 
bourgeoisie that was at a disadvantageous position compared to commercial and 
industrial tycoons of İstanbul, and İzmir largely controlling the TOBB leadership. 
Erbakan attracted these small and middle size business owners by criticizing 
“regionally uneven industrialization” and defining the TOBB leadership as the 
“comprador-Masonic minority.”48  
Following Erbakan’s success, the JP government transferred TOBB’s 
privilege to allocate import licenses to the Ministry of Trade. This weakened 
TOBB’s resources and accelerated the removal of Erbakan following the 
nullification of the elections by the JP government.49 The government gave TOBB’s 
authority of allocating import licenses back in return of pro-JP stand of the new 
leadership. This showed the JP’s sympathy towards the İstanbul-centered big 
businesses which left the Anatolian petite bourgeoisie to be the stronghold of the 
Milli Görüş parties led by Erbakan, and eventually of MÜSİAD which will be 
explained in chapter 5. This process resulted in the formation of the National Order 
Party-NOP [Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP] in January 1970 under Erbakan’s 
leadership.50   
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The military intervention of 12 March 1971 brought the withdrawal of the 
import quota allocation privilege of TOBB and limited its role in the realm of 
interest representation. The JP authorities acted very instrumentally in passing the 
Law of Associations No. 1630 in 1972. This law permitted the JP governments to 
keep TOBB under further control by allowing the government to withdraw TOBB’s 
privileges to control and register prices of imports and the ability to dissolve 
chambers. This law also indicated that  
[A]ssociations may not organize meetings or publish materials 
with the purpose of praising a political party, a corporate 
personality, a community, a dead or living person whose aims or 
activities have been put under ban by law on account of their 
regimes, doctrines, or ideologies.51  
 
During the 1970s, despite this law business and labor associations were more 
politicized.52  
In short, during the 1960s and 1970s, the business community became more 
dependent on the governmental support to survive due to the ISI model. Thus, the 
import quotas had been the major source of government influence on the commercial 
sector in which TOBB had the authority to issue import licenses. These licenses 
determined the permission to export commodities not freely exportable out of 
Turkey. Following the withdrawal of this licensing right after the military 
intervention of 1971, the representative function of TOBB was continuously 
restrained since the civilian governments controlled the organization strictly. This 
led to the emergence of TÜSİAD, as a result of the dissatisfaction of the big 
industrialists with TOBB policies.  
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2.3.2.1. The Voluntary Business Association Formation in 
Turkey 
   
Initially business association activity in Turkey was limited to Chambers, 
later TOBB, with compulsory membership and under close government control until 
the late 1960s. The brief period of the First Development Plan between 1962-1968 
marked an exception because TOBB had little influence on the policy process in 
channeling the demands of their members to government authorities. The formation 
of Turkish voluntary business associations began in 1960s, but they became 
significant mainly in the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s.  
Buğra explains the emergence of such a distinct group of businessmen and 
their voluntary associations in Turkish context with reference to two factors of 
significance. First, the development of the private sector in the 1950s and 1960s had 
brought along a group of big businessmen whose social power was enhanced by the 
significance of their activities for the national economy. Second, the social 
developments of the 1960s and 1970s led certain factions of the big business 
community to reconsider their position as a class vis-à-vis the totality of the Turkish 
society and its future.53 Moreover, since membership was compulsory in TOBB 
controlled by government, businessmen were in need of founding independent 
business associations for voicing and recognition of their specific demands. The 
political environment provided by the 1961 Constitution also functioned as a catalyst 
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in orienting a small group of businessmen to consolidate their social position as a 
class, which paved the path for the establishment of TİSK and TÜSİAD.  
In the 1960s, TİSK emerged as a voluntary business association and warned 
the business community about the labor militancy.54 However, a small number of big 
businessmen reacted against the alarmist attitude of TİSK. This resulted in the 
establishment of a forum, the Conference Board on Economic and Social Issues, to 
discuss social, economic and political problems and to find moderate solutions for 
these problems within capitalist system. This forum, designed as a tripartite 
organization, tried to bring bureaucrats and politicians, certain prominent 
academicians, and members of the business community together. The Board paved 
the path for the emergence of TÜSİAD that believed in the necessity of a solid status 
for the business community and a social consensus within a politico-economic 
environment rather than alarmist attitude of TİSK.55   
2.3.2.1.1. TÜSİAD 
 
The competition among various segments of the business community 
increased due to a scarcity of foreign exchange and credit56 and the big industrialists 
believed that they did not have the weight they thought to have deserved in TOBB.57 
The declaration signed by l45 large industrialists publicly announced the 
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establishment of TÜSİAD on August 2, 1971.58 TÜSİAD claimed to represent the 
interests of the private sector that has incrementally reached to acquire an influential 
position in Turkish political and economic life.  
TÜSİAD’s emergence signified an important development in a decade of 
political polarization and increasing uncertainties in the politico-economic life of the 
country.59  In the TÜSİAD charter, the basic aims of the association were listed: 
improving the image of the private sector, advancing its legitimate economic 
interests, functioning as a research body to inform the public and the government to 
formulate policies in line with the members interests, and promoting public welfare 
through free enterprise.60 TÜSİAD became noticeable with an advertising campaign 
in the newspapers as a means of protesting the Ecevit-led government in the late 
1970s.61 Following the fall of this government, TÜSİAD was even identified as “the 
association that toppled the government” and after the 1980 military intervention as 
“the association that defended the coup’s raison d’être both at home and abroad.”62  
TÜSİAD was founded by a small group of businessmen, owners-managers of 
holding companies, who were suspicious about the social legitimacy of the business 
community in Turkey.63 The twelve leading Turkish businessmen who founded 
TÜSİAD -Vehbi Koç (Koç), Nejat Eczacıbaşı (Eczacıbaşı), Sakıp Sabancı 
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(Sabancı), Selçuk Yaşar (Yaşar), Raşit Özsaruhan (Özsaruhan), Ahmet Sapmaz 
(Güney Sanayi), Feyyaz Berker (Tekfen), Özakat (Özakat), İbrahim Bodur (Bodur), 
Hikmet Erenyol (Joint Stock Co. Electro-Metallurgy), Osman Boyner (Altınyıldız) 
and Muzaffer Gazioğlu (Joint Stock Co. Cement Industries)- were the industrial 
tycoons of Turkey. The leadership of TÜSİAD was deeply inspired by the societal 
model of Western countries in the era of late capitalism. According to Buğra, their 
communality of sociopolitical outlook to assure a solid status for the business 
community as a social class in a stable environment brought these individuals under 
the same roof.64 Thus, TÜSİAD, a class organization par excellence, sometimes has 
found itself in conflict with other members of the business community due to its 
wider class interests.  
TÜSİAD’s stance for the principles of a mixed and planned economy model, 
to protect democratic government and free enterprise, was explicitly stated in the 
Founding Members’ Memorandum65 which called for government planning to 
minimize instability by supporting private industry. TÜSİAD kept its faith in 
strategic planning both to realize rapid economic growth and to formulate a better 
wealth distribution to avoid social disruptions. The same approach continued 
throughout the 1980s when TÜSİAD demanded for reforms favoring privatization, 
decentralization and further democratization.  
TÜSİAD’s demands sometimes generated important frictions with the 
government in the second half of the 1980s. TÜSİAD’s criticisms of government 
interventionism met with public declarations by government authorities that 
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TÜSİAD was surpassing the limits of legitimate associational activity. The three 
young businessmen –Ömer Dinçkök (1987-1988), Cem Boyner (1989-1990) and 
Bülent Eczacıbaşı (1991-1992)- were successive second-generation presidents of 
TÜSİAD. They kept uncompromisingly critical attitudes toward The Motherland 
Party- MP [Anavatan Partisi-ANAP] government policies. The first generation kept 
more prudent stand in reacting to the critical speeches by Dinçkök and his successor 
Boyner by warning them to speak for themselves but not for the association. The 
prudence of the elder members of TÜSİAD was based on the wisdom that the 
government can give businessmen as well as take away from them through 
discretionary methods. The elder members saw this critical stand of the young 
presidents dangerous to provoke government hostility against all members of the 
association, even the whole business community.66 So, TÜSİAD could not be 
politically effective in opposition67 since the association could not present solidarity 
among members in its organizational stance vis-à-vis the government. Thus, the 
relations between voluntary organizations and the state in Turkey had turned into an 
open and bitter political and personal confrontation at the end of the 1980s.68   
Şebnem Gülfidan argues that TÜSİAD and its activities manifested a 
combination of clientelist, pluralist and corporatist patterns which varied according 
to the ideology and the economic policies of the ruling party, the degree of challenge 
from the labor, the political structure of the country and TÜSİAD-government 
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interaction.69 Between 1974-1980, TÜSİAD both strived to restructure the Turkish 
economy and to promote the interests of big industrialists while improving the 
balance of power in favor of the private sector. TÜSİAD attempted to utilize both 
formal and informal channels of access to achieve these goals. However, when these 
tactics, as well as close links with the Prime Ministers, proved ineffective in the late 
1970s, TÜSİAD attempted to exert concerted pressure on the government through 
the mass media. This method proved very successful and the Ecevit government 
resigned in November 1979. The successive Demirel government adopted the 24 
January 1980 economic measures in harmony with TÜSİAD’s demands. During the 
military rule in 1980-1983, three TÜSİAD members served as ministers and through 
these close links TÜSİAD obtained most of the favors it asked from the government 
in return of its support for the military regime.70  
After the transition to the parliamentary politics in 1983, the MP government 
responded to the business community individually rather than on an associational 
basis as cited above. Prime Minister (PM) Özal was knowledgeable about the 
interests of the private sector as a former member of TÜSİAD, Chairman of the 
Metal Industry Industrialists Union, and the coordinator in the Sabancı Holding.71 
Özal centralized economic decision-making, which provided him the means to 
reward or punish individual members of the bourgeoisie according to their 
positioning vis-à-vis the government.72  
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TÜSİAD members developed personal links rather than association-based 
links with the MP government enjoying the concentration of power in the executive 
with the 1982 constitution. This approach of businessmen did not lead to an 
influence on the government in this period. However, this brought sets of informal 
relations of clientela type,73 which influenced TÜSİAD and its activities negatively. 
Thus, TÜSİAD lost its business association characteristics to articulate its interests 
in the period prior to 1980.74 The government preserved its autonomy and was 
reluctant to collaborate with TÜSİAD or TOBB in an institutionalized manner. 
Moreover, TÜSİAD, paradoxically, supported the government in all elections since 
the government’s general economic policies were harmonious with the big business 
to enable them to compete in the foreign markets75 and loyalty to the MP became a 
criterion for privileged access to resources.76  
TÜSİAD always complained about political instability due to government 
crises and constant changes in economic policies. Thus, TÜSİAD obviously 
endeavored to carry out a class mission on behalf of the business community vis-à-
vis the political elite but not state elite. This was proved by the association’s support 
for the 1980 military intervention.  
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TÜSİAD, at the present writing, represents 469 members77 composed of 
owners/managers of the biggest industrial and financial tycoons of Turkey with their 
relatively homogenous approach to macro-economic policies. This relative small and 
homogenous structure with remarkable industrial and financial capacity of its 
members provides TÜSİAD with means to influence the governments. TÜSİAD 
membership provides a privileged label for its members as being members of a small 
but influential community, which has access to government more easily when 
compared to MÜSİAD members. Thus, internal conflicts within the association are 
discouraged to prevent damage to the organization. However, from time to time 
internal conflicts emerge. TÜSİAD individual members solve their own problems 
through their personal connections with the political elite and higher echelons of the 
bureaucracy.78 Moreover, TÜSİAD refrains from public confrontation with other 
business associations as much as possible, which was noticed in their relations79 
either with TOBB or MÜSİAD.  
The need for an institutional change in TÜSİAD was especially felt in the 
1990s, which oriented the association to seek new strategies and revise its 
membership criteria for the access of businessmen from central and east Anatolia. 
TÜSİAD also promoted relations with the regional voluntary business associations. 
However, TÜSİAD’s rapprochement policy was responded by the reluctance of 
these associations perceiving this as TÜSİAD’s strategy to increase its power and 
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legitimacy rather than supporting their cause.80 However, TÜSİAD has been deaf to 
MÜSİAD’s invitation for common action but it did not make any explanation about 
it. 
TÜSİAD adopted further inner democratization especially in the chairman 
election through curbing the power of the Advisory Council that could previously 
determine the successor chairman. TÜSİAD, paradoxically, repeated its pro-military 
stance following the 28 February process as it performed after the 1980 military 
intervention despite its reports demanding more democracy and upper hand of 
civilian government vis-à-vis the bureaucratic cadres, improving human rights, 
reform of the judiciary, minimization of the state in economy via privatization.  
TÜSİAD has taken further steps in the name of international lobbying 
through opening offices in Washington and Brussels to endorse Turkey in the global 
politico-economic subjects. This is important because TÜSİAD wants to get 
involved in the international decision-making process on Turkey by the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the European Union (EU). 
Consequently, TÜSİAD has been both a voluntary business association and a 
part of the ruling elite. It is more a part of the regime than a part of the civil society. 
In the past it has acted with the state elite in opposition to governments.81 This is in 
accordance with its class project of capital accumulation through the state rather than 
the market composed of emerging rivals. Although TÜSİAD sometimes embraces 
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more radical criticisms against the regime, it does not challenge the status quo since 
it is a part of it. 
 
2.3.3. 1980s 
 
 In 1950, TOBB was established and during 1950-1970 corporatist structures 
developed and functioned as alternative networks to mobilize supporters and/or 
neutralize opponents. In 1970, the foundation of TÜSİAD showed the widespread 
discontent of interest representation even by the relatively privileged sections of the 
associational leadership. In the 1970s the pluralist networks developed but this did 
not decrease government’s use of importing licenses vis-à-vis the businessmen. 
On January 24, 1980, the minority government led by Demirel announced a 
major stabilization and economic liberalization program. This event marks a shift 
from a state-dominated, heavily interventionist economic model towards a neo-
liberal and market-oriented one under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF. This 
program, supported by the business community, developed a set of policies to 
determine a permanent transformation of the economy and the nature of state-
business relations for the first time,82 which will be explored in chapter 3. After the 
military intervention on September 12, 1980 the military government seemed ready 
to collaborate with the business groups. It was a remarkable opportunity for the 
Turkish business community since they were historically distrusted, often viewed as 
a “speculator.”83   
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The 1982 constitution, a product of the military government, was designed to 
strengthen the executive authority. Thus, it put interest groups under much stricter 
governmental controls in comparison with the 1961 Constitution, which enlarged 
associational activity in Turkey. The 1982 constitution aimed to keep interest groups 
activity under political control with further depolitization of the society “within a 
comprehensive social, economic, and political blueprint.”84 Article No. 33 of the 
1982 Constitution and the Law of Associations No. 1908 in 1983 prohibited 
professional associations, business associations, trade unions and civil servants to 
engage in political activities by getting or giving support to any political party, or to 
participate any joint action with other associations. The Law foresaw the supervision 
of associations by the Ministry of the Interior Affairs and their dissolution by the 
judiciary.85  
Compared to the 1961 Constitution, the 1982 Constitution enlarged the scope 
of exceptional circumstances permitting the temporary suspension of association 
activities by administrative authorities. The overall aim of the military rule was to 
prevent the recurrence of the pre-1980 dysfunctional politicization of the interest 
groups. Thus, the 1982 Constitution defined Chambers as public professional 
organizations  
established with the objectives of meeting the common needs of 
members, facilitating their professional activities, ensuring the 
development of the profession, safeguarding professional discipline 
and ethics in order to ensure integrity and trust in relations among 
their own members and with the public  
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while limiting their public functions.86 The government was empowered to request 
the dissolution of a chamber of commerce on the grounds that its criticisms of the 
government’s economic policy were itself a political activity. The designers of the 
post-1982 regime determined the role of interest groups to act in a docile and loyal 
manner while expressing their views only on matters directly pertaining to their 
particular domain of activity. Thus, the role of interest groups was kept to regulate 
members’ behaviors.87  
The constitutional restrictions binding associational life were either repealed 
or amended following the transition to parliamentary politics in 1983. The discourse 
of strengthening the civil society went hand in hand with the proliferation of 
associations and their activities in relative independence from the state, which failed 
to control the civil society. Table 1 shows the remarkable increase in the number of 
associations in Turkey during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
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Table 1. No. of Newly Establishing Associations according to Years in Turkey 88  
Years  Number of 
Associations  
1980         598 
1981         471 
1982         478 
1983         413 
1984        2830 
1985        2675 
1986        2742 
1987        2366 
1988        2539 
1989        2920 
1990        3244 
1991        3335 
1992        3696 
1993        4305 
1994        5289 
1995        5766 
1996        5310 
1997        5907 
1998        6312 
Total        61196  
 
Following the transition to parliamentary politics in 1983 the MP 
governments followed the approach of the military government. However, Turgut 
Özal was not eager to establish formal channels of cooperation with business 
organizations.89 Moreover, Özal sometimes threatened TÜSİAD with closure when 
the leadership of the association criticized the economic policies of his government. 
Özal was suspicious of the sincerity of TÜSİAD members in their support for liberal 
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economy.90 When TOBB also severely criticized consequences of government’s 
economic policies such as high interest rates and inflation, the reaction of the 
government was typical: Özal accused TOBB of getting involved in politics.91  
Keeping good relations with the government on a personal level has been a 
more effective strategy in the 1980s for commercial groups rather than establishing 
their autonomous associations to confront it. In the occasional meetings with the 
representatives of major commercial groups to discuss economic matters, Özal was 
more inclined to instruct interest groups than exchange views with them. Özal could 
easily condemn the business associations engaging in political activity. Thus, 
throughout the 1980s, both TOBB and TÜSİAD were to have a rough time in their 
relations with the government.92  
The MP governments put down structural amendments changing the political 
economy of Turkey. These amendments, however, did not imply a decline in the 
significance of the state for business activity. Moreover, the state kept its dominant 
role vis-à-vis the business community intact and even strengthened significantly 
when compared to the previous periods of the Republican era. The state policies 
were marked by a strong element of particularism, which enhanced the incoherence 
of the economic strategy.93 In sum, the MP government with its pro-business stand 
encouraged the pursuit of private interests through the presentation of particular 
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problems by individual businessmen. This, in turn, undermined the business 
associations’ strength either compulsorily or voluntarily established.94 
In the post-1980 period, as in the preceding era, business interests were 
encouraged to be represented through hierarchically organized bodies of public 
professional associations. The subjection of business to governmental decisions, the 
government’s influence on elections to the higher bodies of the TOBB and that of 
the individual chambers of commerce continued during the 1980s. Thus, during the 
post-1980 period, the chambers continued to function as quasi-bureaucratic arms of 
governments. They helped governments to set and enforce the standards for certain 
professions; performing distribution of credits, purchase of government-subsidized 
products, issuing licenses for the export commodities and the like. They also 
directed the economic activities of the private sector to prevent the clash with overall 
economic policy of the government.95 Briefly, the MP governments’ unsympathetic 
approach to democracy did not encourage the development of interest group 
politics.96 
During the 1980s, the term “interest group” kept its pejorative connotation. It 
was still not adequate for businessmen to speak about group interests since the only 
legitimate interest was public interest to be defined by the state. The business 
community was to perform economic activities in harmony with the government 
policies. This oriented the business community to justify business with reference to 
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its social value related to its positive implications and to pursue their interests in a 
particularistic manner.97 Thus, during the 1980s, voluntary associations, in general, 
and business associations, in particular, had no other way except acting in a very 
hesitant way towards the MP governments. 98 
 In the 1980s, the successive MP governments took important steps for the 
institutional basis of a self-regulating free-market system to restructure economy. 
This process went hand in hand with the reorganization of the state apparatus 
through centralization of decision-making by enlarging the powers of the executive 
branch in general. According to Heper, during the 1980s, state-business relations in 
Turkey kept the remarkable signs of monism in the absence of both pluralism and 
neo-corporatism as the state’s autonomy vis-à-vis interest groups was deepened.99 
Özal, with his exclusive inner circle of ministers and technocrats, famous as Özal’s 
princes, had the last word on all the critical economic decisions. They by-passed the 
traditional civil bureaucracy, the parliament, the political parties, and the business 
groups in such a decision-making process. This structure, in turn, widened the gap 
between the state and business associations not only because of a further 
centralization of the economic decision-making process but also due to the 
implementation of more restrictive legal restraints on interest group activity. In this 
context, the MP governments kept themselves remote from all other interest groups 
including TOBB. Only towards the end of the 1980s, the MP government became 
interested in TOBB elections and kept a close eye on the elections and the members 
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of the executive boards of the TOBB. Moreover, the government preferred to by-
pass both TOBB and voluntary business associations. Thus, the government favored 
dealing with the businessmen on an individual basis to get their support for its 
policies.  
The business community was ever ready to keep harmonious relations with 
the government since they did not want to be ruined by selective measures adopted 
by the governments. Under these circumstances, the pervasion of the business 
associations was inevitable due a lack of confidence about their political efficacy. 
Thus, the businessmen preferred to have direct individual contacts with government 
agencies since they could not easily participate in policy formulation as a group. 
Consequently, government regulation from above continued in Turkey during the 
1980s due to the lack of effective pluralist and neo-corporatist interest group 
politics.100 Briefly, the ability of business associations was limited by the reluctance 
of the government to establish formal channels of contact to discuss policy issues 
with businessmen.101  
Consequently, during the 1980s structural adjustment for the establishment 
of a free-market-oriented economy represented a break with the import substitution 
strategy of the past decades. In this period, one could observe the state-business 
relations emerging as an elaborate network of personal ties based on individual 
interests with the top-level officials of the public bureaucracy and/or ministries and 
even sometimes with the PM himself. In sum, the system imposed by the state 
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promoted clientelistic relations between the political authorities in charge of the 
economy and the representatives of business associations.102  
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explained the historical framework of Turkish interest group 
politics. The legal structure developing since the Ottoman period has influenced the 
development of interest group politics hand in hand with developments in the fields 
of society, politics and economy. However, it must be noticed that more important 
than legal structure is the overall structure of the economy, society, and politics of 
competing interests. With the advent to multi-party politics, political parties also 
functioned as platforms of interest articulation. The diversification of social structure 
within a developing capitalist economy resulted in the proliferation of the 
associational life since the 1950s. 
The Turkish state tradition with its unresponsive attitudes to civil society 
resulted in a pattern of interest group politics determined by the upper hand of the 
state. Such conceptualization imposed the political elite a weak and vulnerable 
position vis-à-vis the state elite who formulated state norms and insisted on the 
political elite to act in conformity within this framework. Thus, a development of 
pluralism in Turkey was difficult, if not impossible.  
The idea of representing particular, especially business, interests has not been 
socially acceptable in Turkey. This has prevented the development of neo-
corporatist form of interest representation. Moreover, the governments have not been 
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apt to develop neo-corporatist arrangements for fostering their legitimacy. Turkey 
has also lacked the strong presence of social democracy and strong trade union 
movement that can lead to neo-corporatism. Thus, the Turkish political elite and 
individual businessmen chose to establish personal relations, which depolitized and 
weakened the business associations. Even corruption became a mechanism to solve 
problems within such a legally framed structure, which also led to socio-political 
crises and in the erosion of ethical values.103  
According to Heper, the 1980s provided developments favorable both to the 
advent of pluralism and neo-corporatism. The attempted privatization of the State 
Economic Enterprises (SEEs), the decentralization of government and the 
orientation for a relatively free-market economy could be cited as the developments 
for the flourishing of pluralism. Moreover, developments adequate for neo-
corporatism included a significant reconstruction of the economy, taking interest 
groups for cooperation and a gradual weakening of the official ideology, Atatürkism 
-the basis of the state elite’s formulation of public interest.104 However, none of 
them could achieve a basis to define interest group politics in Turkey since the state 
kept is strong hand over interest groups. 
Turkey followed a development strategy based on heavier interventionism 
and protectionism since the 1930’s étatist policies. Thus, the state seemed as the 
major source of uncertainty for business activity since the domains of business 
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activity and that of state intervention in Turkey remained ambiguous for a long time. 
This prevented the improvement of a self-confident bourgeoisie enjoying a 
hegemonic position. However, some members of the business community could 
overpass this ambiguous environment through particularistic and informal relations 
with political authorities.105 Thus, the Turkish business community could not 
transform into a class but they remained as the extension of the creation of a national 
bourgeoisie since the CUP rule of the late Ottoman period.  
Business activity within uncertain politico-economic medium due to the 
uneven state intervention has always contributed to the vulnerability of the private 
sector vis-à-vis the state. Turkish business community has always tried to participate 
in the decision and rule-making process with the government. However, business 
associations, either compulsory or voluntary, could not be successful in promoting 
specific business interests since the pursuit of these interests were largely carried out 
through personal links of individual members with the political elite. This paved the 
path for strengthening of the business community on an individual basis while 
increasing its dependency on the Turkish state. Such a relation led the state to refuse 
the consolidation of the public role of the business associations as in the neo-
corporatist states. Thus, business associations were weakened and state authorities 
undermined the meaning and significance of these associations for their members.  
Consequently, the associational culture in Turkey historically has been a 
dependent and a highly politicized dimension of Turkish modernization. One could 
note that state-business relations in Turkey hardly developed through neo-corporatist 
or pluralist lines. The strong state tradition of Turkey with a weak civil society 
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paved the path for the political elites to benefit from the personal network based on 
the direct individual contacts with businessmen. This, paradoxically, resulted in the 
weakening of business associations with their dissatisfaction of these clientelistic 
ties even individual members of the business community benefited.  
 97 
CHAPTER III 
TURKISH POLITICAL ECONOMY IN 1980-2000:  
RISE AND FALL OF ISLAMIST POLITICS IN A 
TURBULENT ECONOMY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the first chapter, I explained Truman’s disturbance theory relating the 
creation of interest groups with people’s desire to protect their interests vis-à-vis 
disturbances and changes in their social environment. These disturbances could be 
recessions, wars, inflation, discrimination, and increased government activity. Like 
Truman, I will approach to comprehend the emergence and the development of 
MÜSİAD through two variables of disturbances in the last two decades. The first is 
the rise and fall of Islamist politics in Turkish society. The second is the 
transformation of Turkish economy. Both of these disturbances during the 1980s 
resulted in a societal change and prompted new interests and their organizations, i.e. 
MÜSİAD that emerged in 1990. In short, the implementation of liberal policies in 
the economic field and the development of arelatively free political atmosphere 
paved the path for the emergence of new entrepreneurs of small and middle size 
firms prospering in the 1980s. The rise of Islamist politics went hand in hand with 
the development of this Anatolian petite bourgeoisie who wanted to protect their 
authentic moral values fostered by Islam and tradition. Despite all, these new 
entrepreneurs’ isolation from state resources oriented them to organize in a new 
business association, MÜSİAD.  
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In this chapter, I will delineate the rise and fall of Islamist politics within the 
historical context of the last two decades. In the 1980s, Islam was recognized as an 
important part of Turkish national identity by both the military government (1980-
1983) and the Özal-led governments (1983-1989). This recognition was kept intact 
in the early 1990s, paving the path for the success of the WP in 1994 local and in 
1995 general elections. The success of the WP resulted in the staunch warning of the 
military, the guardians of Kemalism. The Islamic development was repressed in the 
name of the struggle against religious reactionism to keep the secular Republic 
through the well-known 28 February process. The developments in this process 
negatively affected MÜSİAD whose members were evaluated as the funders of 
religious recationism. 
The chapter will also examine the political economy of Turkey in the 1980s 
and the 1990s. First, in a brief account I will discuss the political and economic 
framework of the last two decades. The second part will explain the 1980 
Adjustment Program shaping the economic policies of the following period and its 
prominent result of export-orientation policies in the 1980s. Then, I will delineate 
the transformation of Turkish state’s role in economy in the last two decades. I will 
also explore how these developments affected KOBİs and Islamic-oriented 
enterprises in the same era. The concluding section is composed of the summary of 
the chapter and the importance of the last two decades for the emergence and 
development of MÜSİAD, which will be further detailed in the chapters on 
MÜSİAD. 
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3.2. Political Level 
3.2.1. The Military Government Period: 1980-1983 
 
The Iranian Revolution in 1979 opened a new chapter in world politics when 
Ayatullah Khomeini returned to Iran and declared the establishment of the Islamic 
state short after. The speculation that the message might draw a similar response 
elsewhere in the Islamic world1 brought the question mark into minds of people 
about Turkey. Turkey carried great potential as a neighbor of Iran and as a country 
that was the seat of the Caliphate for a long time. Moreover, the chaotic political 
climate of the late 1970s in Turkey bolstered this anxiety. The question was whether 
the Islamic revival in Turkey would pose a threat to the survival of the modern 
Turkish state and would undermine Turkey’s relations with the West.2  
On September 6, 1980, the “Save Jerusalem” mass rally staged by the 
National Salvation Party-NSP [Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP] in Konya was the last 
straw: the demonstrators marched in long robes and fez and carried green flags while 
shouting slogans calling for the restoration of the Sharia. Some of the participants 
refused to stand up during the playing of the national anthem. The result was harsher 
than the NSP anticipated as this rally functioned as a catalyst in accelerating 
Turkey’s third military intervention on September 12, 1980.3 Kenan Evren, head of 
                                                 
1 İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, “Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey,” Government and 
Opposition, 1983, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 421. 
 
2 Richard Tapper, “Introduction” in Islam in Modern Turkey; Religion, Politics and Literature in A 
Secular State, ed. Richard Tapper (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993),  p. 1. 
 
3 Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), p. 282 Jeremy Salt, 
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the military junta and the President in 1982-1989 period, said: “...The events in 
Konya marked the extent of irtica… [and] showed us the imminent danger and its 
nature.”4  
 Despite the importance of Islamic-oriented protests for the military 
intervention, the military government did not try to eliminate Islam from politics at 
all. Moreover, the integration of Islam into the state’s nationalist ideology was 
especially realized during the military government period, 1980-1983. The military 
authorities -the bastions of secularist Kemalism- attempted to instill Islamic values 
into the population through the education system. Thus, the compulsory religious 
education both in the primary and secondary levels was put in the curriculum, as 
stipulated by the Article 24 of the new 1982 Constitution.5  
Islam was used as a prop for Turkish nationalism, not as a rival to it. There 
was a structural transformation from the military’s previous staunch views on 
religion and politics as was evident in the reconciliation of the two of them. Kenan 
Evren quoted verses from the Koran as a reference point to justify the secular 
policies of the government. In sum, the military government aimed to find a middle 
ground between Islam and the state since Islam’s role was considered as an 
important factor to unite the nation.  
                                                                                                                                         
“Nationalism and the Rise of Muslim Sentiment in Turkey,” p. 16. 
 
4 Kenan Evren, Devlet Başkanı Kenan Evren’in Söylev ve Demeçleri 1980-1981 [Speeches and 
Declarations of President Kenan Evren] (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1981), 17 and Kenan Evren, 
Kenan Evren’in Anıları[Memoirs of Kenan Evren], Vol. I (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1990),  p. 220. 
 
5 “Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under the state supervision and 
control, and instruction in religious culture and moral education will be compulsory in the curricula 
of primary and secondary schools.” in T. C. Anayasası, 3rd ed. (Ankara: Seçkin Yayınevi, 1996), p. 
46, Article no. 24 and paragraph no. 4. and Andrew Mango, “The Consolations of Religion in 
Turkey” in Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, Malcolm Wagstaff, ed., (Center for Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Studies University of Durham, 1990), p. 16. 
 101 
In this historical context, the 1982 constitution might be regarded as a 
“brilliant perversion” from the original Kemalist discourse in the sense that it placed 
more emphasis upon “Turkish historical and moral values.”6 Thus,  the state elite 
recognized Islam with regard to its importance, at least, in maintaining Turkish 
identity and unity, as a crucial antidote to communism and fractional and divisive 
movements. As Heper notes, “[A]lthough absolutely opposed to the utilization of 
religion for political purposes, the military proved itself to be more congenial on the 
issue of the role of the religion in society than the post-Atatürk bureaucratic 
intelligentsia had ever been.”7 
The military regime formulated a new approach, without abandoning the 
secular character of the state, under the banner of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) as 
a new ideological formulation.8 This was originally formulated by a group of 
intellectuals, mostly university professors, who established a club named Aydınlar 
Ocağı (Intellectuals’ Hearth). In the 1980s, the members of the Hearth kept 
important bureaucratic and governmental positions and greatly influenced the 
decision-making process.9 This group of people conceptualized religion as the 
essence of Turkish culture. They basically asserted that the Turkish nation was best 
represented in the triangle of family, mosque and barracks. However, according to 
their approach, this representation was ruined as a consequence of imitating the 
West blindly. In order to overcome this defect, the state should take an active role in 
                                                 
6 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: Eothen Press, 1985),  p. 146. 
 
7 Ibid. p. 134. 
 
8 Richard Tapper, “Introduction,” p. 11. 
 
9 Binnaz Toprak, “Religion as State Ideology in a Secular Setting: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in 
Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, p. 10. 
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formal education and support development of national music, literature and visual 
arts.10 Though such an approach aimed to re-establish the hegemony of the Kemalist 
paradigm, it also contributed to the Islamic revivalism in Turkey and permitted the 
increase of Islamic visibility in the public sphere.  
TIS aimed at an authoritarian but not an Islamic state in which religion was 
seen as the essence of culture and social control. Thus, religion should be fostered in 
the education system but not politicized.11 Levent Köker indicates that the military 
government wanted to overcome the legitimacy crisis of the state and to create 
consent for the consolidation of state power in 1980s by paying lip service to the 
TIS.12 Thus, religion became the most significant determinant of Turkish national 
identity and the tenets of Turkish nationalism remained intact bolstered by Islam. In 
short, the secularist aspect of the Kemalist project was replaced by a reinterpretation 
of Turkish-Islamic history and incorporation of Islam into nationalist credo in the 
1980s.  
Consequently, the 1980s represented a crucial turning point for the Islamist 
movement, which found not only greater mass support but also more opportunities 
to establish itself. The military perceived the role of Islam connecting the individual 
and state and serving as a unifying force between different classes and strata of the 
society. Thus, the military wanted to benefit from Islam not in the political sphere 
but as a cultural entity in their efforts to create a new system of ethics by 
                                                 
10 Ibid. , p. 10-12. 
 
11 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic 
(London: Hurst & Company Publishers, 1997), p. 184. 
 
12 Levent Köker, “Hangi Demokrasi, Hangi Refah?” [Which Democracy, Which Refah?] Birikim, No. 
91. Kasım 1996, p. 49. 
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emphasizing the unifying trait of religion. This provided Islamic culture more 
visibility in the public sphere fostering the basis for the rise of Islamist politics until 
the end of 1990s. 
 3.2.2. Özal’s Period: 1983-1989 
 
Following the approval of the new Constitution by a referendum in 1982, on 
November 6, 1983, the general elections were held and the MP led by Turgut Özal 
became the victorious party. According to Nilüfer Göle, Özal’s MP “combined 
loyalty to Muslim conservatism with a strong commitment toward economic 
liberalism, one that reoriented the Turkish economy to export to world markets.”13 
This approach was based on engineering pragmatism with cultural conservatism, 
which she terms “Islamic social engineering,”14 and defined Özal and his team as 
“Muslim engineers.”15 According to Göle, Özal had built “a party not emphasizing 
‘utopian Islamism’ but instead capitalizing on the heritage and ideal with faith.”16 
Özal saw religion as an important factor -both an object and a subject- in the 
transformation process of Turkey. 17 Thus, he praised the moral principles of Islam 
                                                 
13 Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey,” in Civil 
Society in the Middle East, ed. A. R. Norton (E. J. Brill Leiden, 1996), p. 30. 
 
14 Ibid., p.  31 and see Nilüfer Göle, “Engineers and the Emergence of a Technicist Identity,” in 
Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz 
Kramer, eds. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994). 
 
15 Nilüfer Göle, “Küçük Dünyalar ve Tarih” [Small Worlds and History] in Nokta, Özel ek, 17 April 
1993. 
 
16 Nilüfer Göle, “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics,” p. 43. 
 
17 Mehmet Barlas, Turgut Özal’ın Anıları [Memoirs of Turgut Özal], (2nd ed.), (İstanbul: Sabah 
Yayınları, 1994), p. 201. 
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and argued that the economic problems the country faced had their origin in being 
estranged from the Islamic ethical system.18  
Özal perceived the principle of secularism as the guarantee for religion rather 
than something contrary to religion and defined it as nobody’s interference on any 
other one’s belief system. In this context, he indicated that secularism was an issue 
for the state and not for the individuals, and identified himself as a pious Muslim, 
not a secularist.19 Özal developed a synthesis of modernization and Islam, which was 
also welcomed by the religious segments of the society. Özal’s understanding of 
Islam was the basis for his attitude to liberalism, in which he emphasized 
individualism and the minimization of the state, parallel to his famous three 
freedoms: freedom of thought and speech, freedom of faith/religion and freedom of 
enterprise.20 This approach is similar with the understanding of MÜSİAD on Islam 
and market, which facilitated the meetings of the association and Özal before his 
death.  
Consequently, recognition of Islam at the state level and its improved public 
visibility with the military government period proliferated in the succeeding Özal’s 
governments as well as prospering at the societal level through relatively liberal 
policies of the era.  
                                                 
18 Ibid. , 203. 
 
19 Hürriyet, İstanbul daily,  3 March 1990. 
  
20 Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey (revised English edition) (Northern Cyprus, 
Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1991), p. 311; Turgut Özal, Degişim Belgeleri: 1979-1992 
[Documents of Change: 1979-1992] (Istanbul: Kazancı Matbacılık, 1993), p. 98 and Ergun Özbudun, 
“Özal ve Demokratikleşme” [Özal and Democratization] in Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı [Statesman and 
Politician], İhsan Sezal, ed. (İstanbul: 20 Mayıs Eğitim Kültür ve Sosyal Dayanışma Vakfı- Çetin 
Ofset, 1996), p. 109. 
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 3.2.3. The 1990s 
 
In the first half of the 1990s, the TPP kept the basic tenets of Turkish 
nationalism bolstered with Islam as the policy of 1980s.21 Moreover, especially 
during the 1990s, the official parameters and principles were challenged by various 
discourses of identity/differences, discourses ranging from religious fundamentalism 
to ethno-nationalism, from human rights to civil rights, from multiculturalism to 
post-national constitutional citizenship. Turkish politics during the 1990s has been 
characterized by ambiguity and uncertainty. The Turkish state and its political actors 
faced with the legitimacy and representation crisis increasingly detached from the 
changing nature of societal affairs and social demands. For instance, neither the 
Republican vision of citizenship nor as its most essential element, secularism, was 
able to perform their role in creating responsible selves suitable to the project of 
modernity. 
The Islamic revivalism in Turkey basically proposed to rename and to 
reconstruct Muslim identity by freeing it from traditional interpretations of Islam 
and challenging the Kemalist modernization process promoted by reforms.22 In this 
framework, Islam as the major faith of the nation stands at the very core of the 
debate and the Islamist movement in Turkey seems to have two main concerns. 
First, it is a part of the struggle for recognition of Islamic identity and for its 
incorporation into the public sphere. Second, it is an attempt to offer a 
comprehensive model for pluralism in contemporary societies. Thus, this could be 
                                                 
21 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, pp. 199-204. 
 
22 Nilüfer Göle, “Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites,” p. 
59. 
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easily observed in the discourses and activities of MÜSİAD through making Islam 
more visible in the public sphere with references to religious moral values in 
economy.  
The Islamists’ claim is that the dominance of the secular nationalist 
modernization project in Turkey since the early 1920s has created an identity crisis 
in the country. They argue for the recognition of identity differences in the public 
arena and their incorporation into the state institutions. Their reaction to the 
Kemalist modernity project has taken a form of the politics of pluralism, and of 
identity and citizenship. For the Islamists, the main problem has been the exclusion 
of the Islamic ethos from public discourse and the inclusion of an alien secular 
nationalism into the larger society.23 In short, the Islamist movement in Turkey 
developed its own reading of modernization, which could also be observed in 
MÜSİAD as a modern business association in structure. This reading is to keep 
Islam and traditional local values intact in integration with the modern global world. 
The relations between Islam and state in Turkey in 1990s were shaped by the 
WP’s success in politics. On July 19, 1983 the WP was established under the 
chairmanship of Ali Türkmen who was replaced by Ahmet Tekdal later. When the 
referendum of September 6, 1987 lifted the ban on the pre-1980 leading politicians, 
Erbakan returned as the official leader of the “reconstituted NSP” in the Second 
General Congress of the WP on October 11, 1987.24  
                                                 
23 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkey’s Imagined Enemies: Kurds and Islamists”, The World Today, April 
1996, pp. 99-101. 
 
24 Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak [Neither Sharia Nor Democracy: 
To Understand Welfare Party] (Metis Yayınları: İstanbul, 1994), pp. 19, 24 and M. Hakan Yavuz, 
“Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey,” Comparative Politics, October 1997, Vol. 
30, No.1, p. 71. 
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In the 1990s, the WP managed to break out of its previous minority role and 
became a “mass party with ideological skeleton.” The noteworthy point in the 1990s 
is the October 20, 1991 general elections. The alliance of the Nationalist Working 
Party-NWP [Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi-MÇP]25 and the Reformist Democracy Party-
RDP [Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi-IDP] was established under the banner of the WP. 
The slogan of “The believers united in the WP” and the theme of the revival of the 
Kuvay-ı-Milliye (National Militia Forces of Turkish Independence War), was 
emphasized despite the pragmatic, even opportunistic, calculations that were the 
basis of the alliance in reality. The WP wanted to show this ittifak (alliance) as an 
iltihak (accession),26 and many Islamist politicians unrealistically expected the same.  
The alliance success was 16.88 per cent of the votes and 63 seats in the 
parliament. Nevertheless, the alliance did not last long and on November 15, 1991, 
fifty-two days after the elections, the nineteen NWP-oriented deputies resigned, as 
did the three RDP-oriented ones. This pseudo alliance was over because the 
coalition government was established between Süleyman Demirel’s TPP and Erdal 
İnönü’s Social Democratic People’s Party-SDPP [Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti-
SHP].27 In short, this result provided WP a step to expand its electoral basis in the 
next elections. 
In the municipal elections held on March 27, 1994, the WP got 19.0per cent 
of the votes and gained 6 metropolitan municipalities, including Ankara and 
                                                 
25 This party changed its name to the Nationalist Action Party-NAP [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi] in 
1992.  
 
26 Ruşen Çakır, Ne Şeriat Ne Demokrasi, pp. 28, 39. 
 
27 Ibid. , pp. 32-36. 
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İstanbul, and 22 city municipalities. This electoral success continued on December 
24, 1995 general elections. The WP got 21.3per cent of the national votes and 158 
seats in the parliament, which was welcomed by the leaders of the movement as the 
fruit of the zealous working for more than a quarter century. After great 
maneuvering, the WP, the largest group in the parliament, formed a coalition 
government with the TPP under the leadership of Tansu Çiller on June 28, 1996 
after a difficult short MP-TPP government. The coalition government took vote of 
confidence -thanks to the Grand Unity Party-GUP [Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP] on 
July 8, 1996 and ended on June 18, 1997 due to the resignation of Erbakan under the 
pressure of the military. 
The Refahyol government was hit by two important events. First, the 
National Security Council (NSC) meeting held on February 28, 1997 became the 
catalyst for the toppling of the government. The military wing of the Council warned 
the PM about the religious reactionism and to take necessary precautions. The event 
was important since the ultimatum of the top generals was evaluated as a new type 
of coup and the coming period was called the February 28 process. The Islamic 
activities were banned as they were seen as an extension of reactionism in which 
MÜSİAD was accused too. The effects of this process will be explored in the section 
in chapter 5. Second, on May 21, 1997, Vural Savaş, the Chief Public Prosecutor of 
the Republic, filed a case against the WP with the claim that the WP had become the 
focus of the activities against the secularism principle of the Constitution and 
demanded its closure. Moreover, he accused the WP of bringing the country into the 
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brink of a “civil war.”28 According to the judgment of the Constitution Court, the 
WP was closed on January 15, 1998 and Erbakan was punished by being banned 
from politics for five years with other five prominent figures of the WP. After the 
closure, most of the WP deputies joined the VP established on December 17, 1997.    
In April 18, 1999 elections, the VP entered the parliament as the third major 
party with 105 deputies and 15.41per cent of the votes in the general elections and 
23 per cent of the votes and 680 municipalities in the municipal elections.29 
Following the elections, the refusal of Ms. Merve Kavakçı, the VP deputy, to take 
off her veil at the oath-taking ceremony in the General Assembly of the parliament 
provided the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic with the opportunity to file a 
suit against the VP for its closure.30 
Despite these exclusionary and delegitimizing efforts, a gradual, yet 
profound, social transformation has taken place at the grassroots level as a result of 
the creation of alternative social, cultural and economic spaces. The Islamic-oriented 
groups have used these alternative spaces to create their own parallel society to 
attract culturally and economically excluded groups. For instance, deregulation of 
                                                 
28 Burhanettin Duran, “Approaching the Kurdish Question via Adil Düzen: An Islamist Formula of 
the Welfare Party for Ethnic Coexistence” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 1998, Vol. 18, No. 1, 
p. 123 and Refah Partisi Ön Savunma [Pre-Defense of Welfare Party] (Ankara: ?, 1997) and Refah 
Partisi Esas Hakkında Savunma [Welfare Party’s Defense on Essence] (Ankara:?, 1997). For further 
information see Hürriyet, 22 May 1997 and other daily newspapers of the same day. 
 
29 Murat Çemrek, “Gereği Görüşülüp Düşünüldü: FP’nin Temelli Kapatılmasına...” [We conclude 
that VP is to be Permanently Closed…] Tezkire, Vol. 10,  No. 22, September 2001, p. 17.  
 
30 The VP was closed on 22 June 2001 after a long court period and two new Islamic-oriented parties 
emerged as the Saadet Partisi-SP (Contentment Party-CP), led by the former VP leader Recai Kutan, 
and Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP (Justice and Development Party-JDP) led by the former popular 
mayor of İstanbul metropolitan municipality, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This was also a split between 
the traditionalist and modern wings of the VP. For further information, see Ziya Öniş, “Political Islam 
at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence” Contemporary Politics, 2001, Vol. 7, No. 4. p. 
292. 
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broadcasting has empowered Islamic voices to express themselves on diverse radio 
stations, television channels, magazines and newspapers. In fact, the democratization 
of Turkish politics has also assisted in bringing Islam into the public sphere, as 
politicians have required to address the religious aspirations of the electorate.31 New 
alternative spaces such as MÜSİAD and the new TV stations, have served to 
empower Islamic groups in Turkey.32 
3.3. Economic Level 
3.3.1. A Brief Account of Turkish Economy in 1980-2000 
The year 1980 is a crucial turning point in the history of Turkish economy. 
The previous economic system had been dominated with the characteristics of 
financial repression based on negative real interest rates, a heavy tax burden on 
financial earnings, and high liquidity reserve requirement ratios. Moreover, the 
second half of the 1970s in Turkey was characterized by remarkable political and 
economic instability. On the economic side, the major balance of payments crisis of 
the late 1970s corresponded to the combined impact of two factors: the collapse of 
the dominant ISI model of development33 and external shocks due to the extreme 
increases of oil price. On the political side, succeeding weak coalition governments 
further contributed to economic instability by postponing the necessary structural 
                                                 
31 For further information about the development of Islam in the public sphere see James Pettifer, The 
Turkish Labyrinth: Ataturk and the New Islam (London: PenguinBooks, 1998). 
 
32 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen” 
Middle East Journal, Autumn 1999, Vol. 53, No. 1, p. 585. 
 
33 For further information on the ISI model and its repercussions in Turkey, see Anne O. Krueger, 
Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Turkey (New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1974), Maxwell J. Fry, Finance and Development Planning in Turkey (Leiden: 
E.J.Brill, 1972) and Henri J. Barkey, The State and the Industrialization Crisis in Turkey (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990). 
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adjustment process. These governments were unable to control and stop terrorism 
and urban violence, threatening the daily security of the average citizen. In such a 
medium, it was not surprising that the military intervened for the third time in 
civilian politics, on September 12, 1980.  
Following a long period of state-dominated, heavily interventionist and 
inward looking economic policy and the failure of two stabilization programs in 
1958 and 1970, Turkey commenced an extensive reform program in 1980. 34 The 
minority government led by Süleyman Demirel intended to liberalize the economy 
on a sustainable growth path through export-led policies while reducing inflation on 
permanent basis. Then, austerity measures, famous as January 24 Measures, 
signified the shift towards a market-oriented economic model and the integration of 
Turkey into the global commodity and financial markets. The first step was the 
financial deregulation by liberating interest rates on loans and deposits in July 
1980.35 However, the government kept control on interest rates for preferential 
credits in areas, i.e. export, agriculture and certain categories of investment. Also, 
certificates of deposits (CDs) emerged as the new financial instruments of the 
regulatory framework.36 This process was also part of a broader global trend under 
                                                 
34 For further information on several aspects of the Turkish adjustment program, see collection of 
essays in Tevfik F. Nas and Mehmet Odekon, eds. Liberalization and the Turkish Economy (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1988), Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, eds. The Political Economy of 
Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability (London: Macmillan, 1990) and Ziya Öniş, ed. State and 
Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University 
Press, 1998), Korkut Boratav, Oktay Türel and Erinç Yeldan, “The Turkish Economy in 1981-92: A 
Balance Sheet, Problems and Prospects” METU Studies in Development, 1995, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 1-
36. 
 
35 For the developments in the financial sector since 1980, see Işık İnselbağ and N. Bülent Gültekin, 
“Financial Markets in Turkey” in Liberalization and the Turkish Economy, pp. 129-140. 
 
36 For further information, see G. Sak, Public Policies Towards Financial Liberalization: A General 
Framework and an Evaluation of the Turkish Experience in the 1980s (Ankara: Capital Markets 
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the auspices of the World Bank and IMF. In short, the adjustment program was 
welcomed as a “model” by the international community and supported by generous 
structural adjustment loans, debt relief, and technical aid. 37  
Despite the military intervention on September 12, 1980, the military 
authorities kept the implementation of the program intact by keeping Turgut Özal, 
the architect of the 24 January Measures, giving him the post of Deputy Prime 
Minister in the military cabinet. In the 1981-82 period, the financial liberalization 
continued through the removal of the ceilings on deposit interest rates to maintain 
positive real rates of interest. This approach was based on the presumption that 
higher saving and concomitant higher investment would be achieved while 
decreasing the need for external finance. The program succeeded in terms of real 
economic growth, “relatively” low inflation rate, liberalized external trade regime 
and financial system and further integration of the domestic economy within 
international one during period 1981-82.38 Thus, the 1980-83 military rule period 
was characterized by stabilization, trade liberalization, deregulation of industrial and 
financial markets through an interest rate reform.  
After the general elections of 1983, the MP led by Özal won the majority of 
the parliament and established the government. The inflation started to rise again 
                                                                                                                                         
Board Press, 1995). 
 
37 On the broad political economy of Turkey during the post-1980 era, see Ziya Öniş and Steven B 
Webb, “Turkey: Democratization and Adjustment from Above,” in Voting for Reform: Democracy, 
Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment, Stephan Haggard and Steven B Webb, eds. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 128-184. See also the collection of essays in Atilla Eralp, 
Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada, eds. The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of 
Turkey (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). 
 
38 A. Erinç Yeldan, Harun Bulut, Onur Özgür, Sevgi Rençberoğlu, Engin Volkan and Ebru Voyvoda 
“Dynamics of Growth, Accumulation and Distribution in the post-1980 Turkish Economy: A 
Kaldorian General Equilibrium Interpretation” paper presented at the URPE at the ASSA Meetings, 
New York City, January 3-5, 1999. p. 5. 
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although the program was continuing.39 Financial liberalization improved when the 
residents and non-residents were granted the right to open foreign exchange deposits 
with the commercial banks in 1984. However, at the end of 1985, the rise in 
speculative foreign exchange dealings resulted in some restrictions on foreign 
exchange transactions and deposits of the banks. Thus, limitations were imposed on 
foreign exchange selling rates, required reserves were broadened to include foreign 
exchange deposits, and banks were impelled to sell a certain proportion of the 
foreign exchange receipts to the Central Bank (CB).  
In 1986 an inter-bank money market was created and in 1987 interest rates 
were once again deregulated and the CB started open-market-operations resulting in 
the increase of the interest rates by private banks. Meanwhile, rapidly increasing 
inflation forced banks to postpone further deposit rate increases. This, in turn, led to 
a shift in favor of foreign exchange deposits bringing the CB’s intervention again by 
raising the deposit rate. Yet, the disequilibria in the financial market continued 
signifying the heavy speculation by banks in foreign exchange transactions. This 
opened the path for a sharp rise in foreign exchange interest rates.40 
Starting in 1988, with the return of the pre-coup politicians after the 1987 
referendum, the momentum of the adjustment process started to decline. Özal’s 
government began to follow populist policies of massive wage increases and high 
agricultural subsidies which both led to further deterioration of public accounts and 
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increase of inflation.41 Then, in order to overcome public deficits, the authorities 
eliminated all controls on foreign capital flows,42 which resulted in the capital 
account liberalization with full convertibility of the Turkish Lira (TL) in 1989 by the 
Decree No.32 issued.43  
This transition to the full convertibility, eliminating the protection of the 
value of the Turkish currency, was a very important step toward financial openness. 
This legislation permitted non-residents to buy and sell Turkish securities and to 
transfer income and sales proceeds of these securities abroad through banks and 
other financial institutions. Residents were also permitted to purchase securities 
abroad and to transfer the foreign exchange required to purchase such securities. 
Moreover, Turkish commercial banks were allowed to extend foreign currency 
credits to foreign trade companies, which completed deregulation of capital 
movements.44 The effect of these developments was to open up Turkey’s domestic 
markets to global financial competition and the CB lost its control over the 
determination of exchange and interest rates as policy instruments.45 In short, 
adoption of the full convertibility of the TL constituted the final impediment in the 
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step-by-step liberalization of the Turkish economy, a process that had initiated in 
January 1980.  
The financial liberalization process in the 1980s achieved fiscal and 
monetary stability, stimulated business confidence to invest in productive sectors. 
The relatively stable growth in the 1980s fostered expectations of further 
privatization. However, the new hegemony of the capital markets deteriorated 
macroeconomic performance by worsening income distribution, which discredited 
politics.46 Moreover, during the 1980s, the Turkish economy experienced 
accelerating inflation simultaneously with financial liberalization efforts. Average 
annual inflation was 36.2per cent during 1981-84 and accelerated to 43.3% during 
the 1985-8847 while fluctuating within a 40% to 70% range during the rest of 
1980s.48 
 The Turkish state, starting with the late 1980s, adopted the logic of global 
capitalism and promoted financial liberalization consciously. Liberalization and 
globalization of the Turkish economy occurred more rapidly than expected. The 
government turned its face to global financial markets and permitted large inflows of 
foreign capital, known as hot money, as a key mechanism to restore economic 
growth. However, the governments did not focus on correcting the basic structural 
deficiencies of the Turkish economy, namely large fiscal imbalances and a loss of 
momentum in the export drive. This injection of hot money inflows to the domestic 
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economy enabled both the financing of rising public sector expenditures and relief 
on inflationary pressures by decreasing import costs until the 1994 economic crisis.49 
In sum, this type of growth helped solely to disguise rather than to overcome the 
basic structural weaknesses of the Turkish economy.50  
Paradoxically the populist policies failed to prevent MP, now led by Mesut 
Yılmaz, from losing the general elections in 1991. The coalition government of the 
TPP and the SDPP represented “losers” of the post-1980 reform process, mainly 
wage earners and rural people. The powerful pressures associated with competitive 
political life discouraged the new coalition government from implementing a far-
reaching stabilization program. In short, the populist economic policies since the 
referendum of September 1987 -and the subsequent election of November 1987- 
constituted momentum from 1989 onwards which continued to characterize the 
economic stance of various governments in the 1990s.51  
By the end of 1993, it became clear that the rapid growth of the Turkish 
economy at the beginning of the 1990s had not been based on strong foundations. 
Because the rising current account deficit covered by inflows of primarily short-term 
foreign capital flows, could not establish a basis for a sustainable growth process. 
Thus, the government embraced the low interest rate by relying heavily upon the 
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resources of the CB to break the vicious circle of domestic borrowing with high 
interest rates. Towards the end of 1993, the policies of lower interest rate-higher 
depreciation and cancellation of the Treasury auctions forced the banking system to 
re-arrange the foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities. The rapid 
expansion of public sector credits and expansionary monetary policies motivated by 
populist policies for elections increased inflation significantly in the 1990s and it 
reached its peak of 149per cent escorted with the fall of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) by 6per cent in 1994.52 This, in turn, provoked the demand for foreign 
currency53 and the reduction of the investment rating of Turkey by two major credit 
rating institutions led to the crisis in 1994, which resulted a major outflow of short-
term capital.54 In short, this financial crisis manifested itself as a major balance of 
payments crisis that resulted in massive depreciation of exchange rates. 
The failure of the Çiller-led coalition government, crystallized in 1994 
economic crisis, transformed her populist discourse to a conservative nationalist one. 
Then, the government tried to keep interest rates low and switched from domestic 
borrowing to foreign debt and monetization to reduce inflation without giving up 
economic growth. However, this policy, paradoxically, led instead to higher interest 
rates, higher deficits, and continued high inflation. In sum, the crisis of 1994 showed 
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the vulnerability of the Turkish economy and the structural shortcomings of the 
banking system to speculative gains of hot money.  
The coalition government of TPP-SDPP led by Tansu Çiller launched a 
stabilization program on April 5, 1994, resulting in a further 65per cent devaluation 
of TL.55 The IMF Board approved a stand-by arrangement two months after the 
program started. The austerity measures after 1994 economic crisis, famous as April 
5 Decisions, eventually brought inflation down temporarily from 149per cent to 
72per cent in 1995, but could not eliminate the macroeconomic imbalances. This 
austerity program depended mainly on wage suppression and tight monetary policy. 
This, in turn, accelerated significant shifts in income distribution and to an 
intensification of the transfer of economic surplus from wage-earners and the 
industrial/real sectors towards finance.56  
The program was short-lived since the government once again turned the 
short-term capital inflows to restore the growth.57 It became clear that the 
government did not have the political will to continue the April 5 program and the 
stand-by agreement ended in 1995.58 The real wages continued to decline and the 
inflows of foreign capital enabled the financing of the fiscal gap. The cost of these 
adjustments to the Treasury resulted in the acceleration of the interest burden on its 
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borrowing instruments. Thus, the average real rate of interest offered on the 
government bonds increased to 24.9per cent after the 1994 crisis. 59  
The 1994 economic crisis led MÜSİAD criticize the government and its 
economy policies based on attraction of hot money inflows.  MÜSİAD severely and 
repeatedly underlined the vicious circle of rising interest rates and iflation as well as 
appreciation of TL due to hot money inflows which results in less investment and so 
production. MÜSİAD argued that in such crisis situations, the inflows of short term 
foreign capital could easily leave Turkey, which deepens the crisis situation. 
MÜSİAD defended KOBİs that were negatively affected since they cannot depend 
on Treasury bonds as big business.   
The poor economic performance of the government ultimately led to early 
elections in late 1995.60 All these developments helped the WP to become the largest 
party in the 1995 elections but did not help the economy to recover due to the 
troublesome political climate of Turkey with short-lived coalition governments of 
the MP-TPP, Anayol, and the following WP-TPP, Refahyol. This ambiguous 
political environment hit the economy negatively. Thus, the political turmoil and the 
successive weak governments blocked the implementation of a viable economic 
adjustment program. 
A new coalition, Anasol-D, goverment composed of MP, the Democratic 
Left Party-DLP [Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP] and the Democratic Turkey Party-DTP 
[Demokratik Türkiye Partisi-DTP] was established with the backing of military in 
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July 1997. The pro-Islamic political agenda, orchestrated by the defunct WP- banned 
by the Constitutional Court in January 1997- and its successor VP, addressed the 
issues of worsening income distribution and social equity in their discourses. This, in 
turn, provoked the secular elite to discipline the government’s fiscal management.61 
Thus, the Anasol-D government, led by Mesut Yılmaz, on February 6, 1998 
launched a tax reform package, Mali Milad, labeling it as a milestone for the 
“survival of the regime.”62  
In July 1998 another disinflation program under the guidance of an IMF Staff 
Monitored Program initiated. Although this austerity program was successful in 
terms of inflation rate and fiscal imbalances, it could not relieve the pressures on the 
interest rates. Finally, the Asian financial crisis63 and the Russian crisis hit the 
Turkish economy starting in August of 1998.64 The fall of the coalition government 
due to corruption allegations resulted in the minority government led by Bülent 
Ecevit for a short period until the general elections held in April 1999. Then, the 
coalition government composed of DLP, NAP and MP was founded which had to 
overcome two devastating earthquakes in August and October 1999 deteriorating the 
fiscal balance of the public sector. 65  
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One sign of the vulnerability of Turkish macroeconomic balances in the 
1990s was continuing inflation. The inflation rates varied between 62.3per cent and 
90.6per cent during 1989-93 and 1994-97 periods respectively66 due to the dynamics 
of the growth performance of the Turkish economy and unsuccessful Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) financing policies. The annual inflation rate 
reached up to almost 100per cent again in 1997. Thus, excessive public expenditure 
and the concomitant budget deficits remained primary source of inflation in effect. 
The inflation continued to dominate Turkey67 with the 80-90 per cent range during 
1995-1999.68 The worst result of the inflation was the social structure shaped by 
extreme polarization of incomes, which prevented a social pact to establish a 
consensus on an anti-inflationary strategy.69 Moreover, inflationary structure 
discouraged investments since the interests were high. In such a medium, MÜSİAD 
underlined the importance of production for the development of Turkey and severely 
criticized the high interest policies of governments blocking investments on 
production. 
The coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit started implementing another 
structural reform program after the general elections in April 1999, which was 
strengthened by the stand-by agreement with the IMF in December 1999. The 
program aimed to reduce inflation from 60-70per cent per year to single digits by the 
end of 2002. The major device of this disinflation program was the adoption of a 
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crawling peg regime based on the percent change in the TL value of a basket of 
foreign exchanges, 1 US dollar plus 0.70 Euro, which was fixed for 18 moths period. 
Although there emerged turmoil in the Turkish financial markets in late November 
and early December 2000, the program seemed to function until February 2001, with 
the substantial additional fund of the IMF after the crisis in December 2000.  
This short-lived financial crisis in December 2000 signified the fragile 
structure of the Turkish financial system, which became more visible when Turkish 
economy was exposed to another crisis in February 2001. This crisis was the last 
drop and resulted in the collapse of the stock market and the government decision 
for transition to a floating currency regime from the crawling-peg model which 
meant the a devaluation of 80 per cent in the value of currency and panic in the 
markets. The crisis was very deep bringing the closure of 4,000 firms and half a 
million people lost their job immediately, especially in the banking sector. 
Ironically, both of the crises clarified the dependence of the disinflation program and 
the stability of the banking system on short-term foreign capital inflows. Another 
result of the crisis was that unless the government creates a politically secure 
environment to comfort the foreign direct investment, any disinflation program is to 
fail.70 Thus, the government appointed Kemal Derviş, a former Vice-President of the 
World Bank in charge of poverty alleviation programs, as the State Minister 
responsible from economy.  
Derviş, brought new regulations on reserve requirement, liquidity ratio, loan 
loss provision and their amendments were put into effect. The special law on the 
privatization of state banks was amended and a new action plan for the banks under 
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the management of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) was announced.71 
Derviş’s  National Program assured the major public banks to be merged and 
privatized in three years time, state subsidies to agriculture to be stopped, state-
monopoly of telecommunication, tobacco and spirits, sugar, natural gas to be 
privatized and opened to global markets.  
Ali Bayramoğlu criticized the government harshly following the last crisis.72 
Although MÜSİAD sympathized with the IMF prescribed stability program put 
down by the government in 1999, it believed that the program would not be enough 
to revive the reel economy and provide economic growth with these monetary 
precautions.73 MÜSİAD published a “crisis prescription” for the business life in 
which the members are advised not to pay attention to the words of the political and 
bureaucratic elite. In this booklet, it is argued that their words are mostly propaganda 
oriented. The members are advised to keep themselves in liquid assets and if 
possible in foreign currency, as well as trying to increase the quality of the produced 
goods and export level. Keeping tight control on the import of the one’s firm, selling 
in cash, paying more attention to the marketing and are other vital advises.74 Then, 
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MÜSİAD offered partial monetization and partial consolidation of debts for the 
solution of the crisis in another booklet.75 
Consequently, Turkish post-liberalization era in the last two decades passed 
through various cycles of rapid growth and stagnation with different characteristics. 
The 1983-1988, 1989-1993 and the 1995-1998 periods were characterized by rapid 
growth, expansion of investments and exports together with a significant erosion of 
the share of wage incomes. However, both of the 1983-1987, 1989-1993 and 1999-
2001 periods turned out to be unsustainable on both social and economic grounds by 
the unexpected economic crises of 1988, 1994 and 2001. All in all, the post-1980 
Turkish history of liberalization experience reveals a process of boom-and-bust 
cycles of growth and crisis with unexpected changes in income distribution 
warranted by integration with the global markets. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey’s 
banking and financial institutions became the dominant forces behind the capital 
manipulating the overall economy, which was driven by both domestic and global 
factors. On the domestic front, the collapse of public disposable income accelerated 
PSBR resulting in high interest rates on government bonds and treasury bills. This 
paved the path for the dominance of finance over the reel economy.76 In sum, current 
account imbalances since 1980s made the governments more sensitive about the 
sustainability of external imbalances. 
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3.3.2. 1980 Adjustment Program and Export-Promotion in the 
1980s 
The minority government (November 1979-September 1980) led by 
Süleyman Demirel prepared new austerity program, known as the January 24 
Decisions in 1980. The program was under the leadership of Turgut Özal who held 
the posts of the Undersecretary and the Deputy Minister. These austerity measures 
emphasized the need for market forces to reign freely with less governmental 
intervention in the economy, readjustment of the tax system, deregulation of the 
labor market and privatization. 77 This program also aimed at a more efficient and 
flexible financial system to convert national savings into productive investments at 
the lowest cost while integrating the Turkish economy further into the global 
system.78 
The political turmoil in terms of street fights between leftist and rightist 
groups and the worsening of economic conditions in the late 1970s led the military 
to intervene on September 12, 1980 before the results of the program. The 
adjustment program continued after the military intervention favoring the 
deregulation of industrial and financial markets as well as liberalization of trade and 
capital movements. The major concern of the program was to decrease the rate of 
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inflation and the current account deficits to moderate levels. The multiple exchange 
rates system was discarded and quantitative restrictive measures on imports were 
removed. In January 1980, exchange rate of TL was depreciated 49per cent, from 47 
TL per dollar to TL 70 per dollar. The rate was then adjusted periodically until May 
1981, when adjustments became daily practice. The SEEs increased their prices and 
adopted a flexible industrial price policy. The labor union activity was restricted and 
the salaries of government employees and agricultural support prices were 
reduced.79 
The post-1980 arrangements narrowed the bases of political participation via 
abolishing political parties and outlawing their leaders from political activity, which 
weakened the foundations of parliamentary democracy. This repressive political 
framework eased the implementation of the austerity measures. The military 
government, September 1980-November 1983, tried to stabilize the political system 
through depoliticizing the economy by eliminating any potential threats to the 
market-orientated reforms. Yet the outcome of these measures, paradoxically, have 
formed the seeds of greater instability in the end of the 1980s.80  
Before the 1980 adjustment program, the Turkish state was both a productive 
agent through SEEs and a regulatory agent directly involved in the administration of 
foreign exchange and determination of key prices. After the program, however, the 
state’s productive agent role decreased by adopting privatization policies while 
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keeping its regulatory role in income redistribution through the conduct of its fiscal 
operations, i.e. determination of interest rates and subsidies for exporters.81 In short, 
the 1980 adjustment program transformed the role of the state in the Turkish 
political economy and paved the path for export-oriented policies, which led the 
increase of KOBİs in Anatolia, the basis of MÜSİAD. The instability of Turkish 
economy due to government policies also attracted KOBİs to the importance of 
export rather than leaning on the domestic market. This also formed the basis of 
MÜSİAD’s mass foreign trips to discover new markets for its members who are 
mainly composed of KOBİs.  
Export promotion was the main policy objective of the adjustment program 
of 1980. Thus, after 1980, exporters gained a prestigious position in the society and 
received state encouragement in the form of incentives.82 The governments of the 
1980s supported export activities by a regulated foreign exchange system and 
controls on capital inflows, which lasted until the end of 1988. The depreciation of 
the TL and several tax incentives to exporters were the major driving forces of this 
export-led growth policy in this period. This generated an exportable support with 
heavy use of export subsidies and exportable surplus, which found its way to the 
newly growing Middle Eastern markets.83   
The military and Özal-led governments suppressed wages, which provided 
both lowering production costs and squeezing the domestic market capacity. The 
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business-labor relations in KOBİs, on the other hand, provided a more secure place 
for the labor due to “family” understanding of workplace despite less payment. This 
discourse was voiced in MÜSİAD circles with reference to Islamic moral values and 
East Asian type strong communal bonds to signify the fraternity of worker and the 
employer. The owners of KOBİs could treat workers as family members within 
patrimonial base since they work together. MÜSİAD proposed its members not to 
fire their workers to keep the family spirit intact in their workplace regardless how 
much it costs.84 In short, harmonious labor relations in KOBİs led their development 
so the enlargement of MÜSİAD membership basis. Thus, KOBİs benefited from 
such policies since they could employ more labor while paying less and they could 
increase their profit when they could develop themselves in exports.  
The export performance of Turkish economy was impressive in the period 
1980-88; annual export growth rate reached 19per cent while the average annual 
growth rate of the real GDP was 5.8.85 Moreover, the Turkish export growth rate 
surpassed world export growth rate by a significant margin. This, in turn resulted in 
praise for Turkey as an exemplary model in the annual reports of international 
financial institutions such as the IMF.  
This export promotion and the concomitant price reform aimed at reducing 
the state’s role in the economic affairs. At the end of 1983, most of the quota 
restrictions on the list of “prohibited” items were lifted and tariffs were substantially 
lowered to liberalize the import regime. The system of fixed exchange rate 
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administration was replaced by a flexible regime of crawling-peg and a complex 
system of direct export subsidization was introduced. These policies acted as the 
main instruments for the promotion of exports and pursuit of macroeconomic 
stability. Therefore, the external balance situation improved significantly as the 
external deficit to GDP ratio went down from 7per cent in 1980 to negative 1per 
cent meaning surplus in 1988.86  
The dependence of Turkish industrial production on the availability of 
imports continued despite the noteworthy transformation of the domestic markets 
towards a more open economy in 1980s. The export gains based only on price 
incentives and subsidies had exhausted their impetus by the end of the decade. 87 
Consequently, the post-1980 export-orientation could not be sustained as a viable 
strategy of export-led industrialization in the 1990s. 
 
3.3.3. The Turkish State’s Role in Economy in 1980-2000 
Liberalization of economy in Turkey, as in many other countries, did not 
denote a shift from a state-led model of development to an idealized free-market 
economy, with minimal state interventionism. In fact, despite significant 
liberalization in the financial sector, international trade and capital movements, the 
Turkish state remained a key actor in the economy as well as the distributor of 
economic rents to the private sector. The SEEs, the scapegoat of the budget deficit, 
                                                 
86 Ibid.,  p. 7. 
 
87 Korkut Boratav, A. Erinç Yeldan and Ahmet H. Köse, “Globalization, Distribution and Social 
Policy, 1980-1998,” pp. 14-15.    
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kept their significance in the economy in the last two decades despite the 
privatization efforts.88 This could be observed from the tables below. The Table 2 
denotes that the ratio of PSBR89 to the Gross National Product (GNP) has slightly 
decreased. The Table 3 reveals that state expenses continued increasingly during 
the1980s without any noticeable decrease. We can conclude from both tables that 
GNP, with the export-promotion policies, increased more than the increase of state 
expenses, which resulted in the slight decrease of the PSBR.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 On the role of the SEEs and the privatization efforts, see Çoşkun Can Aktan, “Public Enterprises in 
Turkey” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, March 1996, Vol. 67, No. 1, pp. 117-129. 
 
89 The public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) in Turkey consists of six components: central 
Government, extra-budgetary funds, local authorities, state economic enterprises, social security 
institutions and revolving funds. 
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Table 2. Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) in 1980-200290 
(TL in billions) 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 For further information, see http://www.tcmb.gov.tr and 
http://www.hazine.gov.tr/yayin/hazineistatistikleri/contents.htm#P6 
YEAR PSBR GNP PSBR/GNP
1980 465 5303 8
1981 319 8023 4
1982 374 10612 3
1983 689 13933 4
1984 1194 22168 5
1985 1267 35350 3
1986 1869 51185 3
1987 4563 75019 6
1988 6235 129175 4
1989 12283 230370 5
1990 29429 397178 7
1991 64469 634431 10
1992 116680 1103605 10
1993 239793 1997323 1
1994 306937 3887893 7
1995 408265 7854887 5
1996 1340760 14978067 9
1997 2246600 29393262 7
1998 4822605 53518332 9
1999 11847800 78242496 15
2000 15685000.0000  25971000 12
2001 28528000.0000  84767000 15
2002 22457000.0000  80551000 8
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Table 3. State-Dominated Factors of the Consolidated Budget91                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 1987 Constant Prices 
Years
Expenditures 
(TL Billions)
Personnel 
(TL 
Billions)
Other 
Current 
(TL 
Billions)
Investments 
(TL Billions)
Interest 
Payments 
(TL 
Billions)
Foreign 
Borrowing 
(TL 
Billions)
Domestic 
Borrowing 
(TL 
Billions)
Transfer 
to SEEs 
(TL 
Billions)
Other 
Transfers 
(TL 
Billions)
1979 597 213 50 98 18 5 13 107 111
1980 1079 342 153 186 31 9 22 177 190
1981 1515 398 240 306 75 34 41 191 305
1982 1601 442 278 333 87 53 34 224 237
1983 2612 670 398 473 211 131 80 302 558
1984 3784 896 594 691 441 264 177 275 887
1985 5400 1276 819 1117 675 427 247 181 1332
1986 8560 1840 1211 2019 1331 682 649 138 2021
1987 13044 2996 1542 2642 2266 1006 1260 446 3152
1988 21447 5053 2407 3564 4978 1819 3159 1025 4420
1989 38871 12539 4121 5818 8259 3144 5115 1223 6911
1990 68527 26465 6987 10055 13966 4353 9613 1265 9789
1991 130263 49291 11112 17146 24073 7132 16941 12191 16450
1992 221657 94076 20145 29239 40297 9753 30545 8145 29755
1993 485249 169511 35318 53161 116470 23952 92518 25850 84939
1994 897296 273062 73407 72788 298285 65117 233168 21029 158725
1995 1710645 502600 141549 91777 576115 100596 475519 45500 353104
1996 3940162 974148 308571 238085 1497401 168314 1329087 50200 871757
1997 7990748 2073140 706342 590382 2277917 299950 1977967 123640 2219327
1998 5585376 3870228 1309061 998361 6176595 547081 5629514 159960 3071171
1999 8017791 6908320 2239566 1540232 10720840 896218 9824622 416800 6192033
2000 6602626 9982149 3611314 2472317 20439862 1648000 18791862 885908 9211076
2001 379004 15203977 5164362 4139803 41064609 3570308 37494301 1200656 13605597
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The Turkish economy during the 1980s was also subject to increasing 
politicization of the state and a corresponding weakening of the traditional 
bureaucracy.92 This meant the increasing importance of direct contact for 
businessmen with politicians to achieve more access to state resources. The 
politicization of rent distribution resulted in a loss of confidence and a decline in the 
moral authority of the state in Turkey93 as well as weakened the business 
associations previously explained. Thus, the private sector continued to be heavily 
dependent on its ability to gain access to state resources and incentives, not on its 
own dynamism and initiatives. Moreover, the Özal-led governments followed a 
relaxed attitude towards “economic crimes” of bribery, corruption and 
embezzlement, including hayali ihracaat (fictitious exporting).94 Similarly, 
widespread tax evasion and the growth of the underground economy were features 
of the 1980s. In short,  “the state apparatus turned into a bastion of privilege,” for the 
business community due to its regulatory role in the creation and absorption of the 
economic surplus.95 
In the political arena, the 1987 referendum resulted in return to fully 
competitive politics with the return of “old veteran” politicians like Süleyman 
Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş to the political 
stage. This, in turn, opened up the political system to distributional demands, which 
                                                 
92 On the changing role of the state in Turkey during the post-1980 era, see Korkut Boratav, “İktisat 
Tarihi,1981-1994” [History of Economics, 1981-1994] in Türkiye Tarihi [History of Turkey], Cilt 5, 
Bugünkü Türkiye [Today’s Turkey], Sina Akşin, ed.  (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), pp. 159-210. 
 
93 Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey,” p. 753. 
 
94 For further information, see Canan Balkır, “Trade Strategy in the 1980s” in The Political and 
Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, pp. 135-168. 
 
95 Tevfik F. Nas and Mark J. Perry, “Turkish Inflation and Real Output Growth,” p. 35. 
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had largely been repressed during the military rule and Özal’s early years in office. 
Thus, the referendum, which resulted the return of these politicians to political life 
intensified the political struggle and imposed the government to follow populist 
policies of economic expansionism. Consequently, this new wave of populist 
pressures combined with the general elections in 1987 and municipal elections in 
1989 helped organized labor to attain significant increases in wages. Thus, the 
classical accumulation episode based on wage suppression came to a halt by 1989. 
Furthermore, the increased foreign debt and the concomitant rising costs of 
debt financing in 1980s constituted an important source of macroeconomic 
disequilibria.96 This delegitimized the system by increasing inflationary pressures 
stemming from the budget deficit.97 The governments favored borrowing from the 
growing domestic financial markets rather than undertaking tax and social security 
system reforms. Thus, the instrumental role of public spending continued to 
constitute the legitimacy of the state. This, in turn, fostered the fever of PSBR and 
the concomitant pressures of macroeconomic instability through chronic inflation. 
Moreover, the government transferred foreign exchange transactions on foreign 
trade from the CB to the private banks. This encouraged private banks to utilize 
short-term credits from the external market.98 Thus, the public sector has been 
trapped in a short-term rolling of debt, Ponzi-financing,99 in which domestic 
                                                 
96 Korkut Boratav, A. Erinç Yeldan and Ahmet H. Köse, “Globalization, Distribution and Social 
Policy, 1980-1998,” p. 6.    
 
97 Ibid.,  p. 27.    
 
98 Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Erinç Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization,” p. 499. 
 
99 For further information on Chares K. Ponzi and his finance system see, http://www.mark-
knutson.com/ and http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm. 
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financial markets required the continued inflow of short-term external capital 
inflows.  
 The inefficiency of the state banks was also another factor in the rise of 
PSBR. This inefficiency was due to the implicit resource allocation decision of the 
governments based on the distribution of extended concessionary credits to the 
agricultural sector, KOBİs, and the housing sector. These banks were not able to 
change their traditional loan extending policies and could not reduce the volume of 
concessionary loans. Thus, the total burden of this credit policy and some quasi-
fiscal duties of the state banks increased to USD 20 billion at the end of year 2000. 
These so-called görev zararları (duty losses) were slightly above 10per cent of the 
GDP and 14per cent of the total assets of the banking system. The inadequate 
reimbursement of the Treasury concerning the duty losses further increased the 
liquidity and capital adequacy problems of the state banks. Thus, the cost of fund 
raising for these banks increased.100 This disorder in the financial system resulted in 
an overall economic crisis in which KOBİs, hence MÜSİAD, were severely affected 
since many of petite bourgeoisie lost their enterprises. 
The SEEs happened to be another contributing factor to the PSBR since the 
public enterprise sector performance deteriorated with over-employment and not 
functioning according to market rationality. Although the issue of privatization kept 
its place in the agenda of every government since 1980, its performance of Turkey 
was quite weak until 2000 due to the legal framework and populist policies of the 
                                                 
100 Faruk Selçuk and Ahmet Ertuğrul, “A Brief Account of the Turkish Economy, 1980-2000,” p. 26. 
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governments.101 In short, lack of constraints over the public expenditures led to the 
expansion of the fiscal deficit and rising interest payments. Moreover, Turkey’s 
financial reform resulted in huge public sector debt turning the government into the 
country’s largest source of inflation.102 Thus, the disinflation policies in the late 
1980s were composed of various forms of monetary tightening without any serious 
effort to reduce the PSBR. This policy, in turn, necessitated a higher interest rate on 
domestic assets and a lower depreciation rate to secure the short-term capital 
inflow,103 which resulted futile in preventing the inflation because it continued in the 
1990s. 
The Turkish state’s solution to overcome public debts was the foreign capital 
inflows to Turkey that increased sharply from 1990 onwards and created 
appreciation of the TL in real terms. 104 This helped the governments to undermine 
export growth, even encouraged a parallel process of import expansion, and 
compensated the current account deficit during 1989-1994 period. However, this 
process amplified the magnitude of the macroeconomic instability in Turkey in the 
second half of 1990s.105 
                                                 
101 Merih Celasun, “State-Owned Enterprises and Privatization in Turkey: Policy, Performance and 
Reform Experience, 1985-1995” in State-Owned Enterprises in the Middle East and North Africa: 
Privatization, Performance and Reform, M. Celasun and I. Arslan, eds. (NY: Routledge, 2001), pp. 
224-252. 
 
102 For a more formal account of the deterioration of the fiscal balances of the Turkish public sector in 
the 1990s, see A. Erinç Yeldan, “On Structural Sources of the 1994 Turkish Crisis: A CGE Modelling 
Analysis,” International Review of Applied Economics, 1998, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 397-414. 
 
103 Faruk Selçuk and Ahmet Ertuğrul, “A Brief Account of the Turkish Economy, 1980-2000,” p. 7. 
 
104 See A. Erinç Yeldan, “Surplus Creation and Extraction under Structural Adjustment: Turkey, 
1980-1992” Review of Radical Political Economics, June 1995, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 38-72. 
 
105 For an empirical study of the causal relationship between foreign assets and budget deficits in 
Turkey, see Nurhan Yentürk, “Capital Inflows and Their Impact on Macroeconomic Performance: A 
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The Turkish state intensified the process of globalization and became directly 
accountable to external capital markets in the 1990s. Then, the judgments of global 
capital markets, primarily concerned with the immediate profit but not the long-term 
development prospects of domestic production, became the ultimate determinations 
of the government’s creditworthiness. Thus, the expansion of global capital inflow 
to Turkey did not result in greater investment and employment opportunities by 
either foreign investors or the private sector in Turkey. 106 
In the 1990s, the Turkish state financed its PSBR from domestic sources by 
issuing government debt instruments (GDIs). This implementation enabled 
successive governments to bypass many of the legal regulations and protocols 
constraining their fiscal operations. Thus, the public sector deficit started to be 
financed through domestic agents borrowing that replaced the direct borrowing of 
the public sector from the international capital markets.107 This switch to domestic 
borrowing brought the extraordinary rise in the stock of GDIs from about 6per cent 
of the GNP in 1989 to more than 20per cent by 1998. Thus, the fragility of the 
domestic asset markets increased fostering the very high rates of real interest. Then, 
the real rate of return offered on the GDIs provoked interest payments to increase 
very rapidly, reaching 11per cent of GNP in 1998. Briefly, the balance of payments 
                                                                                                                                         
Comparison of Turkey and Mexico” Boğaziçi Journal, 1995, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 67-84. 
 
106 Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Erinç Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization,” p. 487. 
 
107 Ziya Öniş and Ahmet Faruk Aysan, “Neoliberal Globalisation, The Nation-State and Financial 
Crises in the Semi-periphery,” pp.128-129. 
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in such a structure signified the dependence of Turkish economy on the short-term 
capital flows.108  
The developments since the 1980s subordinated politics to the 
technical/economic logic of neo-liberalism rather than meaningful programs of 
public accountability and social justice. The governments focused on centricist and 
pragmatic solutions to complex problems, which legitimizes the free-market 
paradigm. This, in turn, opened the path for the Anatolian petite bourgeoisie to 
develop themselves as nouveau riches, effective in the establishment of MÜSİAD. 
The export-promotion facilities of the state oriented the members of Anatolian petite 
bourgeoisie to get in touch with the world markets. This was also important for them 
since they could prosper without leaning state resources and form themselves as 
independent generation of businessmen. These businessmen organized under 
MÜSİAD and their independence crystallized in the name of the organization.  
In the late 1980s, the export promotion decreased but these businessmen got 
a long way in developing themselves. The debt spiral of the state, on the other hand, 
oriented the big business to finance public debt in 1990s,109 which increased the 
production and marketing facilities of KOBİs in the domestic market. In such 
medium, KOBİs developed their production power and gained gradual importance in 
Turkey representing almost 50per cent of the whole employment in the economy in 
the last two decades. This, in turn, empowered MÜSİAD to blame large tycoons and 
                                                 
108 Faruk Selçuk and Ahmet Ertuğrul, “A Brief Account of the Turkish Economy, 1980-2000,” p. 18. 
 
109 For further information see, “500 Büyük Sanayi Kuruluşunda Yaratılan Net Katma Değerin Faktör 
Gelirleri İtibariyle (Fonksiyonel) Dağılımı” [The (Functional) Distribution of Net Value Added of 
500 Major Industrial Corporations through Factor Revenues] İSO Dergisi (Özel Sayı-Türkiye’nin 500 
Büyük Sanayi kuruluşu 2000) Ağustos 2001 Sayı 425, pp. 43-45. 
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praise KOBİs as the real force of Turkish production. This became an important part 
of MÜSİAD’s discourse underlying the independence of its members from state who 
do not earn from Treasury bonds but production.  
In short, Turkish economy was trapped in a vicious circle of high interest 
rates and cheap foreign currency due to overvalued TL. This, in turn, increased the 
vulnerability of the domestic economy to the threat of fluctuations in foreign capital 
inflows/outflows, leading to further increases in real interest rates. Thus, instability 
in rates of foreign exchange and interest rates fostered further instability in the 
economy as a whole. The overvaluation of TL oriented KOBİs to invest more on the 
machinery to develop their competence capacity in the world markets. This was 
especially felt in the textile sector in which Turkey got a prominent place in the 
world’s textile export. KOBİs also enlarged their domestic market share through 
investment on production left by the big business community funding public debt. 
The more KOBİs prospered the popularity of MÜSİAD increased and attracted more 
members. 
3.4. The Political-Economy of KOBİs and Islamic-oriented 
Enterprises in 1980-2000 
 
Turkey has witnessed a population and urban explosion during the last fifty 
years. This has been made possible by the state-sponsored policies of modernization 
and secularization of the society. However these policies have also paved the path 
for the general rise of Islamic consciousness throughout the country.110 In this 
process, Turkish economy expanded in the 1980s as a result of the shift from the 
                                                 
110 Ayşe Buğra, “The Claws of the ‘Tigers’ ” Privateview: The Quarterly International Review of the 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association,  Autumn 1997, Vol. 1-2, No. 4-5, p. 54. 
 
 140 
official import substitution policies of the 1960s and the 1970s to a liberal and 
export-oriented economic development path adopted by Turgut Özal (Prime 
Minister, 1983-1989 and President, 1989-1993).  
These changes provided opportunities not only to the established business 
elite, but also to the owners of KOBİs mainly in Anatolian towns as well as in 
metropolitan cities. With the passage to the new export-oriented economic policy of 
the 1980s, a new urban middle class and business elite emerged whose members 
often originated from Anatolia. They were largely Islamic oriented in cultural terms 
and began challenging the preeminence of state-subsidized large industrialists. They 
were more or less newcomers in business and often owed their economic take-off to 
Özal’s liberalization policies and economic developments in some peripheral urban 
centers of Anatolia.111  
In the 1980s, the ensuing fiscal crisis of the state resulted in measures to 
liberalize and to deregulate the highly protected and heavily regulated economy. In 
this new environment, KOBİs located in certain provincial towns displayed a 
significant dynamism in their adaptation to new economy policies. They came to be 
favorably compared with large-scale, diversified companies that had hitherto 
dominated the economic scene.112  
It was also during the 1980s that a remarkable take-off in the volume and 
depth of Islamic business activity took place in the financial sphere. Imported Saudi 
capital aimed to take advantage of the new opportunities provided by the liberal 
                                                 
111 Wendy Kristianasen, “New faces of Islam” Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1997, 
(http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/1997/07/turkey) 
 
112 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 1999), pp. 14-15. 
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economic environment. In this context, Saudi financiers gave preferential treatment 
to Islamic brotherhoods and organizations and they fueled the boom that Turkey 
experienced in the 1980s.113 Özal signed the decree legalizing the establishment of 
special finance houses on December 16, 1983, two days after the inauguration of his 
government. These finance houses were working through interest-free banking in 
accordance with Islamic principles. The first two of them were Al-Baraka Türk and 
Faisal Finans that were of Saudi origin.114 In the case of Al-Baraka, the dominant 
Turkish figures were Korkut Özal, brother of the Prime Minister, and Eymen 
Topbaş, the Chairman of the MP in İstanbul who were also prominent figures of 
İskenderpaşa and Erenköy Nakşibendi tarikats (religious brotherhoods) 
respectively.115  
Similarly, the savings of the Turkish Gasterbeiter (guest worker) community 
in Germany and other European countries have been flowing back to Turkey. This 
inflow also contributed to the rise of Islamic business activity. While interest-free 
banking on the basis of profits sharing was spreading in Turkey, businessmen in 
several Anatolian towns, especially Konya and Yozgat, were able to convince these 
Gasterbeiters and local people to loan their capital for the consolidation of the 
enterprises of their fellow countrymen in Turkey. The successful examples are 
Kombassan, İttifak and Yimpaş holding companies. In turn, the investors were 
entitled to be small shareholders participating in the profit and loss of these çok 
                                                 
113 Ben Lombardi, “Turkey-The Return of the Reluctant Generals?,” pp. 197-198.  
 
114 Cüneyt Arcayürek, Namı 864 Rakımlı Tepe: Çankaya [Hill Famous as Height of 864: Çankaya] 
(3rd ed.), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi,1989), p. 177. 
 
115 Hasan Cemal, Özal Hikayesi [History of Özal] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayýnevi, 1989), 178 and Emin 
Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor [From where Turgut is Running from?] (34th ed.), (İstanbul: Tekin 
Yayınevi, 1989), p. 189. 
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ortaklı şirketler (multiple share holding companies). These companies became quite 
popular in the conservative-religious business circles of Turkey in 1990s and also 
encouraged Islamic tarikats to engage in economic activities on a substantial scale. 
An example is the Server Holding company led by İskenderpaşa branch of 
Nakşibendis.116  
This trend of financing must be understood as a response to the specific 
socio-economic and cultural environment of Turkey. The loans for investment 
towards expanding business or stepping into industrial production are hardly 
affordable for small or medium capital holders in an economic environment marked 
by high inflation. Thus, they were forced to look for other sources for capital instead 
of turning to a commercial finance institutions.117 This investment model of multi-
share holding companies has successfully integrated the basics of the Islamic moral 
code that are highly charged in a traditional-religious environment. It has also 
offered a means of reconciling a modern economic activity and accumulation with 
an Islamic lifestyle. This, in turn, opened up new ways to deal with the structural 
                                                 
116 Server Holding acts in various sectors such as health (Ümraniye Sağlık Tesisleri, Haksa Sağlık 
Hizmetleri and Zinde Sağlık Hizmetleri), education (ASFA Eğitim Tesisleri), automotive (Fuzul 
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(İskenderpaşa Bilgi İşlem ve İnternet Hizmetleri). The annual turnover of the holding company is 
about $ 40 million and the number of employees is around 6000. Server Holding acts also as retailers 
abroad having 3 shops in England and Scotland with its annual turnover of $ 25 millions. Fuzul 
Otomotiv became one of the most leading automotive sales organisations in Turkey. Its 110 branches 
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Turkey, is one of the largest private radio communication network with its 252 transmitters and it also 
broadcasts to Europe, North Africa and Central Asia.  
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problems of the Turkish economy, i.e. the high rates of inflation and lack of capital, 
which make investments unattractive.118  
On March 6, 2000, MÜSİAD organized a summit for multi-partner holding 
companies and 18 of them attended the summit. The participants decided to act 
together for the establishment of necessary legal framework and not to use Islamic 
symbols since this financial system was abused as it turned to be collecting money 
from mosques in the name of Islam.119 MÜSİAD urged that necessary legal 
framework adopted should be for multi-partner companies by the Capital Markets 
Board, the Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Relations.120 MÜSİAD also 
published a book of guidelines on investing in such multi-partner holding 
companies. In this book, the potential investors are encouraged and the Turkish 
community in Germany investing in such companies is praised for their participation 
in the further development of Anatolia. The potential investors are also warned 
about the potential for fraud.121  
The 1990s also witnessed the rise of private sector development, mostly 
based on small-scale, family enterprises in selected Anatolian towns, such as 
Denizli, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Şanlıurfa. The underlying logic of these 
ventures is their self-reliance and ability to “establish themselves as significant 
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119 “MÜSİAD Üyesi Çok Ortaklı Şirketlerden Güç Birliği Kararı” [MÜSİAD Affiliated Multi-Share 
Companies’ Decision on Union of Power] MÜSİAD Bülten, 2000, Vol. 8, No.36, pp. 8-9.  The 
attending holding companies alphabetically are: Apitaş, Avantaj, Büyük Anadolu, Endüstri, GAP 
Investment, İttifak, Jet Group, Kamer Katra, Kimpaş, Kombassan, Konya Sanayi, Kuralkan, Noya, 
Öncü, Sayha, Silm Yatırım, Umpaş. It is noteworthy that Yimpaş Holding did not attend the meeting. 
 
120 Türkiye Ekonomisi 2001 (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 2001), p. 47. 
 
121 For further information, see Yatırımcıya Tavsiyeler: Bir Şirkete Ortak Olmak İsteyen Tasarruf 
Sahiplerinin Dikkat Etmesi Gereken Kurallar [Advises to Investor: The Principles for Investors to 
Get share of Companies] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1999). 
 144 
exporters of manufacturers, while at the same time receiving little or no subsidy 
from the state.”122 The media defined these enterprises success stories by labeling 
them “Anatolian Tigers” reflecting the “generally shared positive sentiments about 
their economic potential.”123 The term clearly signalled the rise of interest in the 
successful economic performance of some East Asian countries known as the Asian 
Tigers. The export potential of some smaller enterprises located in certain towns of 
Anatolia appeared as a hitherto neglected phenomenon of a crucial significance. This 
new dynamic private sector and the emerging local businessmen’s groups began 
springing up all over Turkey. The enthusiastic economic activity in these centers 
helped the economy’s ability to sustain a high growth pattern under prolonged 
macroeconomic instability. These enterprises became a part of the rapidly expanding 
flexible production system based on small but effective production units adapting to 
changing domestic and foreign market conditions.124  Thus, they formed “a strategic 
fit” between the traditional institutions of social relations and current requirements 
of global production and trade.125   
The rise of Islamic capital and the development of Islamic entrepreneurs 
added a new dimension to Turkish political economy. The Islamist ideology in 
Turkey found great support among the owners of KOBİs, both in big cities and in 
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Anatolia, for several reasons. First, they perceived the elimination of traditional 
sectors and small firms by the modern ones as an evil effect of capitalism. Second, 
they also regarded Islam as the just order,126 which protects both private property 
and small entrepreneurs. Third, Islamic charities functioned as sub-markets for the 
promotion of business links among members. Thus, businessmen could consider 
participation in Islamic groups as a way of improving their business activities.127 
Locality was also praised in these networks under the title of Anadoluluk 
(Anatolianhood) with strong reference to traditional values including Islam and 
Turkish nationalism.128  
Consequently, during the 1980s and the early 1990s the KOBİs and the 
Islamic-oriented enterprises proliferated. Islamism and Anadoluluk as a cultural 
basis in network formation fueled them. This process opened the path for the 
emergence of MÜSİAD at the beginning of 1990s. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I benefited from two variables of disturbances during the 
period of 1980-2000 in Turkey. I defined these disturbances, first, the rise and fall of 
Islamist politics in Turkish society and second is the transformation of Turkish 
economy in the last two decades. I argued that these disturbances during 1980s 
                                                 
126 The WP’s economy programme called as Adil Düzen (Just Order) represents a parallel vision 
beside the same name.  
 
127 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie,” p. 
538. 
 
128 In this context, the same arguments or slogans based on conservative values in this direction were 
amply used by the right-wing parties. (Büyük Birlik Partisi-BBP) Grand Unity Party’s (GUP) slogan 
as “Anadolu biliyor...” (Anatolia knows…) represented a good example of such discourse. 
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brought a societal change, which formed the basis for stimulation of new interests to 
be organized as in the case of MÜSİAD, established in 1990. 
The liberalization of the Turkish economy in 1980s meant the economic 
dynamism, rising entrepreneurship and the growing power of private capital 
integrated into global markets. These developments resulted in the emergence of 
new entrepreneurs in the 1980s. The liberalization in the economy prompted 
relatively liberal political atmosphere, which paved the path for the rise of Islamist 
identity in all fields incremenatlly. This coincided with the development of the 
Anatolian petite bourgeoisie who are Islamic oriented and traitional. They were 
isolated from public resources which stimulated the establishment of MÜSİAD. 
“Islam has become the oppositional identity for the excluded sectors of Turkish 
society”129 and the fragmentation of the political center parties from both poles in the 
1990s significantly helped the rise of Islamist politics, specifically WP. These 
developments coincided with the rise of these businessmen and MÜSİAD till 1997. 
This progress reversed back with the February 28 process since state elite evaluated 
members of MÜSİAD as the financial supporters of religious reactionism, which 
affected the organization negatively. 
The Turkish model of neo-liberal restructuring intensified high interest 
earnings associated with the government’s strategy of heavy borrowing and the 
concomitant chronically high rates of inflation existing over the past two decades. 
This led the largest industrial firms to establish commercial banks and to finance the 
government debts with low propensities to invest in 1990s. However, this 
                                                 
129 Hakan Yavuz, “Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,” Journal of International Affairs, 2000, 
Vol. 54, No. 1, p. 22. 
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“schizophrenic anomaly” of big business acting partly as rentiers did not spread to 
KOBİs, which developed their production power.130 KOBİs gained gradual 
importance in Turkey representing almost 50per cent of the whole employment in 
the economy in the last two decades.131 This, in turn, empowered MÜSİAD to blame 
large tycoons and praise KOBİs as the real force of Turkish production. 
Consequently, MÜSİAD was both a response to the needs originated with 
transformation of the economy during 1980s and the KOBİs in Anatolia had grown 
to be the major actors on the economic scene. Moreover, the rise of Islam, as an 
ascending value in society in the post-1980 period, was also a network source of 
MÜSİAD. The export-oriented policies implemented in the 1980s widened the 
horizons of the KOBİs that could develop a “strategical fit” in the integration 
process of Turkey to the global markets. The orientation of large tycoons of Turkey 
to finance public debts in 1990s led KOBİs to develop their production capacities 
and domesic market share, which led  MÜSİAD be noticed, also with thanks to the 
rising Islamist politics. 
 
 
                                                 
130 Korkut Boratav, A. Erinç Yeldan and Ahmet H. Köse, “Globalization, Distribution and Social 
Policy, 1980-1998” p. 26.    
 
131 Ekrem Dönek, “Türk Sanayiinin Gelişmesinde Küçük İşletmelerin Yeri ve Bu İşletmelerin 
Kaynak Temininde Bankacılık Sektörünün Rolü” [The Place of Small Size Enterprises in the 
Development of Turkish Industry and the Role of Banking Sector in Providing Sources for These 
Enterprises] İktisat İşletme ve Finans No. 161, Ağustos 1999, pp. 22-34. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MÜSİAD: HIGH MORALITY HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
 
“Our aim and purpose as MÜSİAD, ... 
is to effect and realize our desired 
rapid development through 
cooperation and promotion of trade 
with whom we have many values in 
common and relations long 
standing.”1  
4.1. Introduction 
 
In the third chapter, I benefited from two variables of disturbances in the last 
two decades of Turkey to understand the emergence and the development of 
MÜSİAD with reference to Truman’s disturbance theory. In this chapter, I will 
benefit from Olson’s collective action theory and Salisbury’s exchange theory to 
comprehend the mobilization of MÜSİAD.  
Olson underlined the importance of selective benefits that are, mainly 
material, incentives exclusively available to members to overcome the free-rider 
instinct among individuals. These exclusive selective benefits could be magazines, 
discounts, travel, insurance etc. offered for the mobilization of members in the 
organization. I will also refer to solitary benefits -social rewards that derive from 
associating in group activities- and purposive benefits -rewards associated with 
ideological or issue-oriented goals- that play an important role in motivating group 
membership in explaining MÜSİAD.  
Salisbury’s theory is also helpful to understand MÜSİAD that interrelates the 
group’s survival upon a mutually advantageous exchange of benefits between the 
                                                 
1 Erol Yarar,  “Introduction” Turkish Trade Mission to the United States of America 21-31 May 1997 
(İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1997), p. 1.   
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leader and the members. Moreover, empirical studies have shown that many 
individuals join groups to receive non-economic benefits such as fun, camaraderie, 
and a good feeling derived from promoting a worthwhile cause.2 In this context, 
MÜSİAD provided friendship among members by organizing picnics, pilgrimage 
and umre tours to Mecca. 
Twelve Islamic oriented young businessmen in İstanbul founded MÜSİAD 
on May 5, 1990. The founding chairman of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar, with his 
charismatic personality held his position almost a decade, until May 1999 when Ali 
Bayramoğlu replaced him. MÜSİAD is the largest voluntary business association in 
Turkey with its almost 2500 members, 27 branch offices and 45 overseas focal 
points at the present writing. Members came often from both developed and 
peripheral regions of the country and they are generally owners of KOBİs.  
In this chapter, first I will analyze the history of MÜSİAD with its formation 
background. In the third and fourth sections of this chapter, I will analyze the 
institutional and membership structure of the organization respectively. In the fifth 
section, I will focus on MÜSİAD’s activities through its publications, internationals 
fairs, foreign trips, panels, educational seminars and other activities it organized as 
well as International Business Forum (IBF) meetings. In the concluding section, I 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey M. Berry, Lobbying for the People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Allan J. 
Cigler and John Mark Hansen, “Group Formation Through Protest: The American Agriculture 
Movement” in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics, (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983); Constance E. Cook, “ Participation in Public Interest 
Groups” American Politics Quarterly, 1984, Vol. 6, pp. 129-166; R. Keneth Godwin and Robert 
Cameron Mitchell, “Rational Models, Collective Goods, and Non-Electoral Political Behavior” 
Western Political Quarterly, 1982, Vol. 35, pp. 160-180; David Marsh, “On Joining Interest Groups” 
British Journal of Political Science, 1976, Vol. 6, pp. 257-272; Terry M. Moe, The Organization of 
Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1980); Andrew S. McFarland, Common Cause: Lobbying 
in the Public Interest (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1984); Robert C. Mitchell, “National 
environmental lobbies and the apparent Illogic of Collective Action” in Clifford Russell, ed. 
Collective Decision-Making (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 87-121. 
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will summarize the chapter and answer the rise of MÜSİAD in relation with its use 
of exclusive selective, solitary and purposive benefits.  
 
4.2. Historical Background 
 
4.2.1. History  
 
The success of TÜSİAD in the 1980s convinced other businessmen that they 
could maintain their advantages more effectively via similar voluntary business 
associations. Thus, these new business associations were modeled on TÜSİAD as a 
successful prototype and TÜSİAD paved the path for mushrooming of 
businessmen’s associations in major cities. Today there are around two hundred such 
private business associations in Turkey. Among several business associations with 
the claim of Islamic identity, MÜSİAD has come to the fore as by far the most 
important one. In 1993 Dünya, Turkish financial daily, due to its organizational 
success, chose it among the most successful associations.3  
Among these associational attempts beside MÜSİAD, İş Hayatında 
Dayanışma-İŞHAD [The Association for Solidarity in Business Life], Serbest 
Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği-SESİAD [The Free Industrialists’ and 
Businessmen’s Association]4 and Anadolu Aslanları İşadamları Derneği-ASKON 
[The Anatolian Lions Businessmen’s Association] are the other business 
organizations with Islamic connotations. Altogether, they have been trying to 
                                                 
3 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1994, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 2. 
 
4 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 1999), p. 19. 
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represent the economic revolt against the dominant pro-western capitalists5 to keep 
their authentic local and religious identities while integrating in world markets. 
These associations have openly acted as a counterweight to TÜSİAD, which is 
comprised of relatively small number of business conglomerates.  
  
4.2.1.1. Formation  
 
MÜSİAD was founded on May 5, 1990 by twelve young businessmen,6 with 
an average age of 33, in İstanbul. The founding chairman of MÜSİAD, Erol Yarar -
son of one of the founding fathers of TÜSİAD- with his charismatic personality held 
his position until May 1999 when Ali Bayramoğlu replaced him, a former Vice-
Chairmen of the organization.  
MÜSİAD defines its goal as 
…creating a developed country with advanced high-tech 
industry within a highly developed commercial environment, 
but without sacrificing national and moral values, where labor 
is not exploited and capital accumulation is not degraded and 
where the distribution of national income is just and fair, a 
country with peace at home, influence in the region and respect 
in the world 7  
 
MÜSİAD claims to be working for the development of Turkey and Turkish society 
in a “democratic and planned order.” MÜSİAD also declares its aims as increasing 
the industrial, commercial, socio-economic, educational level and providing the 
coordination of technology, capital and intellectual cooperation within the 
                                                 
5 Mustafa Özel, “Changing Economic Perspectives in Contemporary Turkey” Islamic World Report, 
Vol. 1, No. 3, 1996, p. 92. 
 
6 (Erol Yarar, B. Ali Bayramoğlu, Abdurrahman Esmerer, Natık Akyol, Şekip Avdağiç, Mehmet 
Gönenç, Mahmut Ensari, Arif Gülen, Halil Ayan, Cihangir Bayramoğlu, Mehmet Turgut, Ahmet 
Yıldırım). 
 
7 MÜSİAD Booklet, p. 3. Emphasis added. 
 152 
constitutional borders and its laws.8 In addition to these objectives, MÜSİAD is also 
dedicated to “find[ing] solutions to the problems of Turkey, Islamic countries in the 
region and mankind in general while committing itself to social and economic 
development, through combining industrialization with ‘high ethical and moral 
standards’.”9  
MÜSİAD has encouraged its members to commit to social and economic 
development in Turkey by promoting quality of production in industry, honesty and 
fairness in trade, high ethical and moral standards in politics.10 It also set a goal for 
itself to increase its membership to 500011 and number of branch offices to 40 by 
2000.12 However, MÜSİAD reached around 3000 members and 28 branch offices at 
maximum in 1998. This rapid growth was rendered possible by setting up branches 
all over the country, especially in the newly developing economic centers of 
Anatolia such as Çorum, Denizli, Gaziantep, Kayseri, Kahramanmaraş, Konya and 
Şanlıurfa. The branch offices were closely tied to the headquarter located in İstanbul 
                                                 
8 “Deneğin Amacı: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası ve Kanunları doğrultusunda Türkiye’nin ve Türk 
toplumunun demokratik ve planlı bir düzen içinde kalkınıp, sinai, ticari, sosyo-ekonomik, eğitim ve 
kültür düzeyinin gelişmesini, teknoloji, sermaye, fikir alışverişi ve koordinasyonu sağlayarak daha 
ileri bir düzeye ulaşmasına yardımcı olmaktır.”   MÜSİAD Tüzük (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1997), p. 3 
Article no. 3. 
 
9 Masudul Alam Choudhury, “The Political Economy of Enterprise, Polity and Knowledge: A Case 
Study with Respect to MÜSİAD and IBF in Turkey” Middle East Business and Economic Review, 
October 1998, v. 10, No. 1-2, pp. 87-88. 
 
10 Haluk Alkan, Türkiye’de Baskı Grupları: Siyaset ve İşadamı Örgütlenmeleri [Pressure Groups in 
Turkey: Politics and Business Organizations] Unpublished PhD Thesis, İstanbul: Marmara 
Üniversitesi, 1998, pp. 293-294. 
 
11 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, Vol. 4, No.13, p. 17. 
 
12 For the figures given above, see MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998,. Vol. 6, No. 29. p. 37. For the membership 
profile and activities of MÜSİAD, see Special Supplement of the Turkish Daily News on MÜSİAD, 
titles “MÜSİAD in the US,” May 21, 1997.      
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because of the highly centralized administrative and hierarchical organizational 
structure.13  
MÜSİAD has established itself as the largest Turkish voluntary business 
association. The organization attracted mainly employers of KOBİs who were 
unable to find any representation in TOBB’s upper echelons. They were also 
unprotected to exploitation by big capital through subcontracting links.14 Ömer 
Bolat, the ex-general secretary and one of the present Vice-Chairmen of MÜSİAD, 
explained the foundation of MÜSİAD as the extension of the liberalization winds of 
the political government in 1980s to support the Anatolian capital and its young 
entrepreneurs for the development of the country.15  
Consequently, MÜSİAD put down a very remarkable development and 
organizational success16 through a speedy expansion in membership volume parallel 
to the rise of the KOBİs in 1990s. However, the rise of MÜSİAD has been 
challenged following the harsh economic crisis and state’s response to Islamic 
developments through the end of 1990s which came to peak after the February 28 
process. 
                                                 
13 Haluk Alkan, Türkiye’de Baskı Grupları: Siyaset ve İşadamı Örgütlenmeleri, p. 159. 
 
14 Haldun Gülalp, “Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party” Muslim World, 
January 1999, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 33-34. 
 
15 Interview with Ömer Bolat. 
 
16 Erol Yarar put down in their visit to France, MÜSİAD with 3,000 members, more than 10,000 
companies, more than 600,000 employees, 7 billion USD export capacity and 24 billion USD total 
production is a important force in Turkey. “Fransa İş Gezisi Umut Verdi (5-9 Mart 1998)” [The Visit 
to France Fostered Hopes (5-9 March 1998)] MÜSİAD Bülten Vol. 6, No. 28, 1998, p. 25. 
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4.3. The Institutional Structure  
 
MÜSİAD defines itself as a non-profit organization providing professional 
services to its members in an efficient way throughout the country and abroad. It 
claims to enable its members to cooperate with each other and promote trade 
internally and externally while contributing to the development of the Turkish 
economy.17  
The institutional structure of MÜSİAD is composed of General Assembly, 
Executive Board, General Administrative Council, General Secretariat, and 
Subordinate Commissions of the Executive Board, Professional Committees. In 
addition to 27 branch offices in Turkey, MÜSİAD has also spread all over the world 
through its 45 foreign branches and liaison offices in 35 countries.  
The General Assembly convenes annually and its elections are held 
biannually. MÜSİAD members are also members of the General Assembly 
simultaneously. For the association members, the General Assembly meetings serve 
as a discussion platform on MÜSİAD’s activities, political economic problems and 
developments in Turkey. They evaluate the organizational activities of the previous 
year and the budget of the forthcoming year.  
The Executive Board is composed of twenty principal and ten substitute 
members who are elected biannually. Executive Board principal members and 
substitute members also serve individually as chairmen of the subordinate 
                                                 
17 The Outlook of the Turkish Economy: October 2001 (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 2001), p. i.  
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commissions and chairmen of the professional committees respectively. The 
Executive Board meets once a week to discuss and act on items of the agenda.  
The General Administrative Council is composed of the Executive Board 
members and Chairmen of Branch Offices. Generally, the General Administrative 
Council meets monthly to discuss and act on the political economic items on its 
agenda.  
General Secretariat is composed of professional staff to execute the 
Executive Board’s decisions. It is a coordinative unit in relations between branch 
offices and the headquarter, and activities of the subordinate Commissions of the 
Executive Board and the Professional Committees. It also assists MÜSİAD members 
in solving business problems.  
The Subordinate Commissions of the Executive Board are composed of a 
chairman -also a member of the Board- and ten members. Each commission serves 
on behalf of the headquarter within the related scope. Generally, the Commissions 
meet weekly.  
A chairman who is also a substitute member of the Executive Board 
Professional Committees presides over the Professional Committees individually. 
These Committees report to the appropriate commission of the Executive Board. 
Each professional committee assists MÜSİAD members on professional sector-
based issues. Thus, each committee actively provides professional assistance and 
cooperation among members of the same profession. Generally, committees meet 
biweekly. 
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Since its establishment in 1990, MÜSİAD has succeeded to set up extensive 
links with official, semi-official and voluntary-based private business organizations 
abroad, like IBF in Pakistan. Hence, MÜSİAD argues to have functioned as a 
communication center for business, especially among Islamic countries.18 
Consequently, MÜSİAD is affiliated with 45 foreign branches established by a 
number of industrialists and businessmen who have migrated from Turkey in 35 
countries as Austria, Australia, Azerbaijan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Canada, Egypt, England, France, Germany (Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, Kassel, Munich, Mannheim, Stuttgart), Greece, 
Holland (Hague, Rotterdam), Hong Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Nigeria, Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Republic of South Africa, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Sweden, Thailand, Uganda, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and USA. MÜSİAD is 
also located in a global business network through International Business Forum 
(IBF) meetings, which will be explained in detail below. MÜSİAD has also 
organized quarterly coordination meetings with Executive Board Members of 
MÜSİAD’s overseas branches and focal points, each time on a different location.  
Within the institutional framework of MÜSİAD, subordinate commissions 
play an important role. In 1997, there were 12 subordinate commissions in 
MÜSİAD: Organization, Professional Committees, Foreign Relations, Fair and 
Forum, Research, Institutional Relations, Intelligence and Arbitration, Financial 
Issues, Education, Press, Publication, Database and Consultation-Expertise. The 
commissions could change in structure as having different numbers of members as 
                                                 
18 The Outlook of the Turkish Economy (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1999), p. 1. 
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well as hierarchical structure either having secretary or not.19 The Commission of 
Professional Committees was composed of 5 subcommittees as Services, 
Construction and Construction Equipments, Machinery-Spare Parts, Textile-Leather-
Carpet-Foodwear, Electrics-Electronics, The Electrics Committee members had 
established the Karz-ı-Hasen institution in order to help each other.20 This 
organizational structuration shows the dissemination of MÜSİAD members in 
different sectors. These sub-committees are established to develop the interaction 
among MÜSİAD members in the same sectors via meetings and sectoral 
publications. There were also 25 branch offices in 1997 located in Adana, Ankara, 
Antalya, Balıkesir, Bandırma, Bartın, Bursa, Çankırı, Çorum, Denizli, Diyarbakır, 
Elazığ, Gaziantep, Gebze, İnegöl, İzmir, Kahramanmaraş, Karadeniz Ereğli, 
Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya, Malatya, Mersin, Samsun, Şanlıurfa. Also in Eskişehir and 
Adapazarı müteşebbis heyeti  (board of entrepreneurs) were founded to accelerate 
the establishment of branch offices in these cities.  
In 1998, the number of commissions decreased to 11 when commissions of 
Institutional Relations and Education were fused. The number of branches increased 
to 27 when Eskişehir, İçel and Sakarya branches were established while Mersin 
branch is closed.21 The number of sub-committees in the Commission of 
Professional Committees increased from 5 to 10 as Food-Drink, Textile-Haute 
                                                 
19 1997 Faaliyet Raporu ve 1998 Faaliyet Programı [1997 Activity Report and 1998 Activity 
Program] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1997). 
 
20 Ibid., Karz-ı-Hasen in Islamic terminology means that to lend debt a Muslim brother for the sake of 
Allah as well as developing religious fraternity and consequently no charge of interest is possible. 
 
21 1998 Faaliyet Raporu ve 1999 Faaliyet Programı [1998 Activity Report and 1999 Activity 
Program] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1998). 
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Couture, Automotive-Spare Parts, Services, Construction-Construction Equipments, 
Machinery-Spare Parts, Electric-Electronics, Chemistry-Mining-Iron-Steel, Wooden 
Products-Furniture, Durable Goods-Paper-Packing.22   
In 1999, the number of commissions decreased to 10 when commissions of 
Research and Publication were fused and the name of the commission Fair and 
Forum was changed into the Development of Industry and Business. The number of 
branches was kept same but the number of Professional Committees dropped to 7 
since committees of Automotive-Spare Parts, Wooden Products-Furniture and 
Durable Goods-Paper-Packing were eliminated de to insufficient activity.23  
In 2000, the number of commssions decreased to 8 when commissions of 
Intelligence and Arbitration and Financial Issues were eliminated and name of the 
commission of Database changed to Information-Communication. The number of 
professional committees increased to 10 as in 1998. However, the number of 
branches decreased to 26 since Çankırı Branch is closed.24  
MÜSİAD’s professional committees are also to promote co-operation and 
trade among members within the same sector through meetings, to prepare medium 
for mutual investment by members and to help in the solution of common problems. 
For example, the Training Commission organizes professional training programs for 
MÜSİAD members to bring them up to date on current methods in management and 
business administration. The aim is to provide members with the knowledge and 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 1999 Faaliyet Raporu ve 2000 Faaliyet Programı [1999 Activity Report and 2000 Activity 
Program] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1999). 
 
24 2000 Faaliyet Raporu ve 2001 Faaliyet Programı [2000 Activity Report and 2001 Activity 
Program] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 2000). 
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practical experience needed to apply these methods in their own businesses. 
MÜSİAD gives importance to the education of its members and staff in branches for 
self-developing via English courses and seminars on different subjects like relations 
with press,25 export practices26 “total quality management.”27  
Sectoral committees are also formed within MÜSİAD in order to mediate the 
different interests of members originating from different sectors. The aim of these 
committees is expressed as providing commercial and technical aid and improving 
the solidarity and dealings among their members. Through these committees, the 
members are informed about sectoral developments and cooperation among firms is 
promoted. MÜSİAD provides services selective in character and oriented to meet the 
demands of its member companies that are relatively small and devoid of an 
organizational division of labor and skilled staff. Therefore, it is impossible for the 
members to gain information about the markets as individuals and especially to 
participate in foreign fairs or to follow economic development and legislation. 
MÜSİAD also provides benefits for these individual small companies such as 
forming a database about sectors and countries. For instance, in foreign trips the 
council of the association, in addition to contacts with the businessmen of the 
country visited, they can also arrange talks with the politicians and ministers of that 
country. Domestically, they can detail the problems and the opinions of their 
members to local politicians and ministers. These are valuable activities, which most 
                                                 
25 MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 3, No. 8, 1995, p. 16. 
 
26 MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 4, No.15, 1996, p. 50. 
 
27 1997 Faaliyet Raporu ve 1998 Faaliyet Programı, p. 21 and MÜSİAD Bülten Vol. 6, No. 28, 1998, 
p. 18. 
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MÜSİAD members cannot achieve individually because of their small size.28 The 
KOBİs have also faced difficulties in trying to obtain external finance due to its high 
cost. MÜSİAD encourages the formation of partnerships among members to solve 
such financial problems and to strengthen the financial structure of the members in a 
competitive medium.  
Through an analysis vis-à-vis the changes in the number of subordinate 
commissions, branch offices and professional committees, we can argue that 
MÜSİAD is getting professional in sectoral arrangements of its members and in the 
establishment of branch offices. The matter is that, it is a time consuming process to 
understand the (un)necessity of the subsections of internal organization.  
 
Table 4. The Change in the Number of Subordinate Commissions 
 
Years 
 
No. of 
Commissions 
1997 12 
1998 11 
1999 10 
2000 8 
 
Table 5. The Change in the Number of Branch Offices 
 
Years 
 
No. of Branch 
Offices 
1997 25 
1998 27 
1999 27 
2000 26 
 
                                                 
28 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, October 2000, Vol. 18, No. 5, pp. 540-541. 
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Table 6. The Change in the Number of Professional Committees 
Years No.  of 
Professional 
Committees 
1997 5 
1998 10 
1999 7 
2000 10 
 
As seen in the tables, there is a fluctuation in the number of commissions, 
branch offices and professional committees. This is due to the enlargement process 
of MÜSİAD, which is not very well planned. However, we see a steady decrease in 
the number of commissions. This could be identified as a process of 
professionalization through which MÜSİAD organizes its internal structure in an 
optimum way. However, due to its inexperience, MÜSİAD is developing its 
structure by trial and error. Moreover, Turkish political economic structure is not 
stable either. It is important to note that MÜSİAD pays attention to the 
organizational total quality as it started the necessary procedure to get ISO 9000 
quality certificate.29 In sum, it is not an easy task to run several professional 
committees in harmony, which were composed of members owning firms in 
different sizes. 
In the process of institutionalization, associational general congresses play an 
important role. Most of the members participate in these meetings in which the 
governing boards are chosen and forthcoming policies are formed. MÜSİAD held its 
8th General Congress on May 22, 1999 in which one of the Vice Chairmen Ali 
                                                 
29 2000 Faaliyet Raporu ve 2001 Faaliyet Programı, p. 3. 
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Bayramoğlu replaced Erol Yarar for the office of Chair. Yarar underlined that he 
was thinking to leave the post one year earlier but he did not do so due to the court 
files about his critique on the eight years permanent education. In his speech, Yarar 
underlined that he did not want to leave in a “coward way.”30   
MÜSİAD organized its 9th General Congress on 8 April 2000 in İstanbul in 
which 44 members were honored with “10th Year Membership Certificate.” Ahmet 
Helvacı, PhD,31 replaced Ömer Bolat, PhD. Bolat is an important figure in the 
institutionalization of  MÜSİAD who worked as a successful General Secretary for 
seven years and then he became one of the Vice-Chairmen.32 Consequently, the 
change with the replacement of the Chair and General Secretary could be identified 
as change of blood in the organization and MÜSİAD discourses became more 
moderate in its critics of government policies. This change was the result of the new 
leadership cadre’s orientation not to get anger of the state elite anymore. 
Consequently, MÜSİAD has been challenged by the problems of 
professionalization that is why it needs amendments in organizational structure 
every year to reach stability. However, this is not only due to the inexperience of 
MÜSİAD but also partially to the unstable Turkish political-economic structure. It 
could be analyzed that the institutional structure of MÜSİAD having overseas 
offices is parallel with the organization’s emphasis on export and discovering new 
world markets. The dynamism of the organization is also embedded in this structural 
                                                 
30 MÜSİAD Bülten Vol. 7, No. 33, 1999, pp. 4-10. 
 
31 MÜSİAD Bülten Vol. 8, No. 37, 2000, p. 19. Previous to this post, Ahmet Helvacı, was lecturing in 
Kırıkkale University. He got his PhD on International Relations from Sheffield University in 1998 
where he did his MA in 1994. where he also lectured.  
 
32 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
 
 163 
framework since MÜSİAD could easily adapt itself to the developments following 
the 28th February process. Ziya Öniş, after his interviews with Bayramoğlu and 
Bolat, notes that “Contrary to the popular belief,… the ‘February 28 Process” has 
been a minor contributor to the decline in MÜSİAD membership” but the reason in 
this decline has been “primarily to the impact of economic crisis.”33  
 
4.4. MÜSİAD’s Membership Structure 
 
 In this section, I will analyze MÜSİAD’s membership structure and evaluate 
the sectoral distribution of member companies according to the number of 
employees and the establishment years.  
MÜSİAD launched the principle of mass mobilization to get public 
recognition. The association consists of a wide array of firms, from big multi share 
holding companies to small firms employing just a few employees. MÜSİAD 
members are active in variety of sectors including, machinery and tools, automotive 
and spare parts, textiles and garments, foodstuff and beverages, chemicals and 
minerals, forestry and wooden products, construction and building materials, electric 
supplies and electronics, computers and information technologies, paper and 
packaging and services sector. The main sectors are manufacturing, textiles, 
chemical, metallurgical products, automotive parts, construction equipments and 
food. Due to operating in many different fields, each sector has its own specific 
problems. Every member individually expects that MÜSİAD membership will help 
                                                 
33 Ziya Öniş,  “Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence” Contemporary 
Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2001, p. 297. 
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him/her solving the problems s/he faces in her/his own field34 because the member 
companies are mostly KOBİs. They lack of necessary resources when compared 
with the members of TÜSİAD to handle their own problems. 
Another salient characteristic of MÜSİAD affiliated companies concerns 
their date of incorporation. The overwhelming majority of these enterprises are very 
recently formed, with companies established before the 1980 representing a small 
minority.35 According to sector and date of entry into business, food and beverages 
appear to be the sector with the largest number of older companies. Table 7 shows 
that MÜSİAD represents the “new money” since most of the member companies are 
established following the 1980s. When we compare between the 1980s and 1990s, 
there is a decrease in the number of firms established in 1990s except the services 
sector. This could be referred to the fact that the 1990s had been the years of service 
sector not only in Turkey but also in the whole world.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie,” p. 
541. 
 
35 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation By Two Turkish 
Business Associations” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1998,Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 525. 
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Table 7. Sectoral Distribution of MÜSİAD Member Companies according to 
Date of Foundation36 
Sectors <1950 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 >1990 na Total 
Food and Beverages 8 8 7 21 71 57 13 185 
Foreign Trade 0 0 1 1 30 20 4 56 
Construction-Construction 
Materials 
3 4 14 53 150 127 36 387 
Textile-Leather-Carpet 2 9 18 48 144 95 25 341 
Electrics-Electronics 2 1 2 7 32 25 7 76 
Services 0 3 4 14 53 73 19 166 
Chemicals-Mining-Iron-
Steel 
5 7 4 36 66 45 10 173 
Machinery-Spare Parts 5 2 14 36 66 45 10 151 
Forest Products-Furniture 0 3 9 14 36 21 6 89 
Automotive-Spare Parts 0 1 4 17 53 46 6 127 
ConsumerGoods Packaging-
Paper 
3 4 8 26 53 41 9 144 
Total 28 42 85 273 754 595 145 1895 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, p. 75. Source MÜSİAD Catalogue 1995.   
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Table 8. Sectoral Distribution of MÜSİAD Member Companies according to 
Number of Employees37 
Sectors <10 10-24 25-49 50-99 >100 na Total 
Food and Beverages 52 52 34 18 14 15 185 
Foreign Trade 31 14 3 1 2 5 56 
Construction-Construction 
Materials 
137 86 58 33 25 48 387 
Textile-Leather-Carpet 110 68 56 37 44 26 341 
Electrics-Electronics 23 24 11 7 4 7 76 
Services 83 34 15 9 9 16 166 
Chemicals-Mining-Iron-
Steel 
67 38 24 9 19 16 173 
Machinery-Spare Parts 26 55 30 18 11 11 151 
Forest Products-Furniture 22 26 17 8 7 9 89 
Automotive-Spare Parts 47 41 16 13 3 7 127 
ConsumerGoods 
Packaging-Paper 
60 37 21 6 11 9 144 
Total 658 475 285 159 149    169 1895 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Ibid. Source MÜSİAD Catalogue 1995.   
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Table 9.  Distribution of Members’ Size according to Foundation Years38 
 <1950 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990- Na Sub-total 
<10 8 12 28 94 251 229 36 658 
10-24 10 10 20 74 184 163 14 475 
25-49 3 4 10 44 118 98 8 285 
50-99 2 3 13 21 81 34 5 159 
>100 5 10 10 36 68 17 3 149 
Na 0 3 4 14 37 38 73 169 
Sub-
total 
28 42 85 283 739 579 139 1895 
 
Table 10. The Distribution of MÜSİAD members according to Sectors39 
Sectors Percentage 
Textile 17.4% 
Construction and Construction Equipments 16.7% 
Services 11.3% 
Chemicals, Plastic and Oil Products 10.7% 
Food 10.1% 
Machinery 8.0% 
Durable Goods 7.4% 
Automotive 7.1% 
Furniture and Wooden Products 5.9% 
Electric-Electronic 5.4% 
 
MÜSİAD members are located in many different sectors. However, textile 
and construction & construction equipments compose one third of all MÜSİAD 
                                                 
38 Ibid.,  p. 74. Source MÜSİAD Catalogue 1995.   
 
39 MÜSİAD Üyeleri Barter Araştırma Raporu [Research Report on Barter among MÜSİAD 
Members] (İstanbul: UTESAV, 1999),  p. 1. 
 168 
members. The sectoral distribution of these enterprises according to the size, 
indicates that there are no significant variations among different sectors in terms of 
enterprise size. However, to a certain extent, automotive sector enterprises are less 
represented.40 
On MÜSİAD’s membership structure, the number of individual members is 
less than the number of enterprises represented. The majority of the enterprises 
represented by MÜSİAD are smaller ones than employing less than 50 workers, with 
the very small ones employing less than 10 workers constituting largest group in the 
five-fold classification according to size. The number of enterprises employing more 
than 100 workers is close to the number of firms employing between 50-99 workers. 
Moreover, according to the Table 9, 1980s seem the golden years as the foundation 
years of the companies since the number of enterprises reached its peak in every 
size. 
Another important side of MÜSİAD is the membership numbers. After two 
years of institutional consolidation in 1990-1992 through the introduction meetings 
in different cities, MÜSİAD launched the principle of mass mobilization to get 
public recognition. The group’s membership reached 2916 by 1998 at the highest. It 
decreased sharply to 2378 in 1999 and the decrease continued slightly as 2316 by 
2000. When the number of members reached around 3000 in 1998, the number of 
affiliated firms happened to be around 10,000. We observe a sharp increase in the 
number of members in the first years and in 1996 when Refahyol government came 
to power. We also observe a sharp decrease in 1999, which could be related to two 
factors. Firstly, the closure file against the association as the extent of the February 
                                                 
40 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, p. 22. 
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28 process has been effective in the leaving of MÜSİAD members since they 
believed that their organization will be closed like the WP. Second, 1999 was a 
harsh year especially for the KOBİs, when the government had to put down a 
structural economic reform program supported by IMF and World Bank.  
 
Table 11. The Change in the Membership according to Years41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 This chart was provided by Şükrü Kaya, from the Foreign Affairs Department of MÜSİAD. 
Years 
No. of Total 
Members 
% Change in 
Membership 
1990 12 - 
1991 266 2217% 
1992 773 291% 
1993 1616 209% 
1994 1969 9% 
1995 2146 24% 
1996 2668 21% 
1997 2853 6% 
1998 2916 2% 
1999 2378 -28.5% 
2000 2316 -8% 
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Graphic 1. MÜSİAD Membership Volume Change 
according to Years
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As it was indicated, MÜSİAD increased the number of its members with 
eagerness. However, the organization has not accepted all the applications for 
membership. In 1997, 93 applications were accepted and 15 were refused, in 1998, 
59 applications were accepted and 15 were refused, in 1999, 26 applications were 
accepted and 8 were refused. The organization after 1997 also applied more strict 
requirements in admitting new members and maintaining current members.42  
MÜSIAD claims that the organization did not follow any discriminatory or 
exclusive policy in terms of sector, size, location, party allegiance or even religious 
faith. The organization argued that the only criterion for membership is commitment 
to business ethics and honesty. MÜSIAD strictly refused the applications of those 
who had a corrupt business background. Through the membership process, the 
                                                 
42 Ziya Öniş,  “Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence,” p. 297. 
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applicant is exposed to serious investigation of  “the necessary qualities -such as 
respect for the cultural values of society, trustworthiness, quality consciousness, 
loyalty and respect for employees, customers, and suppliers.”43 The Intelligence and 
Arbitration Committee evaluates the application of a potential member according to 
these criteria and  the Executive Board gives the final decision for approval or 
rejection of the membership. Although non-Muslims are eligible for membership, 
MÜSİAD has not received any such application.44   
MÜSİAD members also include some very large companies such as 
Kombassan, İttifak and Yimpaş holding companies. They constitute a network of 
firms representing the combined capital of more than 80,000 shareholders for each, 
many of whom are migrant workers in Germany. The most striking case of 
MÜSİAD member large companies is Kombassan45 located in Konya,46 the 
traditional stronghold of Islamic business and electoral district of Necmettin 
Erbakan. Kombassan is one of the Anatolian holding companies, which successfully 
implemented the multi-shareholder system of raising capital among small 
shareholders. Kombassan was established in 1989 as a small enterprise, Konya 
Printing & Packaging Inc., of printing and packaging materials production facilities. 
Kombassan attracted a huge flow of capital from Gastarbeiter community in 
                                                 
43 Hayrettin Özler, State and Business in Turkey: Issues of Collective Action with Special Reference 
to MÜSİAD (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Strathclyde, April 2001), p. 295. 
 
44 Interview with Abdurrahman Esmerer. He served as the Chair of the Intelligence and Arbitration 
Committee for two years. 
 
45 Kombassan, Konya Baskı Sistemleri Sanayi A.Ş., is the first company of  Kombassan Holding 
which was a small scale paper-printing company when it was first established. 
 
46 According to the 1999 records of Konya Chamber of Business, there happened to be 32 holding 
companies based on multi-share holder enterprise system in the city and except one of them, 
Özkaymak Holding which is an old family company in different sectors from transportation to 
tourism as well as mining. 
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different European countries to get share of the holding company. Thus, in ten years 
period, it has become a giant group owning more than 30 industrial plants, nearly 
100 companies and employing 22 thousand people throughout Turkey, Germany, 
Malaysia, U.S.A., Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kazakhstan.  
With such exceptions, like Kombassan, however, it is still fair to say that the 
majority of MÜSİAD members are small and medium-scale firms. According to 
Murat Çokgezen, the big firms of MÜSİAD contributed more to the provision of 
public goods such as the formation of pubic opinion or setting political ties with the 
governments. Thus, the smaller firms basically increased the number of heads in the 
association to show the mass support for the movement. He argues that big firms 
have benefited more from these collective goods although they borne the cost of 
most of these activities. 47 For instance, the chairmen, ex and the present one, 
became public figures in the Turkish economic and political life and this provided 
them easy access to political elite. In such a structure, despite the heterogeneity of 
size in MÜSİAD membership structure, conflicts of interest between the big and the 
little “fishes” among MÜSİAD members has not emerged yet.  
Another striking characteristic involves the spread of geographic location. 
An examination of MÜSİAD membership suggests that the largest numbers of its 
members are to be found in some of the major metropolitan centers such as İstanbul, 
Bursa and İzmir, as well as in the key traditional inner Anatolian strongholds such as 
Konya and Kayseri. The largest number of MÜSİAD’s members is located in 
                                                 
47 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie,” pp. 
537-538, 541. 
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İstanbul. The headquarter kept 488 members in 1995, 22.7% and 851 in 1997, 29.8% 
of the all members respectively.  
MÜSİAD members also include, however, firms from smaller Anatolian 
towns identified as significant success stories by the media, resulting in the label the 
“Anatolian Tigers.” The towns in question include Denizli, Gaziantep, 
Kahramanmaraş, and Şanlıurfa. The characteristic of these towns is that a number of 
relatively small or medium-sized firms located in these centers have managed to 
establish themselves as significant exporters of manufactures to the world market 
especially in the textile sector. They succeeded that receiving little or no subsidy 
from the state for this purpose. In these Anatolian towns despite the decrease in the 
number of members in Çorum, Denizli, Kahramanmaraş, there is a noticeable 
increase in the number of members in Gaziantep and Şanlıurfa. In these changes, the 
enthusiasm of the branch offices to gain new members is important. The sectoral and 
regional crises also badly affected the membership of these branches. As it could be 
seen at the Table 12, I could not find any correlation between MÜSİAD membership 
changes in towns and the results of the last two municipal elections. 
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Table 12. Geographical Distribution of Members: 1995-1997 according 
to Branch Offices48 in Relation with the 1994 and 1999 Municipal Elections49 
 
 1995 1997 Change in 
Membership 
1994 1999 
Adana 28 89 61 MP NAP 
Ankara 175 149 -26 WP VP 
Antalya 0 43 43 TPP TPP 
Balıkesir 83 41 -42 TPP MP 
Bandırma 0 33 33 TPP DLP 
Bartın 0 23 23 MP DLP 
Bursa 99 353 254 MP DLP 
Çankırı 28 25 -3 TPP NAP 
Çorum 17 13 -4 WP NAP 
Denizli 75 52 -23 TPP TPP 
Diyarbakır 0 41 41 WP PDP 
Elazığ 0 39 39 WP VP 
Gaziantep 61 95 34 SDPP RPP 
Gebze 0 87 87 WP VP 
İnegöl 0 7 7 WP VP 
İzmir 114 174 60 TPP DLP 
Kahramanmaraş 54 47 -7 MP VP 
Karadeniz 
Ereğlisi 
0 35 35 MP MP 
Kayseri 112 152 40 WP VP 
Kocaeli 89 97 8 WP VP 
Konya 153 179 26 WP VP 
Malatya 35 50 15 WP VP 
Mersin 0 51 51 MP NAP 
Samsun 22 42 20 TPP MP 
Şanlıurfa 16 42 26 WP VP 
İstanbul 488 851 363 WP VP 
 
The claim that whole booming activity of KOBİs in Turkey is represented 
under the umbrella of MÜSİAD would be wrong. However, the promotion of KOBİs 
                                                 
48 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, pp. 69-70. Source MÜSİAD Firm Presentation 
Catalogue 1995 and MÜSİAD Agenda 1997. 
 
49 Aadana, Ankara, Antalya, Bursa, Çorum, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, İstanbul, İzmir, Kayseri, Konya, 
Mersin, Samsun and Şanlıurfa are metropolitan municipalities. Mahalli İdareler Seçimi Sonuçları, 
27.3.1994 (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1994) and Mahalli İdareler Seçimi Sonuçları, 
18.04.1999 (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1999). 
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and the mobilization of public resources and the financial system for this purpose 
constitute one of the persistent themes in the MÜSİAD perspective since the 
organization is mainly composed of KOBİs.  
As a result, MÜSİAD keeps the title as the largest voluntary business 
association in Turkey despite the decrease in the number of members in the last 
years. As a heterogenous structure of businessmen in different sectors and different 
sizes, it is difficult for MÜSİAD to satisfy its members. This dissatisfaction resulted 
in the canceling of some memberships as well as the closure of some branch offices. 
Despite all, MÜSİAD succeeded to become public figure via noticeable membership 
volume.  
 
4.5. Acivities 
 
 In this section, activities of MÜSİAD will be focus of analysis. MÜSİAD 
performs several activities composed of periodical publications, organizing 
international fairs and mass trips to foreign countries, educational seminars and 
panels as exclusive selective benefits. MÜSİAD also organizes social activities 
including picnics, pilgrimage and umre travels, iftar (breaking the fast) programs 
and visits to political elites and high-level bureaucrats and to different business 
organizations. The organization welcomes business groups, ambassadors and 
consulates from other countries to develop business relations. MÜSİAD, by its 
periodical publications, enables members to know each other, to keep up with 
MÜSİAD identity as well as to form a public opinion. Through international fairs 
and mass trips to foreign countries MÜSİAD encourages its members to be more 
global and export-oriented. Through panels and educational seminars MÜSİAD 
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could develop qualifications of its members and staff. In short, these activities 
fostered the common bond of being a MÜSİAD member as a solitary benefit. 
 
4.5.1. Publications  
  
Since its establishment, MÜSİAD has prepared several reports on Turkish 
economy and other countries for the use of its members. These reports contained 
information on industrial and commercial potential of foreign countries, transport 
and lodging facilities and laws on foreign trade. In this framework, the professional 
General Secretariat of the organization has promptly informed members of any 
inquiries on offers for goods and services within periodical publications. Along 
studies and reports on specific subjects, MÜSİAD publishes these following 
periodicals: MÜSİAD Bülten, Çerçeve, MÜSİAD Bülten Sektör, and EKOMÜSİAD. 
MÜSİAD Bülten (Bulletin) started as a monthly periodical and then it 
changed its publication frequency to bimonthly. MÜSİAD Bülten includes: 
information on MÜSİAD’s activities, practical hints on business problems, 
investment facilities in Turkey and other countries, announcements by MÜSİAD 
members, information on exhibitions and trade fairs, announcements on domestic 
and foreign requirement for goods, state incentives for industrialists50, commercial 
and job advertisements from its members. MÜSİAD Bülten also provides a monthly 
report on the Turkish economy, reports on foreign trips, the meetings and press 
conferences of the Chairman, and news from the headquarter and branch offices. 
Since half of the each issue in volume are full of news from the headquarter, 
                                                 
50 Mustafa Yüceel, “Yatırımlarda Devlet Yardımları: Yatırım Teşvikleri” MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 5, 
No.22, 1997, pp.45-48. 
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MÜSİAD represents a centralized organization model in which the strong hand of 
the headquarter is felt in developing organizational policies.  
The first issue of MÜSİAD Bülten was published in December 1993 and 
composed of 16 pages. Also in the early issues we see advertisements of the people 
who are looking for job and most of them are women with headscarf. So, these 
issues have helped the Islamic oriented women getting in public sphere to some 
extent.  Following the economic crisis in 2001 February, the number of pages 
decreased to half, around 50 pages, while more advertisements started to appear.  
Çerçeve (Frame) is a monthly magazine of MÜSİAD which started in 
September 1992. Çerçeve contains articles written by academicians, MÜSİAD staff 
and members on an actual topic or a topic on Islam and business, e.g. how to handle 
the problem of usury in modern capitalist economy. It also includes advertisements 
from MÜSİAD members. Çerçeve is circulated to all MÜSİAD members, to the 
media, prominent persons in business and politics, university professors, various 
professional and business organizations and representative offices of Turkey in 
foreign countries.51 When compared to MÜSİAD Bülten, it is more academic 
oriented. Fist issue of Çerçeve was about fifty pages and it developed in time both in 
volume and in content. In this context, the issue titled “700. Yılında Osmanlı 
Dünyası” (World of Ottoman in its 700th Anniversary) is a remarkable piece 
composed of several articles on the Ottoman Empire, especially on its economic 
side. This  also shows MÜSİAD’s strong emphasis on the Ottoman as a model to be 
                                                 
51 MÜSİAD Booklet. 
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followed.52 Via circulation of Çerçeve, MÜSİAD has aimed to disseminate its views 
to different intellectual and elite groups and to form public opinion.   
MÜSİAD started the publication of MÜSİAD Bülten Sektör in April 2000 
quarterly as the extension of professional committees of MÜSİAD in the sectors of 
Electric-Electronic-Computer and Durable Goods, Construction and Construction 
Equipments, Food and Drink, Service, and Automotive and Spare Parts. MÜSİAD 
Bülten Sektör magazines are composed of sector-oriented news, advertisements of 
the member companies, their success stories and future plans as well as interviews 
with the managers of the leading companies of the sectors. MÜSİAD Bülten Sektör 
aims to develop MÜSİAD identity through dissemination of cooperation among 
members within each sector. 
EKOMÜSİAD is the monthly political-economic report prepared by 
MÜSİAD. It started in January of 1998 and due to several intervals it could only 
publish 14 issues in 40 months. EKOMÜSİAD is a small report distributed within 
MÜSİAD Bülten. Its main sections are Turkey, World, Market, Politics and 
Economic World. This small booklet is composed of analytical articles on Turkish 
political economy, practical experiences to businessmen with a modern management 
perspective, world markets and world politics, and international relations and 
evaluation of Turkey’s foreign policies. EKOMÜSİAD, like Çerçeve, is presented in 
a more intellectual language and it orients itself as defining a standpoint of 
MÜSİAD. 
Consequently, these periodicals have been quite effective among MÜSİAD 
members to develop a “MÜSİAD identity” as an exclusive selective benefit. Beside 
                                                 
52 For further information see, Çerçeve, 1999, Vol. 8, No. 25. 
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informing members on different investment facilities either abroad or in Turkey, 
these periodicals functioned in public opinion formation by their dissemination to 
different groups as intellectuals and  businessmen. 
 
4.5.2. International Fairs 
 
MÜSİAD organizes international trade fairs and participates in the IBF 
meetings. The latter is an initiative to promote global co-operation and networking 
between Muslim businessmen and Muslim countries. MÜSİAD recognized the 
importance of international markets and established representations, first in countries 
where Turkish migrants are located such as in Germany and France. In addition to 
this, MÜSİAD established several focal points in different parts of the world.53  
MÜSİAD members have great willingness to seek out foreign markets. Thus, the 
main drive of MÜSİAD has become to explore new foreign markets and it has given 
so much consideration to international fairs and organized trips abroad. This 
approach enables the association’s members to have information about and to 
participate in international developments. Parallel to the aspiration in the export 
facilities, these activities constitute a very important aspect of MÜSİAD.  
The 1st MÜSİAD International Trade Fair was held in İzmir on October 29-
31, 1993 in which 189 MÜSİAD member firms, 55 firms from 3 different 
countries54 and 20 thousand visitors participated. The second and third fairs were 
                                                 
53 Karin Vorhoff, “Businessmen and Their Organizations: Between Instrumental Solidarity, Cultural 
Diversity, and the State” in Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism (İstanbul: Orient-Institut der 
DMG 2000), Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert Karin Vorhoff St. Yerasimos, G. Seufert, K. 
Vorhoff, eds., p.158. 
 
54 There is no data about the name of these countries in any MÜSİAD record.  
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held on October 27-30, 1994 and November 2-5, 1995 again in İzmir. In the 2nd 
MÜSİAD International Trade Fair, 235 MÜSİAD member firms, and firms55 from 
Jordan, Germany and Bangladesh and 31 thousand visitors participated. In the 3rd 
MÜSİAD International Trade Fair in İzmir, 274 MÜSİAD member firms, 18 firms 
from 10 countries and 33 thousand visitors participated.56 The 4th MÜSİAD 
International Fair was held on November 19-24, 1996 in İstanbul57 in which 287 
MÜSİAD member firms, 52 firms from 17 countries and 45 thousand visitors 
participated.58 The 5th MÜSİAD International Fair was held on November 18-23, 
1997, in which 296 MÜSİAD member firms, 54 foreign firms59 and 71 thousand 
visitors participated.60 The 6th MÜSİAD International Fair was held on November 
19-22, 1998 in which 286 MÜSİAD member firms, 21 firms from 10 countries and 
                                                 
55 The number of foreign firms is not indicated in any MÜSİAD record. 
 
56 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 8, p. 24 and Nusret Özcan, “Medine Pazarı Işığıyla Dört 
Dörtlük Pazar: 4. Uluslararası MÜSİAD Pazarı” [A Perfect Fair in Light of the Medina Market: The 
4th International MÜSİAD Fair] MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997, Vol. 5, No. 18, p. 
23-24. The number of foreign firms participating in the 2nd MÜSİAD International Trade Fair is not 
cited. 
 
57 After the 4th MÜSİAD International Fair, the following fairs were also held in İstanbul, which 
became a tradition. İzmir is the second biggest commercial city after İstanbul and most of the national 
and international commercial fairs are held in these cities. 
 
58 Ömer Bolat, “Genel Sekreterden” [From the General Secretary] MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel 
Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 18, p. 2. It is also underlined that one billion of USD of trade connections 
were made among firms participating in the fair. 
 
59 The number of the countries of foreign firms participating in the 5th MÜSİAD International Trade 
Fair is not cited. 
 
60 MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 24, p. 35. According to the results of 
a questionnaire, it was learned that during the three days at the fair a total of one and half billion US 
dollars worth of initial connections and trade agreement were made. Yeni Şafak, Akit, Dünya and 
Turkish Daily News, Turkish dailies, published a ‘MÜSİAD FAIR SPECIAL ISSUE’ and certain 
sections of the press gave a large coverage to Fair and the Forum. MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel 
Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 24, pp. 53-54 and 1997 Faaliyet Raporu ve 1998 Faaliyet Programı, pp. 
12-14. 
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110 thousand visitors participated.61 The 6th MÜSİAD International Fair drew to a 
successful growth of 35% in the increase of visitors compared to the previous one.62 
Morality and business were briefly mixed in the fair’s motto “The economy prospers 
in clean hands” in relation with MÜSİAD’s general motto “High morality high 
technology.” This was also in conjunction with Turkish politics and business circles 
tainted by major mafia scandals in recent years.63  
The 6th MÜSİAD International Fair was separated into MUMAC’ 98; 
machines, automation, and automotive side industry products and electric-electronic 
products, MUSCON’ 98; construction, furniture and construction equipments, 
MUTEX’ 98; textiles, clothing, leather products and carpets were displayed, 
MUFOPACK’ 98; where food, drinks and packaging systems were displayed.64 7th 
MÜSİAD International Fair was held on October 14-17, 1999 in which 180 firms 
both from Turkey and 16 countries as well as 150 thousand visitors participated.65 
The 8th MÜSİAD International Fair was organized on 26-29 October 2000, in which 
250 local and foreign firms as well as 100 thousand people participated. Like in 
1999, Fair consisted of the follwoing divisions: MUMAC 2000 – Machinery, 
Electrical, Electronic, Automotive; MUSCON 2000 – Construction, Furniture, 
                                                 
61 “Fair-Forum Multi-vision Script” MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 18, 
p. 23. 
 
62 Ömer Bolat, “From the General Secretary” MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı Vol. 6, No. 
31, 1998, p. 2. 
 
63 Karin Vorhoff, “Businessmen and Their Organizations,” p. 172. 
 
64 MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1998,  Vol. 6, No. 31, p. 17. 
 
65 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1999, Vol. 7, No. 33, p. 14. 
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Services; MUTEX 2000 – Textile, Clothing; MUFOCPACK 2000 – Food and 
Packaging.66 
Table 13. MÜSİAD International Fairs 
Years No. of 
Local 
Firms 
No. of 
Foreign 
Firms 
No. of 
Foreign 
Countries 
No. of 
Visitors ♦ 
Location 
1993 189 55 3 20 İzmir 
1994 235 ? 3 31 İzmir 
1995 274 18 10 33 İzmir 
1996 287 52 17 45 İstanbul 
1997 296 54 ? 71 İstanbul 
1998 286 21 10 110 İstanbul 
1999 180* ? 16 150 İstanbul 
2000 250* ? ? 100 İstanbul 
 
?: no available data 
*:  the number of firms is for both local and foreign firms 
♦: Numbers in thousands 
 
When we analyze international fairs organized by MÜSİAD, we observe a 
steady increase in the number of visitors except the year 2000 when there is a sharp 
decrease about one third. We could understand that MÜSİAD International Fairs 
became quite popular from the perspective of visitors. However, the economic crisis 
also affected the number of visitors even though there is no admission charge. We 
cannot observe the same steady increasing trend in neither of the other variables as 
in the number of local or foreign firms or foreign countries. Moreover, the 
unavailability of the missing data is another problem in developing a detailed 
analysis.  
It is quite interesting that the number of foreign firms was the highest in the 
first international fair and this number was not caught up in the following years 
                                                 
66 8th MÜSİAD International Fair Special Edition, 2000, p. 3.  
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however the number of foreign countries has increased up to 17 in 1996. This shows 
that MÜSİAD got attraction from different countries however the number of foreign 
firms remained low. Most of the participating countries in MÜSİAD international 
fairs are Muslim populated countries. In this context, MÜSİAD advertisement 
campaigns in their mass trips could be comprehended as successful to some extent. 
The number of local firms has shown a remarkable increase until 1997 but since then 
there is a decrease trend in relation with the economic crisis in Turkey. When 
compared to MÜSİAD’s aspiration in reaching to the world markets, these numbers 
are quite modest and this shows that MÜSİAD has not been successful enough to 
attract international audience.  
 
4.5.3. International Business Forum (IBF) Meetings 
 
The IBF meetings function as the window of MÜSİAD to get in touch with 
businessmen from other countries. The 1st IBF, opened by Pakistani President 
Leghari, was held on September 21-23, 1995 under the leadership of the Pakistan 
Business Forum in Lahore. This meeting brought together representatives of the 
Muslim business world and 230 businessmen from 23 Islamic countries and 500 
Pakistani businessmen participated. The meeting included sector-oriented business 
talks and focused mainly on economic and business problems in the Islamic world. 
In the 1st IBF, a group of 20 MÜSİAD members led by Erol Yarar represented 
MÜSİAD. At the end of the meeting, it was decided to found the IBF to gather all 
Muslim businessmen in the world under its platform at an annual meeting. Pakistani 
Business Forum President Tanveer Ahmed Magoon was elected as the President of 
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the IBF and the Lahor Leader and Administration Institute to house the IBF 
Secretariat.”67  
The 2nd IBF meeting was hosted by MÜSİAD at the same time when the 4th 
MÜSİAD International Fair was held, November 19-24, 1996. 439 delegates from 
36 different countries participated in the 2nd IBF meeting when MÜSİAD President 
Erol Yarar took the IBF Presidency from Tanveer Ahmed Magoon and the IBF 
General Secretariat was transferred from Lahore to İstanbul.68 This meeting had 
become important in the Turkish political agenda with the participation of the Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan and Minister of State Abdullah Gül, Labor and Social 
Security Minister Necati Çelik and İstanbul Governor Rıdvan Yenişen as well as 
Sudan’s Minister of State, Mustafa Sait; Singapore’s Minister of State, Sıddık Sanif; 
Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic’s Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Kenan 
Akın; Malaysian Parliament Representative, Cemil Mahmud; Algerian Islamic 
Movement Leader, Mahmud Nahnah; Iran’s Vice Minister of Industry, Tabatabai on 
November 20, 1996.69 According to MÜSİAD, the 2nd IBF meeting was successful 
in providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and information between researchers 
and industrial practitioners in the general area of business network. The attendance 
of the Turkish PM as well as several ministers from different countries increased the 
importance of the meeting. Moreover, national business delegations, scholars from 
                                                 
67 Nusret Özcan, “MÜSİAD Öncülüğünde Emir-Alim-Tüccar Buluşması” [Leader-Scholar-Trader 
Meeting under MÜSİAD’s Initiative] MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 
18, p. 6. 
 
68 Ibid.,  p. 14. 
 
69 Ibid.,  p. 8. 
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all parts of the Islamic World attending at the Forum, presented their own papers and 
models on Islam and economics.  
The 3rd IBF meeting organized again by MÜSİAD was held during 
November18-23, 1997 in İstanbul. 642 businessmen and high-level bureaucrats from 
51 countries participated as delegates. The theme of the meeting was “Establishing 
A Global Business Network among Muslim Nations.”70 There were participants at 
the ministerial level from such countries as Singapore, Sudan, Uganda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.71 In the meeting, three international projects for cooperation in the 
Islamic world were presented. Among these, the Auto Gross Market project began in 
Turkey to develop a chain first inside Turkey and then abroad. Konya Sanayi 
Holding, another multiple share holding company, succeeded the standardization 
and marketing of automotive spare particles of different KOBİs in Konya region as 
the extent of this project. The International Courier Project that also was presented in 
1997 has developed throughout the year with meetings and contacts in Pakistan, 
Turkey and Germany. Although the project of Franchising, Production in Textiles 
and Store Chain was also presented but there has been no concrete development 
related to this project. 
 In November 1998, on the eve of the 6th MÜSİAD International Fair, 
MÜSİAD presided and hosted the 4th IBF meeting, held on November 19-22, 1998 
in İstanbul. In this meeting, IBF-NET Internet Project prepared by Orhan İkiz, 
member of MÜSİAD Board of Directors, was presented. This project aimed to 
                                                 
70 MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 24, pp. 3-4. 
 
71 Ibid.,  p. 6. 
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provide information flow among participants and businessmen they represent. 
Registered as “ibfnet.net” the project is at the stage of being activated in 1999 
following subscriptions.”72 Moreover, in the 4th IBF Final Communiqué, it was 
indicated that  
International terrorism is an explicit violation of human rights by 
which thousands of innocent people have been killed. The last 
incident of protecting internationally-accepted terrorist chief 
Abdullah Öcalan by the Italian government is an unacceptable 
violation of international law and moral codes of conduct. The 
IBF’s participants condemn the stance of the Italian government 
and call upon it to cooperate with the Turkish government on this 
issue. 
 
The lines cited above shows the power of MÜSİAD in the IBF as well as its 
nationalist vision and its Islamic motivation. Moreover, in the 4th IBF Congress one 
of the concerns was the management of investment and funds of the Muslims in the 
world. The volume of these funds was estimated to be around USD 1.2 trillion left at 
the disposal of non-Muslim fund/asset managers. It was considered beneficial for the 
Muslims to create their own Islamic funds on global scale managed by Muslim 
professional fund/asset managers in full compliance with Islamic principles and for 
the benefits of the Muslim ummah.73  In this context, MÜSİAD attaches importance 
on IBF meetings to gain the Islamic world’s markets. Consequently, MÜSİAD 
hosted the 2nd, 3rd and 4th IBF meetings between 1996-1998 in conjunction with the 
4th, 5th and 6th MÜSİAD International Fairs and these hosting activities brought more 
                                                 
72 Yusuf Balcı, “İş Dünyasının 4. Zirvesi İstanbul’da Gerçekleştirildi” [The 4th Summit of the 
business World Took Place in İstanbul] MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1998,  Vol. 6, No. 
31, pp. 28-29. 
 
73 “4. Uluslarası İş Forumu Nihai Bildirgesi” [4th International Business Forum Final Communiqué)], 
Ibid.,  p. 33. 
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international popularity to the MÜSİAD and its affiliated businessmen developed 
their foreign trade capacity. 
The 5th IBF Meeting was held during 12-13 April 2000 in Cape Town, 
Republic of South Africa in which 100 businessmen from 9 countries participated. 
36 MÜSİAD members led by Ali Bayramoğlu represented Turkey in this meeting.74 
The main principles of the IBF were also kept intact as Erol Yarar said, in the IBF 
Board of Governors’ Meeting on October 25, 2000 in İstanbul, “Our goal is, by 
bringing businessmen together, to provide economic and cultural solidarity and 
enable them to stand against the worldwide globalization wind and stay on their 
feet.”75  
The 6th IBF Congress was held on April 12-14, 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, in which 300 businessmen from 18 different countries participated. In this 
meeting 30 MÜSİAD members led by Erol Yarar participated.76 The mass 
participation of MÜSİAD members in IBF meetings shows how MÜSİAD pays 
attention to international cooperation among Muslim businessmen and how the 
organization MÜSİAD tries to get the leadership in this context. 
Consequently, MÜSİAD aims to reach the markets in the Islamic world via 
an efficient international business organization as IBF. The prominent role of 
MÜSİAD in IBF has also provided a remarkable role in the internal politics during 
the Refahyol government, which lasted following the fall of this government. 
                                                 
74 MÜSİAD Bülten, 2000, Vol. 8, No. 37,  p. 49. The numbers show that, MÜSİAD members formed 
more than one third of the participants in relation to MÜSİAD’s interest in IBF meetings. 
 
75 8th MÜSİAD International Fair Special Edition, 2000, p. 13. 
 
76 MÜSİAD Bülten, 2001,  Vol. 9, No. 42, pp. 17-18. It is important to note that Erol Yarar keeps his 
active mode in the association despite his resignation from the office of Chair. 
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4.5.4. Foreign Trips 
 
MÜSİAD supports a dual economic model based on “the encouragement of 
export and minimization of import to provide external trade balance.” In conjunction 
with this model, it has organized several trade missions abroad for its members to 
encourage co-operation and establishment of trade relations with companies in other 
countries. In order to realize this model, the state is also urged to provide the 
necessary attractive industrial encouragement policies.  
During these missions abroad, MÜSİAD management has established 
contacts with government officials, managers and officials of private and state-sector 
organizations to conduct talks and sign co-operation agreements. In these trade 
missions, MÜSİAD has organized group tours to domestic and foreign trade fairs 
and professional exhibitions for its members. These trips provided them to discover, 
study and follow up developments, and to enhance commercial and technical 
knowledge with MÜSİAD’s objective of encouraging members to participate in such 
events. The General Secretariat of MÜSİAD periodically informs members about all 
fairs also and exhibitions organized in Turkey. Foreign Relations Department (FRD) 
of the association is responsible for carrying out the participation activities in these 
fairs. During these trips participant members get the chance to meet their 
counterparts in foreign countries and establish trade relations.    
MÜSİAD orients its members to develop themselves through export since 
the association believes that it is the only path to overcome the bottleneck of Turkish 
economy. On these trips cooperation agreements have been signed with several 
countries, which were escorted by high-level bureaucrats and politicians. These 
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business trips have been to: Central Asian Republics; Kazakhstan (1), Uzbekistan 
(1), Azerbaijan (1), Crimea (1), Middle East Countries; Northern Cyprus Turkish 
Republic (1), Saudi Arabia (4), Iran (2), Iraq (1), Jordan (2), Palestine (2), United 
Arab Emirates (3), Syria (1), Yemen (1), Unity of Independent States; Russia (1), 
Ukraine (1), African countries; Egypt (5), Sudan (2), Libya (1), Nigeria (1), 
Republic of South Africa (2), Morocco (1), Algeria (1), Western European countries; 
Germany (6), England (1), Holland (1), Austria (2), Hungary (1),  Italy (2), France 
(2), Balkan countries; Bosnia-Herzegovina (3), Macedonia (1), Albania (1), 
Romania (3), Bulgaria (1), Greece (2) Southeast Asian countries; Malaysia (5), 
Indonesia (3), Singapore (5), Taiwan (1), Pakistan (5), Bangladesh (4), India (1), 
Hong-Kong (1), China (1), Australia (2), Japan (1), Thailand (1) and USA (3).77 
According to my analysis, MÜSİAD organized mass trips to 26 Muslim countries 
and to 22 non-Muslim countries. However, the frequency of the trips to Muslim 
countries is, when compared with non-Muslim ones, is higher as 53 to 41 times 
frequently. In short, this shows MÜSİAD’s orientation towards Muslim countries. 
The most important reason attached to export by MÜSİAD is that companies 
can overcome the restrictions of the domestic market by entering into the overseas 
market. Another reason is related to attempts to strengthen the social and political 
position of the association. Thus, the exporting activities are presented as a kind of 
national service to promote the influence of MÜSİAD in the social and political 
fields. In this framework, although the activities aimed at export are not collective 
advantages for each member, the success of the activities is a collective good 
                                                 
77 The numbers in parentheses show the frequency of trips to these countries. 
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provided by MÜSİAD to all of its members.78 For this reason, one of the most 
important aspirations of MÜSİAD members is to exceed the limitations of the 
domestic market by advancing commercial relations among members beside 
encouragement for exportation. In this context, international fairs organized by 
MÜSİAD and the IBF meetings become quite important. 
Consequently, the orientation of MÜSİAD to foreign markets is also due to 
the compulsion that the SEEs and cartel or monopolies of big conglomerates control 
the domestic market convened under TÜSİAD. Since it is not easy to compete with 
these tycoons, the best way for MÜSİAD members seem to be the foreign markets. 
Moreover, with the motivation gained for export in 1980s, many KOBİs in Anatolia 
chose the path of export rather than competing in the domestic market. Briefly, 
MÜSİAD wanted to encourage its members for export in order to show the state that 
KOBİs are more successful in export than their capacities and they must be 
rewarded with more credit.  
 
4.5.5. Panels, Educational Seminars and Other Activities 
 
MÜSİAD has organized 450 panels in a period of nine years79 in different 
subjects on economic and socio-political issues ranging from Private Finance 
Institution’s Situation and Their Importance in Turkish Economy80 to İmam-Hatip 
(Prayer Leader-Preacher) High Schools.81 Conferences given by academics, 
                                                 
78 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie,” pp. 
540-541. 
 
79 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1999, Vol. 7, No. 33, pp. 13. 
 
80 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 7. 
 
81 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 8, , p. 16. 
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politicians and high-ranking bureaucrats offer another forum for networking. In the 
traditional weekly Friday meetings prominent politicians, academicians, consulates, 
ambassadors,82 foreign ministers are invited for giving talk on economy, local 
administration, daily politics, and Islamic issues in daily life.83  
MÜSİAD has also organized seminars on professional management 
techniques, modern business administration, domestic and foreign trade and English 
courses at the headquarter and at branch offices in various locations. The Training 
Commission of MÜSİAD organized additional seminars included foreign trading, 
total quality management, quality control methods, professional salesmanship, 
effective speaking, meeting management, the role of management techniques in 
business success, development of management skills, management assistance, public 
relations and other subjects. MÜSİAD has also established database connection and 
developed intranet facilities with data banks in Turkey and abroad. The aim is to 
provide this exclusive selective service to its members to develop 
intercommunication among them.  
MÜSİAD also attempted to foster co-operation and solidarity among its 
members as a solitary benefit. Thus, the association carried out social activities 
including sharing of hobbies,84 picnics,85 umre travels to Saudi Arabia,86 visit to big 
                                                                                                                                         
 
82 Adolfo Saracho, Ambassador of Argentina, is the first ambassador visiting MÜSİAD. Çerçeve, 
1992, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 25-26.  
 
83 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1995, Vol. 3, No. 8, p. 25. 
84 Ibid., p. 23. 
 
85 MÜSİAD Bülten, 2000, Vol. 8, No. 38, p. 42. 
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factories like SIEMENS in Mudanya.87 MÜSİAD also began holding a week 
traditionally in summer 2000 in which MÜSİAD members with families 
participate.88  
MÜSİAD as a business association gives importance to visit President,89 
ministers,90 governors and high-level bureaucrats91 and media organizations as 
newspapers, radios and televisions.92 Through these visits, the association aims to 
develop public opinion and being noticed in the decision-making circles and by 
public. Moreover, MÜSİAD’s Iftars became very traditional since the beginning. 
Erbakan had also attended in one of them when he was PM. In these iftars several 
political party leaders from different parties, especially rightist ones, and mayors and 
high-level bureaucrats participate.93  MÜSİAD also traditionally organizes iftars for 
the university students,94 and professors in order to develop university-industry 
interaction, 95 its own members,96 and to press.97 Also in the holy Ramadan they help 
                                                                                                                                         
86 Ömer Bolat, “MÜSİAD’ın Suudi Arabistan-Umre Gezi Raporu (16-23 Aralık 1998)” [The Report 
on MÜSİAD’ın Umre Travel to Saudi Arabia (16-23 December 1998)] MÜSİAD Bülten, 1999, Vol. 
7, No. 32, pp. 37-40. 
 
87 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, Vol. 4, No.15, p. 23. 
 
88 MÜSİAD Bülten, 2000, Vol. 8, No. 38, p. 17.  
 
89 Ibid.,  pp. 4-6. 
 
90 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, Vol. 4, No.13, p. 59. For example Rıfat Hisarcıklıoğlu, the current 
Chairman of TOBB, was in the visiting committee of Ömer Barutçu, the ex-minister of 
Transportation. Hisarcıklıoğlu was in the Directors Board of MÜSİAD Ankara Branch in 1996. 
91 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, Vol. 4, No.15, pp. 66-67. 
 
92 Ibid.,  p. 51. 
 
93 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1997, Vol. 5, No.17, pp. 4-7 and MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998, Vol. 6, No.27, pp.13-15. 
 
94 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1997, Vol. 5, No.17, p. 9 and MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998, Vol. 6, No.27, p.21. 
 
95 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1997, Vol. 5, No.17, pp. 10-11 and MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998, Vol. 6, No.27, pp.19-
20. 
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the poor people98 as well as helping poor students in Southeast Anatolia in other 
times.99 MÜSİAD members also did a great help following the earthquake on 
August 17, 1999 in Turkey.100 All these organizations provide MÜSİAD public 
visibility and facilitate its public opinion formation. 
Beside these, MÜSİAD also gives visits to other business associations as 
ASKON and İŞHAD.101 Also Fermani Altun, Chairman  of Ehl-i-Beyt Foundation 
and Demokrat Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği-DEMSİAD [The Democratic 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Asssociation] visited MÜSİAD.102 The board of 
Directors of ASKON gave a visit to MÜSİAD103 as well as İŞHAD. These visits 
develop the relations within the business community.  
MÜSİAD also welcomed commercial groups from England, Italy, Romania, 
Taiwan, Australia, Somali, Chechnya, Senegal, Russia, Albania, USA, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Kuwait, and Palestine and Kazakhstan in 1997;104 from Malaysia, Tunisia, 
Palestine, Germany, Jordan, and Singapore in 1998;105 from Italy, Romania, 
                                                                                                                                         
 
96 MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 6, No.27, 1998, pp.16-17. 
 
97 “MÜSİAD’ın Basın İftarı” MÜSİAD Bülten, 1999, Vol. 7, No. 32, p. 53. 
 
98 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998, Vol. 6, No.27, pp. 48, 51. 
 
99 Ibid.,  p. 66. 
 
100 MÜSİAD Bülten Vol. 7, No. 34, 1999, pp. 8-12, 19. 
 
101 Ibid.,  pp. 35-37. 
 
102 2000 Faaliyet Raporu ve 2001 Faaliyet Programı, p. 4. 
  
103 MÜSİAD Bülten Vol. 8, No. 37, 2000, p. 30. 
 
104 1997 Faaliyet Raporu ve 1998 Faaliyet Programı, pp. 7-10. 
 
105 1998 Faaliyet Raporu ve 1999 Faaliyet Programı, pp. 4-6. 
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Belgium, Palestine, Singapore, Australia, England, Pakistan, and USA in 1999;106 
and from Iran, Russia, Congo, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Uganda, Indonesia, Greece, 
and USA in 2000.107 This shows the strong relations established both inside and 
outside the country paving the path for MÜSİAD to become like a liaison office for 
many domestic and foreign businessmen. 
MÜSİAD is also in touch with other civil society organizations convened 
under Türkiye Gönüllü Kültür Teşekkülleri-TTGV (Turkish Voluntary Cultural 
Organizations)108 which is the combination of 600 different foundations, 
associations, unions, trade unions. This umbrella organization was founded through 
the leadership of Aydınlar Ocağı (Intellectuals’ Hearth).109 The first meeting of 
TTGV was organized by Intellectuals’ Hearth on May 31, 1991 in which 87 
organizations participated. The second meeting was organized by Birlik Vakfı (Unity 
Foundation) in Ankara on December 14-15, 1991, third one by İş Dünyası Vakfı 
(Business World Foundation) in Ankara on December, 19, 1992, fourth one by 
Türkiye Yazarlar Birliği (Union of Turkish Writers) in Şanlıurfa on November 27-
28, 1993 and fifth one was organized by MÜSİAD in İstanbul on November 19, 
                                                 
106 1999 Faaliyet Raporu ve 2000 Faaliyet Programı, pp. 5-6.  
 
107 2000 Faaliyet Raporu ve 2001 Faaliyet Programı, pp. 9-10.  
 
108 For further information see, http://www.turgev.org/  
 
109 Aydınlar Ocağı became a prominent organization following the 1980 military intervention 
since this group of people conceptualized religion as the essence of Turkish culture and 
formulated The Turkish-Islamic synthesis parallel to the vision of the military government 
who wanted to benefit religion. Binnaz Toprak, “Religion as State Ideology in a Secular 
Setting: The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” in Aspects of Religion in Secular Turkey, Malcolm 
Wagstaff, ed., (Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies University of Durham, 1990), 
p. 10. For further information, see, http://www.aydinlarocagi.org/  
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1994.110   Erol Yarar also chaired the Gönüllü Kültür Teşekkülleri Heyeti (Board of 
Voluntary Cultural Organizations) that protested the compulsory eight-year 
education process. They proposed “5+3” model rather than permanent 8 years 
education that started after the February 28 process. They also visited the then Prime 
Minister Necmettin Erbakan, Tansu Çiller, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu in this context.111  
On 27 May 1998, TTGV organized a meeting Demokrasi Kurultayı 
(Democracy Congress) related to the anniversary of May 27, 1960 military 
intervention in which Erol Yarar made a speech.112 In his speech, Yarar connected 
the struggle for democracy and human rights with the struggle between “good” and 
“evil” in an Islamic framework.113 MÜSİAD also participated in United Nations 
Conference on Human Settlements Habitat II City Summit, World Business Forum 
with 10 different presentations and with a group of 25 people composed of 
academicians and businessmen led by Erol Yarar in İstanbul during May 30- June 2, 
1996.114  
                                                 
110 Türkiye Gönüllü Kültür Teşekkülleri Toplantıları [The Meetings of the Turkish Voluntary Cultural 
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Türkiye Gönüllü Kültür Teşekkülleri 5. İstişare Topantısı: 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye’nin Hedefleri – 
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Organizations: Turkey’s targets in the 21st Century-İstanbul, 19 November 1994] (İstanbul: 
MÜSİAD, 1994). 
 
111 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1997, Vol. 5, No.20, pp. 8-12. 
 
112 “Demokrasi Kurultayı” [Democracy Congress] MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998, Vol. 6, No. 29, pp. 17-21.  
 
113 “Demokrasi, insan hakları mücadelesi, bugünün mücadelesi değildir. Bu mücadele, asırların 
mücadelesidir. Hazreti Adem’den bu zamana kadar gelen hakla batılın, doğru ile yanlışın, hakların 
müdafaasının bir mücadelesidir. Ve bu mücadeleyi yapan insanlarda belirli sıfatlar olması gerekir ki 
bu mücadele Allah’ın izni ile neticeye gitsin ve bu mücadele arzu edile bir şekilde noktalansın.” 
Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküller Vakfı Demokrasi Kurultayı: Hepimiz İçin Demokrasi [The Foundation 
of Turkish Voluntary Cultural Organizations’ Democracy Congress: Democracy for All of Us] 
(İstanbul: Türkiye Gönüllü teşekküller Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), p. 69. 
 
114 For further information, see The Global Business Agenda of MÜSİAD – İstanbul, 30 May-2 June 
1996 (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1996). In this book, MÜSİAD defines the ideal city as “a place where 
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These developments show that MÜSİAD has tried to prove itself caring for 
the public interests beside being a business association related to just interests of its 
members. As Buğra states,  
These activities play a very important role in fostering 
feelings of solidarity, especially because they all take 
place in a cultural frame of reference where Islam 
significantly contributes to the establishment of a 
shared understanding concerning business ethics, 
corporate responsibility, and commonality of 
interests.115 
 
MÜSİAD members derive satisfaction from these activities of the organization, 
which binds them in a coherent community. The arrangements of travel abroad bring 
geographically diversified MÜSİAD’s members together. Thus, MÜSİAD’s social 
activities acquire a much greater significance for enhancing group cohesion and 
solidarity.  
MÜSİAD has always functioned as an information office as well as a 
consortium or network firm for its members. The association plays a very important 
role in network formation by fostering feelings of trust and solidarity both at local 
and at national level by the periodical meetings of boards and professional 
committees in different cities. In addition, the association helps its members to solve 
problems outside organizational activities and provides references to the members 
for use in their commercial relations. Thus, MÜSİAD could mediate business 
relations involving input, supply, outsourcing, subcontracting, retailing and 
distribution of representative agencies. This intermediation facility of the association 
                                                                                                                                         
justice, ecological balance, knowledge, compassion, affection, solidarity, charity, ability, humility, 
spirituality, esthetics, beauty and in short all human activities exist.” p. 2 and MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, 
Vol. 4, No.13, p. 37. 
 
115 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 529. 
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happened to be useful in reducing uncertainty and preventing the breaching of 
contacts, i.e. in franchising offices distribution by a bigger member to smaller 
members in different cities. This minimized costs of information gathering and 
monitoring. MÜSİAD supplies these services more cheaply or free of charge as 
exclusive selective benefits. The services, such as information provision, and foreign 
and domestic fairs and trips, readily becomes important providing the cost-saving 
when the membership structure of MÜSİAD is taken into account.116  
Consequently, directed to the needs of a newly forming middle class, 
MÜSİAD has offered exclusive selective benefits in their activities to widen circles 
of professional acquaintances. This is an important service for the members whose 
backgrounds would not position them for such successful networking in the world of 
business and politics. Thus, MÜSİAD membership provided the possibility of 
forming acquaintances with other businessmen who could be counted as reliable 
because they had gone through the meticulous process of enrolment to MÜSİAD.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I benefited from Olson’s collective action theory and 
Salisbury’s exchange theory to understand MÜSİAD’s mobilization. We observe 
Olson’s exclusive selective benefits approach to prevent the free-rider problem 
implemented through MÜSİAD’s activities such as its publications, international 
fairs, foreign trips, educational seminars and etc. exclusively to its members. 
MÜSİAD’s activities also functioned as solitary benefits fostering the common bond 
                                                 
116 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, pp. 20-22. 
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of being a MÜSİAD member and developing a MÜSİAD identity among members. 
When we examine these activities from the perspective of Salisbury’s exchange 
theory, we see that MÜSİAD leaders interrelated the association’s survival and 
mobilization with a mutually advantageous exchange of these benefits. Social 
identities based on religion, norms and ideology form the basis of interest group 
organization. This understanding is quite valid in the identity formation of MÜSİAD 
shaped with reference to Islamic moral values and Anadoluluk. 
Historically, KOBİs and the Islamic-oriented enterprises -interest-free 
finance institutions, multi share holder enterprises- fueled through Islam and locality 
as Anadoluluk prospered in 1980s and early 1990s. This resulted in the emergence of 
MÜSİAD in 1990 that succeeded a speedy expansion in membership volume. In the 
institutionalization process, MÜSİAD has been challenged by the problems of 
professionalization. Thus, the association implemented amendments in 
organizational structure every year to reach stability. However, this is not only due 
to the inexperience of MÜSİAD but also political-economic structure of Turkey is 
also not stable either. The dynamism of the organization within this structural 
framework led MÜSİAD adapt itself to the developments following the February 28 
process as well.  
Consequently, MÜSİAD is still the largest voluntary business association in 
Turkey despite the decrease in the number of members in the last years. As a 
heterogenous structure of businessmen in different sectors and different sizes, it is 
difficult for MÜSİAD to satisfy its members. This dissatisfaction resulted in the 
canceling of some memberships and the closure of branch offices.  
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CHAPTER V 
IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF MÜSİAD 
 5.1. Introduction 
 
MÜSİAD has developed a functional understanding, but not a fundamentalist 
doctrine, of Islam as a common cultural bond among members and a motive to 
secure markets and to prevent labor militancy. This approach to Islam has been 
highly colored with Turkish nationalism and Ottoman imperial past. The “MÜ” in 
the acronym of the association1 and the projects for economic union among Islamic 
countries led to allegations that MÜSİAD was a reactionist religious movement 
rather than a business association. MÜSİAD’s parallel discourse and stand with the 
Milli Görüş parties, WP and VP in our case, fostered this allegation. MÜSİAD was 
even assumed to be the business extension of the Milli Görüş movement. Thus, the 
developments following the February 28 process negatively affected the association. 
MÜSİAD members found themselves portrayed as regular outlaws, which resulted 
in a discourse change through replacement of merits of Islamic solidarity by the 
irrelevance of religious faith and capital.  
MÜSİAD referred to the East Asian model of development as another 
ideological pillar. This reference was due the model’s conformity to the increasingly 
dominant system of “flexible production”2 permitting MÜSİAD to emphasize 
communitarian and Islamic moral values.  Despite severity of the economic and 
                                                 
1 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 1999), p. 24. 
 
2 Ayşe Buğra, “The Claws of the ‘Tigers’ ” Privateview: The Quarterly International Review of the 
Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association,  Autumn 1997, Vol. 1-2, No. 4-5, p. 50. 
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financial crisis faced by East Asian economies, MÜSİAD anticipated that these 
economies are to resume their high growth performance in a short time. However, 
this ideological pillar of MÜSİAD was destroyed following the East Asian economic 
crisis. The existence of TÜSİAD and its members of Turkish big conglomerates 
have also been influential in the identity formation of MÜSİAD. MÜSİAD criticized 
that these big conglomerates have developed their business not via their 
entrepreneurial success but via their close relation with the state. Despite MÜSİAD’s 
critics on the state’s role in Turkish interest group politics, it stood close to the 
Refahyol government to secure state benefits.  
This chapter outlines the ideological framework of MÜSİAD to understand 
the structuration and the identity formation of the association. In this context, I will 
firstly analyze the role and function of Islam for the association. Then, I will analyze 
the consequences of February 28 process that oriented MÜSİAD to de-emphasize 
Islam in its discourses. I will also analyze the similarities and differences between 
MÜSİAD and Milli Görüş parties, especially WP-VP. On the economic side, my 
focus will be another ideological pillar of MÜSİAD, the East Asian development 
model that is overshadowed following the economic crisis in East Asian countries. I 
will also pay attention to TÜSİAD as “the other” in the identity of MÜSİAD.  
5.2. MÜSİAD and Islamist Politics 
5.2.1. The Role and Function of Islam within MÜSİAD 
 
Islam kept its importance in the Turkish society and acted as a “binding 
force” among a newly developing business class although secularism has been state 
policy since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Islam also “…appears to be 
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consistent with certain trends in global production and trade patterns that are 
emphasized by MÜSİAD’s administration.”3 In this section, I will discuss the role 
and function of religion and its transformation in MÜSİAD’s discourses. 
When it comes to the issue of Islam, MÜSİAD’s rhetoric emphasizes the 
Islamic identity basis for the formation of networks of trust and solidarity.4 This 
framework has characterized Islam as an organizational resource to successfully 
bridge the association’s narrow interest representation role and its wider class 
mission of social transformation.  
Being a pious Muslim has not only been one facet of the typical MÜSİAD 
member identity since business and co-operation with the normal, read interest 
based, banks was not banned as a commercial practice among MÜSİAD members. 
However, MÜSİAD members are encouraged to ask a fiqh (Islamic law) adviser for 
halal (lawful in Islamic terms) way of earning and spending.5 In the same way, Erol 
Yarar, in the 6th Financial General Meeting of MÜSİAD, indicated the importance of 
acting according to communitarian conscience and keeping Muslim businessmen in 
unity while earning in a halal way.6 Thus, he defined Muslim businessmen as 
today’s akıncılar (pioneer force of the middle age armies). In short, in a MÜSİAD 
periodical, traits of Muslim businessman are described as: 
… a Muslim businessman must earn halal means (in the way that 
Allah wants) and spend in a halal way, he must avoid tricks, 
                                                 
3 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation By Two Turkish 
Business Associations” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, p. 530. 
 
4 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, p. 55.  
 
5 Erhan Eken, “Fıkıh Danışmanlığı”  MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 3 No. 5, 1995, p. 3. 
 
s 6th General Financial Congress  
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speculation and monopolizing, he should not pursue areas of profit 
that would not please Allah even though they might be very 
profitable and rational, i.e. producing, selling or advertising 
alcoholic products, running gambling halls or usury should all be 
avoided, just as a Muslim should not pursue everything without 
limit, a Muslim businessman should not produce or do business 
without limits, he should earn by means of effort and risk, he should 
escape from interest earnings where he has put no effort and taken 
no risks, a Muslim must be very careful of the rights of his 
employees and those with whom he does business. He must know 
that any earnings gained by abusing other rights will be harmful 
over the long run, when spending he should avoid he two extremes 
of wastefulness and miserliness as well as avoiding ostentation, 
capital should not be left idle; it should be directed to fields suitable 
to religion, a Muslim businessman must never forget that his capital 
is a trust and that he must fulfill all his responsibilities toward it. 7  
 
 Ayşe Buğra defines Islamic business at the associational level, as the 
activities of business associations that have claims to an Islamic worldview. She 
evaluates MÜSİAD by far the most influential organization bringing its members 
together in a coherent community of interest and common values.8 The level of 
Islamic business appears to be the network in which Islam functions as the key 
element in the intense cooperation among small or medium-sized economic units. 
The aim is to achieve competitiveness and access to public resources that would 
certainly not be feasible without such cooperation. In fact, this has been more 
evident especially in MÜSİAD’s operation like a consortium in its privatization 
offers in 1998.9  
                                                 
7 Erhan Eken, “Genel Yayın Yönetmeninden” [From the Editor], MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel 
Sayısı, 1997, Vol. 5, No. 18, p. 4. 
 
8 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, pp. 48. 
 
9 Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party 
in Perspetive” Third World Quarterly, September 1997, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 758. 
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The “MÜ” standing for müstakil (independent) is read as Müslüman 
(Muslim)10 by the secular circles to connote religious reactionism rather than 
religious attitudes in conjunction with MÜSİAD. This etymological background also 
provides some indication of MÜSİAD’s socio-economic basis and its ideological 
orientation since many members have a background of a conservative, rural 
environment imprinted by Sunni Islam.11 Moreover, these segments of the new, 
mainly Anatolian, business community, represented by MÜSİAD, have promoted 
ties with the broader Islamic world, often in symbolic terms associated with 
capitalist consumption. This has also included sales campaigns promising donations 
to Muslim charities working in Bosnia and Chechnya.12 MÜSİAD, in this context, 
has given special importance to several subjects as the Palestine issue through which 
the association severely condemned the occupation and activities of Israel against 
Muslim population in every opportunity.13 MÜSİAD also used the same harsh 
language against Russia in relation to Chechnya.14 In addition to these, MÜSİAD 
was quite critical about the French Parliament decision approving “the so-called 
Armenian genocide.”15 These examples show the essence of Islamic understanding 
                                                 
10 The preference of müstakil is also interesting since it is Arabic originated and in modern Turkish 
bağımsız is used for independent. 
 
11 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Turkish-Israeli Relations Through The Lens of the Turkish Identity Debate” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1997, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 24. 
 
12 Ibid.,  p. 25. 
 
13  “MÜSİAD Başkanı Erol Yarar’dan Kurban Bayramı Mesajı” [Erol Yarar’s Message for Sacrifice 
Festival] MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, Vol. 4, No.13, p. 3. 
 
14  “MÜSİAD’dan Çeçenistan ve Türk Halkına Başsağlığı Mesajı” [MÜSİAD’s Funeral Message for 
the People of Checenya and Turkey] Ibid.,  p. 18. 
 
15 MÜSİAD Bülten, 1998,  Vol. 6, No. 29, p. 26. 
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of MÜSİAD that is highly mixed with nationalism giving special importance to the 
Ottoman imperial past.  
MÜSİAD also represents the Turkish model of industrialist-businessman 
whose main intention is not to become rich but to do something for his own 
homeland. This motivation of commercial endeavor is best explained in vatana, 
memlekete vefa borcu (debt to one’s fatherland, country).16 Interestingly, the 
discourse on commonality of interests and their harmony opposed to class conflict 
also intersects the Islamic business ethic with its Kemalist counterpart that 
emphasized national interest as the only one ignoring individual and/or class 
interests. Turkish big-business community, led by TÜSİAD in fact internalized those 
elements of Kemalist rhetoric for a long time and they tried “to legitimize their 
wealth on the basis of their contributions to the economic development of the 
country.”17 In many cases such patriotism is highly composed of Turkish 
nationalism. This is clearly felt on the discourses of Turkish businessmen and 
industrialists while they are opening up or building bridges with the Turkic 
Republics of Central Asia.  
Marketing strategies with religious references are also important on the 
domestic front for MÜSİAD members. MÜSİAD member companies benefited from 
such references in their advertising activities to publicize a large number of 
consumer goods and services ranging from clothing, i.e. Tekbir Haute Couture Inc., 
                                                 
16 Karin Vorhoff, “Businessmen and Their Organizations: Between Instrumental Solidarity, Cultural 
Diversity, and the State” in Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism (İstanbul: Orient-Institut der 
DMG 2000), Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert Karin Vorhoff St. Yerasimos, G. Seufert, K. 
Vorhoff, eds., p. 167. 
 
17 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 533. 
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to luxury hotels, i.e. Caprice Hotel. Islam appears as an important resource to 
enlarge the market share of MÜSİAD’s member companies. However, Islam’s role 
in the generation of investment funds appears to be much more important as in the 
case of multi share holding companies.  
The mission of MÜSİAD is abbreviated in the organization’s slogan “high 
morality, high technology,” and its logo characterizing man and technology in a 
harmonious circle.18 Thus, MÜSİAD does not condemn capitalism per se, but 
criticizes the devious materialism of western capitalism in which human is degraded 
to an alienated being that is lack of spirituality and far away from the absolute 
knowledge of Allah.19 This attempt at reconciling capitalism, modernization and 
Islam has oriented MÜSİAD in the construction and representation of a new 
businessman. However, this new businessman has appeared as a truly indigenous 
entrepreneur keeping his/her religious and local habits while adopting global 
fashions.20 
MÜSİAD’s publications and the statements of association’s representatives 
are quite illuminating to understand the meaning of MÜSİAD’s “national and moral 
values” discourse in business. This discourse introduces Islam as the essential 
reference in daily and economic life activities.21 In this context, Mustafa Özel, an 
                                                 
18 For further information, see Erol Yarar, A New Perspective of the world at the Threshold of the 21st 
Century (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, ?). 
 
19 For further information on MÜSİAD’s approach, see 4th International Business Forum (IBF) in 
1998 multimedia show text. Çerçeve, 1998, Vol. 6, No. 23, pp. 4-7.  
 
20 Karin Vorhoff, “Businessmen and Their Organizations,”  p. 162. 
 
21 For further information on Islamic business within a modern, capitalist environment, see Hamdi 
Döndüren, İslami Ölçülerle Ticaret Rehberi: 100 Soru 100 Cevap [Business Guide with Islamic 
Measurements: 100 Questions and 100 Answers] (İstanbul: Erkam Yayınları, 1998).  
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ideologue of the organization, has produced quite much on capitalism, globalization 
and Muslim business tradition in Turkey.22 MÜSİAD’s periodicals; Bülten, Çerçeve 
and EKOMÜSİAD, mainly include essays focusing on the relation between Islam 
and economics to develop arrangements for trade and production compatible with 
the ban on interest. These articles try to establish correct practices or rules for 
Muslim businessmen with recourse to Islamic theological sources. In these articles, 
parallels such as modern practices in economics, i.e. venture capital, and murabaha, 
authentic practices of Muslim societies in pre-industrial times, are shown.23 They 
also inquire and refer to the economic system in the classical Ottoman period. Thus, 
MÜSİAD’s Muslim fraternity discourse emerges as a clear Turkish variant in which 
the Ottomans are praised as one’s “exemplary forefathers free of sin.”24  
Being Islamic and oppositional provides MÜSİAD to underline the 
importance of general industrial progress, rapid development and export growth for 
                                                                                                                                         
 
22 Some of his books Mustafa Özel, Piyasa Düşmanı Kapitalizm [Capitalism the Market Enemy] 
(İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1993); İktisat ve Din [Economy and Religion] (İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1994); 
Amerikan Yüzyılı’nın Sonu  [The End of American Century] (İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1994); Birey, 
Burjuva ve Zengin [Individual, Bourgeoisie and Rich] (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1994); Devlet ve 
Ekonomi [State and Economy] (İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1995); Değişim ve Kriz [Chage and Crisis] 
(İstanbul: İz yayıncılık, 1995); Niteliğin Egemenliği [The Hegemony of Quality] (İstanbul: İklim 
Yayınları, 1995); Yöneticilik Dersleri [Lessons on Management] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1996); 
İstikbal Köklerdedir [Future is in the Roots] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1996); Medeniyet ve Modernlik 
[Civilization and Modernity] (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1997),  Ticaret Savaşları [Trade Wars] 
(İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 1997),  Refahlı Türkiye [Turkey with Refah] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 
1997); Müslüman ve Ekonomi [Muslim and Economy] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1997); İslam 
Geleneğinden Çağdaş Dünyaya Etkici Yönetici [Impressive Manager from Islamic Tradition to 
Modern World] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998); Liderlik Sanatı [Art of Leadership] (İstanbul: İz 
Yayıncılık, 1998), Mustafa Özel, trans. and ed. Stratejik Yönetim ve Liderlik [Strategical Management 
and Leadership] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1995); İktisat Risaleleri [Pamphlets on Economy] (İstanbul: 
İz Yayıncılık, 1997); Küresel Rekabet [Global Competition] (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998). 
 
23 Erol Yarar, “Risk Sermayesi Üzerine” [On Venture Capital] Çerçeve, 1997, Vol. 5 No. 20, p. 5.  
 
24 Karin Vorhoff, “Businessmen and Their Organizations,” p. 166. 
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its members.25 Thus, Islam is put forward in a way that “…certain elements of a 
minority psychology, manifested in the expression of a feeling of being excluded 
from economic life controlled by a big-business community supported by the 
secularist state, have a significant place in the organizing rhetoric of this 
association.”26 However, MÜSİAD’s religious discourse is not just a rhetorical 
activity but it is a part of its grand strategy of a closer union with the Islamic world. 
In this context, the association formulated concrete projects for economic union 
among Islamic countries.27  
The Cotton Union is such a favorite project that envisions to promote an 
economic and later political co-operation between the cotton-producing countries of 
the Near East and Central Asia. This project covers Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan and visualizes a combined strategy of expansion to augment 
international competitiveness in cotton textiles and related fields in the countries 
concerned.28 MÜSİAD presents Turkey as the leading power of this possible union 
due to its relatively high technological standards and its closeness to western 
markets. The association aims to develop this project into a Silk Road Union, which 
should evolve into an economic and political power bloc, challenging the USA and 
                                                 
25 Ayşe Buğra, “The Claws of the ‘Tigers’ ” p. 50. 
 
26 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 529.   
 
27 For further information, see Haşmet Başar, İslam Ülkeleri Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği [Economic 
Co=operation among Islamic Countries] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1994). 
 
28 Ziya Öniş, “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey,” p. 760. 
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the EU in future.29 In short, MÜSİAD develops a kind of rhetoric based on Third 
World solidarity among Muslim countries. 
MÜSİAD aims to “become an effective economic power in the 21st century” 
30 by encouraging cooperation among Islamic societies. According to MÜSİAD, 
Islamic countries are becoming increasingly more important in the world trade by 
holding 25% of natural resources.31 In this context, Islamic mysticism is 
reformulated as a component of the socio-economic strategy advocated by 
MÜSİAD. Yarar, mentioning the reasons of the economic backwardness of the 
Muslim world, he indicates that “The mystical motto, “bir lokma bir hırka” (one 
mouthful food, one short coat) was misconceived and opened the way to 
sluggishness. As a result, motivation towards the world was lost completely.”32  
According to Yarar, Islamic world, including Turkey, could not follow the 
economic developments emerging with industrial revolution in the west and could 
not form their own industrial and education policies.33 In fact, MÜSİAD repeatedly 
emphasizes and propagates the need for Islamic solidarity and the compatibility of 
                                                 
29 For further information see, Mehmet Tasmacı, Yusuf Olcay and Orhan Kavuncu, Pamuk Birliği 
1996 [Cotton Union 1996] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1996) and Murat Çemrek, “MÜSİAD’s Cotton 
Union Project (CUP): An Important Cornerstone for the Development of Central Asian Economies” 
in Development Issues in Central Asia, Jonathan Warner, ed. (Bishkek: Civic Education Project and 
American University in Kyrgyzstan, 1999), pp. 204-222. 
 
30 Natık Akyol’s speech, MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997, Vol. 5, No. 18, p. 28. He 
was both the Vice Chair of MÜSİAD chairing Foreign Relations Department.  
 
31 MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997,  Vol. 5, No. 24, p. 5. 
 
32 Erol Yarar, A New Perspective of the world at the Threshold of the 21st Century, p. 39. 
 
33 Erol Yarar, “21. Yüzyıla Girerken Dünya ve Türkiye’ye Yeni Bir Bakış” [A New Prospect on the 
World and Turkey while Entering the 21st Century] MÜSİAD Bülten, 1996, Vol. 4, No. 13, p. 10. 
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Islam with entrepreneurial activity.34 Thus, the organization develops an Islamic 
reading of modernity with a vision accepting that science and technology of the 
West could be imported without their values. This approach to modernization has 
been kept in the Islamist circles in Turkey since the beginning of modernization 
process.35  
Erol Yarar views Islam “as a revealed ideology … singularly characterized 
by social integrity and cooperation [thus] cooperation should be considered as an 
integral part of our religion… To realize [that Muslim countries] have no other 
alternative.”36 Erol Yarar, in his opening speech of the 3rd IBF meeting, indicated 
that  
… first everyone should know that Muslims and Islamic 
civilization never put forth a strategy based on conflict, because 
the word ‘Islam’ means peace. It is believed that peace and 
freedom take man to the truth. Rather than establishing unity 
by making enemies, Islam aims for cohesion and understanding 
through increasing friendship. From this perspective, Islam 
represents peace and serenity; it does not represent terror as 
some circles are trying to spread. If a civilization representing 
war is being sought. It is western civilization, as historical 
realities showing world history ¾ of the wars where more than 
250 thousand people were killed took place in Western Europe, 
and only fifty years ago millions of innocent people were killed 
in the middle of Europe by Hitler and Stalin. 37 
 
In the opening speech of 2nd IBF meeting, Yarar argued that since the Islamic 
countries have not established economic unity among themselves, they have not 
been able to obtain an adequate share of the world market. He indicated that using 
                                                 
34 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, pp. 26-27. 
 
35 For a good critique of this approach, see İsmet Özel, Üç Mesele; Teknik, Medeniyet, Yabancılaşma 
[The Three Matters: Technics, Civilization, Alienation] (İstanbul: Çıdam Yayınları, 1992). 
 
36 Erol Yarar, “Foreword” in Haşmet Başar, Economic Cooperation among Islamic Countries 
(İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1994), p.3. 
 
37 MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997, Vol. 5, No. 24, p. 14. 
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the Medina Market model, Islamic countries must develop mutual trade and 
economic cooperation. Yarar also recomended that this should be accomplished with 
the pioneer role of the private sector developing a trade network. He urged that 
businessmen should take the lead and Islamic countries should speed up this process 
by being helpful to one another in this matter.38   He related this approach with 
Prophet Muhammad’s Medina Market and defined its main principles as:  
[The Prophet] established three main principles for the Market 
in Medina: (1) trade among believers should be promoted and 
commercial activities should not be taxed in advance; (2) the 
market should be free, no one should have a privileged 
position; and (3) price formation should take place without any 
intervention.39  
 
He also noted that  
Since the establishment of MÜSİAD, our aim is to establish the 
Medina market according to the teachings of our Prophet 
Muhammad via the interrelation of emir (leader), alim 
(scholar), and tacir (businessman) with the motto of ‘high 
morality, high technology’. We know that Islam disseminated 
through successful Muslim businessmen… as MÜSİAD our 
target is to develop cooperation via forming global business 
network among Muslim countries.40  
 
It is obvious that MÜSİAD propagated a competitive economic system with 
reference to the rules set by the Prophet Mohammed himself on the functioning of 
the Medina market as guidelines. The Prophet excluded state intervention and 
eliminated taxes in the Medina market except the zekat (alms giving), given “either 
                                                 
38 Nusret Özcan, “MÜSİAD Öncülüğünde Emir-Alim-Tüccar Buluşması” [Leader-Scholar-Trader 
Meeting under MÜSİAD’s Initiative] MÜSİAD Bülten, Fuar Forum Özel Sayısı, 1997, Vol. 5, No. 18, 
p. 9. 
 
39 “Fair-Forum Multi-vision Script” Ibid.,  p. 16. 
 
40 Tayfun Ergin, MÜSİAD’ın Suudi Arabistan Gezisi: 6-13 Ocak 1997, [MÜSİAD’s travel to Saudi 
Arabia: 6-13 January 1997], pp. 3-4. 
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to the state or directly to the poor.”41 MÜSİAD’s discourse on Medina market and 
zekat could be analyzed from the perspective that the organization is for decreasing 
the taxes as much as possible while decreasing the role of the state in economy. 
In this context, MÜSİAD sees Islam helpful for gaining back the lost markets 
in the Muslim populated countries. Ömer Bolat argues that Turkey has a “super 
power” image in the Islamic world but Turkey even could not succeed to be a 
regional power. He offers that this image could be utilized to sell Turkish products 
in Muslim countries that are full of American and German products.42 This is 
parallel to Menderes Çınar’s argument that MÜSİAD accepts the market rationalism 
as an economic/economist rationality rather than cultural to re-establish Islamic 
civilization hand in hand with the formation of a powerful Turkey. As a result, 
MÜSİAD proposes alternative legitimizing ideology rather than an alternative 
economic model.43 Thus, MÜSİAD’s market rationalism is to preserve the interests 
of the newly rising bourgeoisie elite that demands less “state shadow” due to their 
disadvantaged position of getting almost no credit or further incentives. In sum, 
MÜSİAD develops this market rationalism within an Islamic framework without 
sacrificing the capitalist richness.  
MÜSİAD opposes both standard welfare state provisions and organized 
representation of interest by labor unions. Yarar states that “the ‘social state’ (sic.)” 
is “among those characteristics of the now outmoded industrial society which are 
                                                 
41 Ayşe Buğra, “The Claws of the ‘Tigers’ ” p. 54. 
 
42 Interview with Ömer Bolat. 
 
43 Menderes Çınar, “Yükselen Değerlerin İşadamı Cephesi: MÜSİAD” [The Businessmen Front of 
Rising Values: MÜSİAD] Birikim, No. 95, Mart 1997, pp. 52-56. 
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often incompatible with the requirements of the currently ascending information 
society.”44 Thus, the promotion of KOBİs based on Islamic business ethics and loyal 
labor constitute one of MÜSİAD’s major organizing themes.45 In this context, 
leniency and flexibility emerge as characteristics of Islamic economics in labor 
markets. MÜSİAD’s emphasis on flexibility is characterized by “production for 
changing markets, increased use of a labor pool using tacit knowledge, and less 
hierarchical, vertically organized management.”46 MÜSİAD argues that such 
arrangement on communitarian solidarity and flexible production avoids the 
problems of alienation and impoverishment of human relations associated with 
modern industrial society.47 Thus, religious ties binding the community of believers 
are often referred for providing stable and productive industrial relations.  
MÜSİAD experts propose replacement of formal labor relations and 
collective bargaining practices by mutual trust, affection and respect. Just and 
punctual payment of employee is attributed to Islamic business ethics.48 This 
understanding also incorporates treating labor force as “family members” as a 
natural outcome of Islamic business ethics. However, this approach cannot be a 
legally guaranteed right of workers formally enforced by law. In this framework, 
workers’ obligations are defined with reference to Prophet Mohammed’s statements 
such as “…the income that is most highly regarded by Allah is the income of the 
                                                 
44 Erol Yarar, A New Perspective of the World at Threshold of the 21st Century, p. 12. 
 
45 Ümit  Cizre- Sakallıoğlu and Erinç Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalization: Turkey 
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47 Ibid., p. 50. 
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worker who is respectable to his employer” or “…whoever goes to sleep exhausted 
by hard work for his daily bread sleeps with all his sins forgiven.” Thus, MÜSİAD 
interprets Islamic business-labor relations through mutual trust between the 
employer -affectionate and just to his/her employees- and the worker -respectful and 
hardworking- needless of a formal labor code and especially, labor unions.49 This 
approach largely excludes formal, institutionalized mechanisms of social security 
and increase the vulnerability of the labor to be protected by informal and personal 
support networks through kinship ties and religion. However, MÜSİAD’s 
understanding of labor relations contrasts with that of the Islamic-oriented trade 
union federation Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Hak-İş [The Confederation 
of Right Worker Unions]. Salim Uslu, the president of Hak-İş, indicated that 
MÜSİAD members’ not permitting organization of trade unions in their 
establishments  clearly approve such “Islamic” principles.50  
Consequently, MÜSİAD has a functional Islamic understanding influenced 
by the Ottoman imperial past and Turkish nationalism to revive the Islamic 
civilization. This approach opposes any other interpretation with the argument that 
any understanding blocking prosperity cannot be “Islamic.” MÜSİAD indicates that 
Islam preaches harmony and peace opposed to conflict and controversy so the 
presence of labor unions and possible strikes is excluded in the name of such 
harmony and peace. MÜSİAD benefits Islam as a cultural spirit to motivate 
businessmen to develop their business while silencing the labor. Thus, MÜSİAD’s 
emphasis on Islam cannot be evaluated as an extent of reactionism but it provides a 
                                                 
49 Ayşe Buğra, Islam in Economic Organizations, p. 49. 
 
50 Ibid., p. 28. 
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common bond for its members. In sum, the role of Islam for MÜSİAD is to provide 
more markets in the Islamic world which was captured by the non-Muslim powers. 
However, MÜSİAD’s emphasis on Islam lessened following the February 28 
process that will be explained below.  
5.2.2. MÜSİAD and the February 28 Process 
 
On February 28, 1997, in the regular monthly meeting of National Security 
Council (NSC) the top five generals led by the chief of the military staff armed 
forces gave the government an ultimatum to composed of 18 articles. The generals 
strictly indicated the importance of necessary measures to be taken immediately for 
fighting with the irtica and preserving the secular Turkish Republic. This was a state 
elite reaction against the coalition government led by pro-Islamic Prime Minister, 
Necmettin Erbakan.51 This attempt was evaluated as a “post-modern coup d’état”52 
                                                 
51 For a partial literature developed on February 28 Period, see Abdullah Yıldız ( ed. ), 28 
Şubat/Belgeler [28 February/Documents] (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 2000); Ali Bayramoğlu, 28 
Şubat Süreci: Bir Müdahelenin Güncesi [The February 28 Process: The Diary of An Intervention] 
(İstanbul: Birey Yayınları, 2001); Alpat İnönü, Hamamböcekleri, Ateştopu ve Askerler: 28 Şubat 
Sürecinde Türkiye [Insects, Fireball and Soldiers: Turkey in the February 28 Process](İzmir: Mayıs 
Yayınları, 1999); Bedri Baykam, Ordu Satranç Oynarken: Kemalizm’e Karşı Iskalanan Komplo ve 
28 Subat’a Giden Uzun Yol [While Military was Playing Chess: The Failed Conspiracy against 
Kemalizm and the Long Path to February 28] (İstanbul: Piramit Film Produksiyon Yapımcılık ve 
Yayıncılık, 2001); Cengiz Çandar, Çıktık Açık Alınla: 28 Şubat Postmodern Darbe Gecişi’nde (1996-
2000) [Open Foreheads: Through the February 28 Post-modern Coup Detat’s Passage] (İstanbul: 
Timaş Yayınları, 2001); Dogu Perincek, 28 Şubat ve Ordu [28 February and the Military] (İstanbul: 
Kaynak, 2000); Emre Kongar, 28 Şubat ve Demokrasi [28 February and Democracy] (İstanbul: 
Remzi Kitabevi, 2000);Ergun Aksoy, 28 Şubat’tan Balgat’a: Mücahit [From 28 February to Balgat: 
Mujahid] (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2000); Fikret Başkaya, Yediyüz: Osmanlı Beyliği’nden 28 
Şubat’a: Bir Devlet Geleneğinin Anatomisi [Seven Hundred: From Ottoman Fiefdom to 28 February: 
The Anatomy of A State Tradition] (İstanbul: Ütopya Yayıncılık, 1999); Hakan Akpınar, 28 
Şubat/Postmodern Darbenin Öyküsü [28 February/The Story of Postmodern Coup Detat] 
(Ankara:Ümit Yayıncılık, 2001); Hulki Cevizoğlu, 28 Şubat: Bir Hükümet Nasıl Devrildi [28 
February: How was a Government Overthrown?] (İstanbul: Ceviz Kabuğu Yayınları, 2001); Hulki 
Cevizoğlu,  Generalinden 28 Şubat İtirafı: Post-modern Darbe [28 February Confession from Its 
General: Post-Modern Coup Detat] (İstanbul: Ceviz Kabuğu Yayınları, 2001); Kazım Güleçyüz, 
Balans Ayarı Birinci Bölüm: 28 Şubat Öncesi [Car Wheel Balance First Episode: Pre-28 February] 
(İstanbul: Yeni Asya Neşriyat, 2000); Kenan Akın, Milli Nizam’dan 28 Şubat’a Olay Adam Erbakan 
[From National Order to 28 February Erbakan the Man of Events] (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 2000); 
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or “light coup” and the forthcoming period was labeled as the February 28 process in 
which any development with Islamic connotations in the public sphere was severely 
repressed by the state. Consequently, such a development not only affected the 
cabinet, which resigned on  June 18, 1997, but also MÜSİAD.  
One of the articles given to the government by the military on February 28, 
1997 was to replace the five years permanent compulsory education with the the 
eight years one. Erol Yarar opposed the eight years permanent compulsory education 
project harshly.53 He indicated that there is a settlement of atheist-unreligious 
education and life under the title of permanent education.54 This speech opened the 
beginning of a problematic period for MÜSİAD. Thus, speeches and financial 
transfers made by MÜSİAD’s chairman and officers were taken as evidence of 
irtica. 
On May 25, 1998 the State Security Court (SSC) public prosecutor 
demanded the closure of MÜSİAD for violating the laws governing Societies and 
Associations. The court also charged MÜSİAD Chairman Erol Yarar with 
“provoking enmity and hatred among the people by indicating differences of … 
                                                                                                                                         
Mustafa Erdogan, 28 Şubat Süreci [February 28 Process] (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 1999); 
Nazlı Ilıcak, 28 Şubat Sürecinde Din ve Laiklik [Religion and Secularism during the February 28 
Process] (İstanbul: Birey Yayıncılık, 1999); Nazlı Ilıcak, Sert Adımlarla Heryer İnlesin: 28 Şubat’ın 
Perde Arkası [The Background of 28 February] (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2001); Nevzat Bolugiray, 
28 Şubat Süreç [February 28 Process] (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1999);Talat Turhan, 27 Mayıs 
1960’tan 28 Şubat 1997’e: Devrimci Bir Kurmay Subay’ın Etkinlikleri [From 27 May 1960 to 28 
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52 Çengiz Çandar, “Post-modern Darbe” 28.06.1997, in Çıktık Açık Alınla: 28 Şubat Postmodern 
Darbe Geçidi’nde (1996-2000), p. 119. Çengiz Çandar is the first one to use this concept. 
 
53 MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 5, No.22, 1997, pp. 23-24. 
 
54 MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 5, No.23, 1997, p. 7. “Ülkede kesintisiz eğitim adı altında kesin dinsiz eğitim 
ve kesin dinsiz hayatın gündeme yerleştirilmesine çalışıldığı...” 
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religion and confession” according to the Turkish Penal Code No. 312.55 The reason 
of this charge was a speech that he made on October 4, 1997 criticizing the new 
education law extending the compulsory education period from five to eight years. 
The law also brought restrictions on religious education,56 especially the closure of 
the middle section of the İmam-Hatip (Prayer Leader Preacher) schools.57 In this 
speech, Yarar’s call for a “liberation struggle” constituted a crime according to the 
prosecutor. Yarar described the new education law as the work of “non-believers” 
saying that “kesintisiz eğitim kesin dinsiz eğitim” (“uninterrupted education is certain 
un-religious/atheist education”) and he also likened the proponents of this law to 
“dogs.”58 Afterwards, Yarar evaluated the file against him as adaletsiz (unjust) and 
mesnetsiz (resourceless).59  
Yarar’s hearing was held on June 29, 1998 in the SSC in Ankara and the 
prosecutor asked for a one to three year prison sentence for him. At the hearing on 
July 29, Yarar denied his opposition to the eight-year compulsory education.60 In 
May 1999, the court convicted the first file about Yarar with a suspended sentence 
                                                 
55 According to Turkish Penalty Code, Article 312-2, inciting hatred among people by making 
reference to class, race, religion, sect and region differences is a crime and one who commits this 
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with probation for him but rejected the closure of MÜSİAD. Thus, Yarar resigned 
from the chairmanship in MÜSİAD’s 8th General Congress on May 22, 1999 and 
was replaced by Ali Bayramoğlu, one of the Vice-Chairman. This resignation was 
perhaps not natural when one takes related external conditions and the political 
climate unfavorable for the association following 28 February process. Interestingly, 
in July 1999 a new case was opened against the new president, for the same offence 
of Yarar “provoking enmity and hatred among the people by indicating differences 
of … religion and confession.”61  
MÜSİAD opened court files against some newspapers due to their news 
accusing the organization with religious reactionism. MÜSİAD won the file against 
Milliyet, Turkish daily, on August 20, 1997 due to the publication of the news 
“Ordu’dan Ambargo: Genel Kurmay İrticacı Kuruluşlardan Alışveriş Yapmayın” 
(Embargo from Military- General Headstaff: Do not Have Shopping from 
Reactionist Enterprises) in which MÜSİAD member firms are cited.62 Moreover 
MÜSİAD also won the files against Hürriyet, Turkish daily, which put the headline 
as “MÜSİAD Topun Ağzında” (Alert for MÜSİAD) on May 25, 1998 and Radikal, 
Turkish Daily, as “MÜSİAD’a Kapatma İstemi” (Demand for the Closure of 
MÜSİAD) and on May 26, 1998 Radikal, “Yeşil Sermayede Panik” (Panic at Green 
Capital), on April 24, 1998 Güneş, Turkish daily, “MÜSİAD’a İrtica Operasyonu” 
(Reactionist Operation against MÜSİAD), on April 24, 1998, Yeni Yüzyıl, Turkish 
daily “MÜSİAD’a Büyük Darbe” (Huge Strike on MÜSİAD), on April 21, 1998, 
Sabah, Turkish daily “İrticacı Sermayeye Büyük Baskın” (Huge Pressure on 
                                                 
61 Radikal, Turkish daily, 22 April 1999, 29 June 1999 and 6 July 1999. 
 
62 MÜSİAD Bülten, Vol. 5, No.23, 1997, pp.45-48. 
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Reactionist Capital) and on April 22, 1998, Akşam, Turkish daily “MÜSİAD’cılara 
İrtica Sorgusu.” (Questioning of Reactionism against MÜSİAD  members).63 These 
newspaper headlines show how MÜSİAD fell into an illegitimate position before 
state elite, which negatively affected its credibility and power in lobbying. 
The events in the aftermath of February 28 Process had put MÜSİAD 
businessmen in the position of ordinary outlaws symbolized in the term yeşil 
sermaye (green capital). Thus, MÜSİAD rejected this term that the secularists use in 
relation to the conservative religiously oriented business circles.64 The military chief 
of staff’s released a list of companies that were alleged to be in alliance with 
religious reactionism and declared to exclude them from public auctions in army 
contracts. This statement of the military oriented MÜSİAD circles to shift their 
discourse on the merits of Islamic solidarity to prove the irrelevance of religious 
faith and capital. Thus, under these circumstances, Islam had become an obstacle 
before business rather than an asset. Then, MÜSİAD circles started to underline that 
“money has no religion, no faith, and no ideology” in their statements. 65  
After 1997 MÜSİAD, at the associational and individual member level, 
became more eager to offer assurances that their main concern is business not Islam 
although they might be pious and practicing Muslims individually. MÜSİAD 
members started to explain their participation in the association due to their need to 
be backed by a professional organization one can trust rather than emphasizing 
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common religious beliefs.66 They left bringing their Islamic identity to the 
foreground. They did not want to be seen as part of Islamic interests benefiting from 
and contributing to the rise of the Milli Görüş movement. This transformation was 
typically expressed by reasoning that: 1. Business is business so even if the trading 
counter partner is a MÜSİAD member no one would pay more or sell for less; 2. 
Money has no religion so there is no room for Islamic identity to play a role in 
business matters; 3. Since Turkey is a Muslim populated country, reference to 
“Islamic” capital or “Muslim” businessmen do not make any sense; and 4. As there 
is no place for KOBİs in TÜSİAD and Chambers are under the control of big 
business community, MÜSİAD is the business association they can participate.67 
This change oriented MÜSİAD to refer Turkey’s shortcomings with regard to 
democracy, freedom of speech, thought and religious practice as important topics 
beside the economic indicators in 1998 and 1999 economy reports.68 In sum, 
MÜSİAD seems to have experienced better days during the short period of the 
Refahyol government when there was a government to hear the association.  
MÜSİAD defined the February 28 process as the unnecessary political 
tension and political provocations of some business and media circles which 
“paralyzed the economic management of the government”69 and  
at the beginning of the second half of 1997, Turkey has an 
outlook and agenda in the political sphere darkened by 
restrictive regulations and practices contrary to democratic 
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traditions and basic human rights and freedoms, most 
importantly, freedom of belief, reminding of notorious state 
rule in 1940s.70  
 
This approach shaped MÜSİAD’s negative perspective in the style of replacement of 
the Refahyol government by Anasol-D government as  
The developments which took place in the process leading to 
the 54th government’s resignation on June 18, 1997 and the 
formation of the 55th government did not conform to 
democratic norms and traditions... the fact that the 55th 
coalition government could be formed by three political parties 
with differing views on main economic and social issues and 
depends on the support of fourth political party and a number 
of maverick deputies… Also, the unprecedented purge in 
bureaucracy in the 55th government has caused wariness and 
hurt the usual working traditions of bureaucracy.71  
 
Erol Yarar, in the General Administration Board Meeting held on February 
28, 1998, referred to the developments since 28 February 1997. He defined them as 
transformation of the country into the totalitarian and repressive regime as in 1940s 
within a social engineering project by an elitist vision. He also criticized the 
“hegemony of appointed ones over the elected ones,” read supremacy of bureaucrats 
over politicians, which makes Turkey a non-democratic country. Yarar also 
criticized that the same forces backing the February 28 process try to prevent the 
development of Anatolian Lions via monopolist holdings.72  
MÜSİAD’s approach to the developments following February 28 could be 
analyzed within an economic framework. The members of the organization were 
severely affected since MÜSİAD had become the target of the state elite, secular 
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media due to its close relations with the WP and consequently Refahyol government. 
However, the division within the business community and exchange of favors 
between the government and certain businessmen were neglected. The “losers” 
became the “winners”. Thus, the business elite of large tycoons started to cry out 
loud with reference to the divisiveness of the WP and Islamic ideology that the 
newcomers would replace their interests. For example, the ex-chairman of TOBB, 
Fuat Miras, complained that, “the WP wing of government works in partnership with 
MÜSİAD. In every position, at every bid they are present. Those not in MÜSİAD 
have been excluded from foreign trips.”73 These well-concerted campaigns led by 
military briefings resulted in the collapse of the Refahyol government. 
MÜSİAD members suspected about the closure of the association due to the 
court file with such demand. Moreover, some of the new members, who anticipated 
more from the state during the Refahyol government via MÜSİAD membership, had 
become the ones who have left the organization. Despite all negative developments, 
the decrease in the number of MÜSİAD members could be more related to the 
economic crisis more than the February 28 process.74 On the other hand, the harsh 
attitude against MÜSİAD unified the members to defend the organization via 
keeping their membership in the bad days.75 Beside all, MÜSİAD seems to have 
changed its policy from huge membership to a more moderate one for further control 
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of the organization as well as underlining its “business” association character more 
than “religious” side. 
Consequently, following February 1997, MÜSİAD was isolated and was 
exposed to legal persecution. This may also explain the slight shift in theme and 
rhetoric adopted by the association in the period after this political turn. MÜSİAD 
seems to have diminished its Islamic discourse as a binding force and a market 
motive since political Islam is severely repressed. The association has abandoned its 
closeness with the Milli Görüş parties, representing political Islam in Turkey.76 In its 
earlier publications MÜSİAD was more explicit about the need for Islamic 
spirituality and morality in the Turkish economy and its critics on the cruelty of 
western type capitalism and disastrous dominance of a tekelci sermaye (monopolistic 
capitalism) in Turkey. As a result, MÜSİAD survived even it was severely wounded 
due to the developments following the February 28 process. The organization fell in 
a target position due its parallel discourse with Milli Görüş parties as WP and VP. 
 
5.4 MÜSİAD and Milli Görüş Parties 
The interest conflicts between big business and KOBİs go far back in the 
political career of Necmettin Erbakan. In 1969, Erbakan had fallen in a dispute with 
Süleyman Demirel –the Prime Minister and the leader of the JP and old friend of 
Erbakan from his university years- because Erbakan had succeeded against the JP-
backed candidate in the TOBB elections. In his campaign, Erbakan could have 
mobilized the KOBİs alienated by the TOBB’s leadership since TOBB had been 
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traditionally controlled by big business until Erbakan’s office period. However, 
Erbakan was removed from office by the ruling JP and its supporting big business 
groups. Moreover, Demirel vetoed Erbakan’s candidacy from the JP in the general 
elections, Erbakan had been elected as an independent deputy from the religious 
stronghold of Konya. During his selection campaign as an independent candidate, 
Erbakan used the slogan that he would create milliyetçi-mukaddesatçı (nationalist 
and pro-sacred values) Turkey.77  
Following the general elections, Erbakan established the NOP on January 26, 
1970 and became the leader of the party. The emergence of the NOP also constituted 
evidence on the rapid socio-economic change of Turkey.78 The DP and the JP were 
able to co-opt the large industrialists, big businessmen, landowners, artisans and 
small businessmen into the same political organization only until the end of the 
1960s. Through the development of capitalism and Turkish industrialization the JP 
started to pursue pro-industrialist and state-centric policies. Thus, religiously 
sensitive small merchants, craftsmen, and small farmers searched for a new 
institution to voice their protest against the primary role of big business. This, in 
turn, eased the establishment of the NOP.79 In this context, the Milli Görüş ideology 
of the NOP developed on the main principles of industrialization, free enterprise, 
independence from the West, closer relations with the Islamic world, adil ekonomik 
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düzen (just economic order), a conservative moral view and human rights declared 
in the Constitution. Briefly, the Milli Görüş had kept the three main pillars of its 
ideology: a religious view of the world, a call for rapid industrialization and a social 
ethic of populist distribution.  
Following the military intervention in 1971, the NOP was closed due its 
activities against secularism on May 21, 1971. The NSP was established on October 
11, 1972 keeping the Milli Görüş ideology intact. In the First Grand Congress of the 
NSP, on January 21, 1973, the first Chairman Süleyman Arif Emre explained the 
aim of Milli Görüş as providing the development both in material and spiritual fields 
and emphasized the importance of individual education for such an achievement.80 
Thus, the NSP’s leadership attempted to build a patronage network through backing 
the Anatolian petite bourgeoisie during its tenure as a partner in three coalition 
governments between 1973-1978.  
Following the military intervention of 12 September 1980, the NSP and all 
other political parties were closed down. Then in 1983, the WP was established 
along the same ideological lines. Through 1970s and 1980s, the NSP and WP 
attracted those who were not fully integrated culturally and economically into the 
modernist center. This was the motive behind the support for NSP’s explicitly 
religious, anti-Western, anti-socialist though highly progressive program.81 
According to Ruşen Çakır, the mission of the Milli Görüş parties until 1980s was to 
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integrate the religious people kept at the periphery of the system. This provided 
legitimacy for the secular regime through the integration of Islamic groups in the 
political system and the enlargement of political participation.82 Following the 
military intervention in 1980, the military government undertook this integration 
mission by paying lip service to the TIS.  
The reaction against the big business has remained an integral component of 
the anti-Kemalist political strategy of both the WP and its predecessors, NOP and 
NSP although they had hitherto been regarded as radical form(ul)ations of marginal 
significance. However, things gradually began to change when the rise of political 
Islam appeared of uncontestable significance in Turkey, in particular, and in the 
Middle East, in general.83 Within the 28 February process, the WP was closed. The 
WP authorities established the VP in 1997 as a precaution for the closure of the 
party and the WP was closed on January 16, 1998. The VP continued the reference 
to religious connotations of its predecessor Milli Görüş parties but in a more 
overshadowed tone with democracy, human rights while preserving the aim to 
empower Anatolian petite bourgeoisie. However, the VP was also closed on June 22, 
2001.  
MÜSİAD’s demand of a larger role for its members in the economy 
intersected with the Islamic-oriented WP’s challenge to the legacy of the secular 
Turkish Republic. The VP’s preservation of the same ideological line after the WP’s 
abolishment added to the suspicion that MÜSİAD is such an extension of these two 
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parties. MÜSİAD’s criticisms of what it considers to be the outmoded industrial 
society, and the “just order” manifesto of the WP were both based on anti-western 
rhetoric.84 MÜSİAD’s common worldview and political rhetoric with the WP-VP 
line in conjunction to the desired economic program deepened this suspicion.85 The 
WP’s electoral victories at the municipal level in 1994, and later at the general 
elections in 1995 made MÜSİAD increasingly influential and visible, which also 
resulted in the rise of its membership tremendously.  
The formation of the WP-led coalition government in 1996 increased the 
MÜSİAD’s significance in the economy and in society. This, in turn, even 
culminated in a latent rivalry with TÜSİAD.86 Despite MÜSİAD’s claims to be 
equally distant from all political parties, the close relations between MÜSİAD 
members and the WP were clear. The WP also stood close to MÜSİAD to develop 
its relations with the business world. During the WP’s tenure in government, 
MÜSİAD’s activities increased significantly as leading the business community in 
PM Erbakan’s foreign trips. The increase in the activities went hand in hand with the 
cited rise in the number of members to get share from public resources.87 According 
to the other side of the coin, the emergence of a developed Islamic business 
community in 1980s helped the WP for its electoral success of the mid-1990s. 
Hence, since the late 1960s a certain link between Islamic business interests and 
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Milli Görüş parties’ campaigning on explicitly Islamic grounds has always been 
evident. In sum, the growing strength and dynamism of the Islamic capital forming 
the economic and financial backbone of the WP was quite functional in its rise and 
electoral success.88  
The transformation of the WP from a marginal force to a significant political 
movement was parallel to the growing power of the Islamic-oriented business in the 
1990s. Thus, the WP’s rise reflected the aspirations of the rising Islamic bourgeoisie 
to consolidate their positions in competition with other segments of Turkish private 
business and to obtain a greater share of public resources, both at the central and 
local levels. Considering the Turkish state’s role as a key distributor of rents in 
major economic are(n)as, Islamic-oriented businessmen’s cooperation at both the 
associational level by MÜSİAD and the political level by the WP to obtain more 
from public resources is not surprising. In this mutual relation, the WP-VP line 
constituted the political expression of these rising business interests in return.89 
Thus, the WP-VP politicians claimed that Islam should be an important point of 
reference in flexible production,90 which has been quite parallel to MÜSİAD’s 
discourse.  
MÜSİAD also drew parallel lines with the Milli Görüş parties, i.e. redefining 
of Turkey’s economic relations and foreign policy through a shift from the West 
towards a closer union with the Islamic world.91 The Milli Görüş parties favored co-
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operation among the Muslim countries dedicated to the revival of the Muslim world 
under the leadership of Turkey.92 In this framework, Erbakan proposed the main five 
steps that the Muslim countries must establish among each other (1) the “Muslim” 
United Nations; (2) the “Muslim” Defense Organization; (3) the “Muslim” Common 
Market; (4) the “Muslim” Common Currency (Islamic dinar); and (5) the “Muslim” 
Cultural Cooperation.93 Erbakan declared these proposals firstly in the Siret 
Conference held in İstanbul in 1976 when he was the Deputy Prime Minister and 
claimed that if these formations were not actualized the world of Islam could not be 
saved from troubles.94 In this context, during the last coalition government in 1997 
Erbakan put the main steps to form the Developing Eight, D-8, Muslim countries as 
a counter forum to the seven leading industrialized countries’ G7. Briefly, 
MÜSİAD’s rhetoric of Third World solidarity, with strong reference to the Ottoman 
Empire,95 among Muslim countries is quite parallel to the Muslim parochialism of 
the Milli Görüş Parties.   
We also observe congruence of views between Milli Görüş parties, except 
the VP, and MÜSİAD about Turkey’s relations with the EU.96 The Milli Görüş 
parties strongly opposed to Turkey’s entrance into the EU. Erbakan identified the 
organization as a Christian-dominated political organization, and a Zionist plot, 
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rather than an economic-oriented community. According to Erbakan, the 
organization sought to melt the Muslim Turkish nation within Christian Europe, to 
eliminate Turkish nationalism and Turkish national industry while extracting Turkey 
from the world of Islam.97  
According to Erbakan, in the case of Turkey’s acceptation to the EU, Israel 
would also be accepted. This, in turn, would reduce Turkey into a position of 
defending the same interests with Israel, which is against Muslim identity of the 
country. Erbakan claimed that the aim of Zionism is to eliminate Turkey’s Islamic 
character by inserting it into the EU and then make it serve ideals as a “puppet.” 
Therefore, Erbakan evaluated the application to the EU as a betrayal of Turkish 
independence. He also identified entrance to the EU as accepting the second Sevres 
Agreement,98 which would prevent the development of Turkish culture, art and 
economy as well as the possible unification of Muslim Countries as a rival to EU. 
Erbakan, on the other hand, was always in favor of developing economic relations 
with the Western countries and acknowledged Turkish economy to be competitive 
with the West.99 On the eve of the coalition government in 1996, however, Erbakan 
changed his anti-Western discourse. For the sake of government, Erbakan moderated 
his stance on a number of issues as accepting the coalition protocol with the 
statements that the coalition government looked favorably upon a free market 
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economy and the customs union with the EU, even supporting the international 
treaty with Israel.100  
MÜSİAD develops a similar approach about Turkish membership to the EU 
but in a less radical mode. Thus, the association judges the integration of Turkey into 
the EU as a step in the wrong direction. MÜSİAD stresses that Turkey in no way 
needs to weep like “a rejected lover” at the closed gates to the EU while so much 
potential lies in the other parts of the world located at the east of Turkey or to the far 
west, in the USA. Yet this does not mean that MÜSİAD business circles ignore 
expanding into the European market. They are perfectly aware of the fact that 
Europe is a highly significant market for Turkey and believe in the necessity of 
facilitating trade with Europe. They point out that this need not necessitate a political 
union with a conglomerate that presents itself as a “Christian Club.” MÜSİAD 
circles have heavily complained that the Customs Union (CU) agreement works only 
in Europe’s favor, since the EU has not yet fulfilled its obligations of helping 
Turkish economy in turn.101 
Although the MÜSİAD’s opposition on EU is dyed with nationalist and 
Islamist color, in fact it is much more economic-oriented. KOBİs were negatively 
affected following the CU agreement in 1996. That is why, MÜSİAD opposes 
membership both in CU and EU to protect its members while voicing Turkey has 
lost a lot since the CU and the EU did not pay what it has promised to Turkey. 
MÜSİAD also stresses that since KOBİs compose 90% percent of Turkish industrial 
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basis, not only these enterprises but also Turkey will be severely influenced due to 
lack of enough industrial development vis-à-vis the EU countries in the case of 
possible EU membership.  
Consequently, Milli Görüş parties and MÜSİAD have formed similar 
approaches in economic, political, social and cultural aspects of life in relation to 
their common membership basis. Moreover, their similar standpoints in 
comprehending the role of religion in Turkish society brought the evaluation of 
MÜSİAD as the extent of Milli Görüş in the economic field. Although MÜSİAD is 
composed of several businessmen who do not vote for Milli Görüş parties, such an 
allegation brought suffering to MÜSİAD following the February 28 process. This 
lasted with erosion in one of MÜSİAD’s ideological pillars. The second ideological 
pillar shaped with reference to East Asian development model was hardly damaged 
following the economic crisis in these countries, which will be explained at below. 
5.3. MÜSİAD and Economy 
 5.3.1. MÜSİAD and the East Asian Model 
 
MÜSİAD’s administration emphasized that Islam can act as a binding force, 
especially because it appears to be consistent with certain trends in global production 
and trade patterns.102 Beside references to Islamic solidarity to secure associational 
membership and markets in Muslim regions, orientation towards East Asian 
hierarchic, semi-authoritarian model of capitalism appeared more agreeable for 
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MÜSİAD in comparison to Western model.103 MÜSİAD’s Eastern-looking strategy 
clearly aimed at strengthening relations with East Asia, “the most dynamic region of 
the world with which even the recessing Europe itself is trying to strengthen its 
ties.”104 MÜSİAD’s emphasis on East Asia sometimes overshadowed the Muslim 
one in the geographical priorities of economic strategy. MÜSİAD attached 
importance to cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia, two Muslim countries of 
the ASEAN, to form a bridge between Turkey and the more advanced economies of 
East Asia. The exportation of halal food products and the organization of joint 
ventures in hacc (pilgrimage) tourism were cited as the possible trade items with 
these two countries in developing close links.105 
MÜSİAD drew on the East Asian development model opposing to the 
European one, represented by TÜSİAD. The East Asian model’s success is often 
attributed to be the “strategic fit” between the traditional institutions regulating 
social relations and the requirements of globalization of markets. In the same way, 
MÜSİAD aimed to benefit from Islam “at the international and domestic level as a 
basis for cooperation and solidarity between producers; as a device to create secure 
market niches or sources of investment finance; and as a means of containing social 
unrest and labor militancy.”106 Erol Yarar praised the Asian nations’ faithfulness to 
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their cultural identity and their resistance to the western civilization as an important 
factor behind the success of the Asian model of development. He criticized the 
philosophical background of western model as 
so-called rationalist, Cartesian philosophy [that] has drawn 
individual and social life into chaos by rejecting the value and 
existence of what cannot be measured or calculated. This 
overturning of religious values, and their replacement by a 
secular ‘morality,’ transformed homo sapiens into homo 
brutalis.107 
 
 
Yarar also attributed the success of the East Asian development model to its 
conformity with the increasingly dominant system of flexible production. MÜSİAD 
circles interpreted the positive aspects of flexible production including “a 
questioning of Western values and institutions, and the incorporation of a well-
entrenched respect for cultural identity as an asset in the organization of economic 
life.”108 Parallel to East Asian capitalism MÜSİAD presented homo Islamicus 
centered socio-economic order as an alternative to the homo brutalis centered one.109 
East Asian hierarchic and semi-authoritarian model of capitalism also provided 
MÜSİAD to emphasize corporatist type of interest group politics at the discourse 
level underlining the importance of state in the development of KOBİs. 
Following the economic crisis in East Asia, MÜSİAD underlined that:  
The recent developments in the world economy point to the 
need for greater cooperation amongst countries as opposed to 
building economic blocks in different regions of the world 
geography. Whilst speculations, an inmate feature of financial 
markets, and in fact a certain degree of speculation being 
beneficial for smooth working of free forces and attainment of 
efficiency in the markets, the recent experience [Asian 
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Economic crisis] has shown that excessive speculation in the 
form of manipulations, predatory financial attacks, etc. can 
produce undesirable results for all economies in today’s ‘global 
village.’ Therefore, the existing ‘rules of the game’ in the 
financial world call for considerable revision of whereby new 
rules and regulations would be established towards a more 
stable financial environment on a global scale.110 
 
Despite severity of the economic and financial crisis faced by East Asian 
economies, MÜSİAD kept the belief that these economies are to resume their high 
growth performance in the near future  
[Asian] growth has brought to the fore eastern values, which 
emphasize the family, the spirit of the society over individual 
growth as loyalty rather than the Western professional logic. 
Economic development has become multi-parameter equation 
rather than a single parameter one.111 
 
MÜSİAD’s reference to East Asian success stories, especially the Japanese 
miracle, was to justify its ideological stance by defining the Japanese success as the 
combination of cultural and communitarian values with its developmental 
objectives. Mustafa Özel attributed Japanese success to the Japanese entrepreneurs’ 
rational response to systemic changes in the world with the state’s encouragement 
backing them. They developed technological know-how and networks between 
productive and commercial units and succeeded cooperation among small and 
medium size enterprises. Özel noted that development could only be realized 
through the collective participation of local people and internal dynamics of regions 
in economic activities, either in Turkey or in another country.112 
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 MÜSİAD, although attached great importance to East Asian development 
model, has contradicted with this model at some points rather than a resemblance. 
For example, MÜSİAD urged Turkish state to shift subsidizing from already big 
conglomerates located in industrialized regions of Turkey to KOBİs apt to invest in 
less developed regions of Anatolia. However, East Asian model was based on the 
creation of big conglomerates, “national champions,” in relation to their export 
capacity to compete in the global markets. MÜSİAD has also criticized the Turkish 
state to own banks and determine the financial sector hand in hand with banks of the 
big conglomerates. This critical stance against the role of the state in financial sector 
contradicted with the East Asian model since the state has been the “market maker” 
in the financial markets by rewarding specific sectors. Moreover, MÜSİAD has 
underlined the necessity of short-term loans for KOBİs relying on their own 
resources not enough for capacity enhancement and new investments. However, this 
state backing export-oriented model failed in East Asia with the economic crises in 
the late 1990s.113  
Consequently, MÜSİAD largely drew on the East Asian development model 
with a certain interpretation of Islam to bind its members into a coherent community 
and to represent their economic interests as an integral component of an ideological 
mission. However, MÜSİAD’s emphasis for East Asian model was hardly damaged 
because of the economic crisis and its severe effects in these countries. Another one 
in Russia in 1998, which had also influenced Turkish economy negatively to a great 
extent, followed the economic crises coming one after one in East Asian countries. 
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Although MÜSİAD silenced about its praise for East Asian model, these 
developments did not change the MÜSİAD’s emphasis on moral and communitarian 
values with reference to Islam. Beside the contradictions between MÜSİAD’s 
discourse and the East Asian model, the association kept the major motive as 
allocation of state resources to the KOBİs that it represents mainly. 
5.3.2. MÜSİAD vs. TÜSİAD 
 
In this section, I will analyze MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD in a comparative 
framework. TÜSİAD functioned as “the other” in the identity formation and related 
discourses of MÜSİAD. Despite their differences, TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD both 
appear as products of a particular societal environment where the state has a very 
significant role in shaping economy and society. Both of these business associations 
attempted to enhance class cohesion and to influence the course of social and 
economic development in Turkey.114  
TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD both, theoretically, aim to end the overall dominance 
of the state and political elite in the economic sphere characterizing Turkish state 
since the Ottoman era.  However, their methods are different as TÜSİAD relies on 
macro-level social and political change whereas MÜSİAD depends on a cultural 
method of changing society in general. Despite their criticism of Turkish state’s 
intense entanglement in economy, they do not argue for a complete retreat of the 
state from the economy. They also call for state intervention to develop the standards 
of infrastructure and a solid system of social security. Both associations defending 
the free market economy insist on privatization of the unproductive SEEs. 
                                                 
114 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State,” p. 524. 
 237 
MÜSİAD, as a result of representing mostly KOBİs, advocates a system of state 
incentives and tax measures. Yet, to continue their claim to be independent, 
MÜSİAD urges the guarantee of conditions for free competition arguing that the 
KOBİs are dynamic and ambitious enough to develop high standards of quality on 
their own.115  
A general understanding arose that MÜSİAD is the antithesis of TÜSİAD. 
Thus, the latter has symbolized big industrial and financial tycoons, monopoly and 
westernization and the former has represented KOBİs, free competition, Islamism. 
TÜSİAD is composed of the owners and the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of 
leading enterprises of Turkish industrial, financial and media sectors representing 
almost half of the economy with a relatively small membership of 469 members. 
Despite MÜSİAD’s relatively large membership, its members altogether represent 
less than ten percent of the economy.116 Thus, despite the rapid growth of MÜSİAD 
and some of the member companies since their foundation, the economic power of 
the MÜSİAD membership is just a small fraction of that of the TÜSİAD 
membership. In this context, the complete absence of co-operation between two 
associations is striking in conjunction with the difference of economic and cultural 
niches they each occupy.117 
Similar to TÜSİAD’s mission, MÜSİAD defends the vision of a developed 
and internationally influential Turkey. Buğra defines the ideological mission of 
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MÜSİAD at the level of a class118 strategy presented as an alternative to the that of 
TÜSİAD administration. MÜSİAD is composed of a large group of members 
manifesting a much greater diversity of size and geographic location than the ones 
represented by TÜSİAD. MÜSİAD members are disseminated all over Turkey in 
contrast to TÜSİAD members who are located in İstanbul and the surrounding 
Marmara region. Moreover, the big business community in İstanbul exhibits 
important differences with local businessmen in certain Anatolian towns, which 
permits MÜSİAD to emphasize the competitive potential of their Anatolian 
members as “Anatolian Lions.”119 
MÜSİAD’s membership policy has aimed at quite different clientele than 
TÜSİAD in relation to size of the member companies. There is no condition 
blocking double membership and, i.e. the director of İhlas Holding and Ülker group 
are members in both of the associations. Until the last years, MÜSİAD was in favor 
of an expansionist membership policy welcoming representatives of small, medium 
and big business and industrialists from all sectors, which increased the 
heterogeneity of the association. Thus, most of MÜSİAD’s services are designed as 
selective incentives to help both in the mediation of conflicting interests and in the 
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recruitment of new members.120 The process of member recruitment appears 
similarly selective since in TÜSİAD recommendation of three existing members is 
necessary. One can apply MÜSİAD individually for membership but the 
association’s Intelligence and Arbitration Commission checks the commercial 
accuracy, honesty and morality of the candidate.  
MÜSİAD emphasized the Islamic character of Turkish society in an attempt 
both to prove the compatibility of Islam with capitalism and to benefit from religion 
foster a sense of solidarity among those segments of national and international 
business communities.121 MÜSİAD, like TÜSİAD, incorporated a critical position 
against the traditional exercise of political authority in conformity with its narrowly 
defined interest representation role and its relation with the state.122  
MÜSİAD has tried to make its name popular by similar activities undertaken 
by TÜSİAD; i.e. both organizations have bimonthly magazines as TÜSİAD’s Görüş 
and Privateview and MÜSİAD’s Çerçeve. Both associations also have a monthly 
Bulletin. The experts of both associations have also prepared reports on certain 
subjects on Turkish economy and politics. However, MÜSİAD reports could not 
form discussions like those of TÜSİAD since the secular media, owned by mainly 
TÜSİAD members, did not pay attention to MÜSİAD’s reports. In addition, both of 
them try to attract the public’s attention by organizing meetings and conferences.   
                                                 
120 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie,” p. 
537.   
 
121 Ibid.,  p. 536.  
 
122 Ibid.,  p. 528.  
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It is a fact that neither MÜSİAD nor TÜSIAD distinctly represent different 
modes of capitalism or cultural models of Confucianism or and Protestantism. 
However, their main difference lies in their relation with the state. It is also 
noteworthy that, TÜSİAD member companies are more family-based whereas 
MÜSİAD big members are community-oriented as in the examples of multi-share 
holding companies. 
The key differences between the perspectives of MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD 
started to wane in time. Firstly, the former was Eastern-oriented heavily influenced 
by the success stories of East Asian development model and found close affinities 
between the communitarian traditions of Islam and the communitarian features of 
these Asian countries. This ideological orientation continued until the heavy crisis in 
these countries. The latter is Western-oriented, secularist and supports integration 
into EU as a basis for both economic prosperity and the consolidation of Turkish 
democracy. Secondly, TÜSİAD placed much more emphasis on expanding the rights 
and freedoms of the individual for developing democracy in Turkey.123 MÜSİAD 
changed its discourse of downgrading issues associated with liberal democracy 
following the February 28 process. Hence, discussions of individual rights and civil 
liberties started to figure in MÜSİAD reports,124 beside the frequent references to 
social rights and the importance of achieving social justice. MÜSİAD companies 
                                                 
123 For further information, see TÜSİAD, Türkiye’de Demokratikleşme Perspektifleri 
[Democratization Perspectives in Turkey] (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1997).  
 
124 For further information, see Constitutional Reform and Democratisation of Government 
(MÜSİAD: İstanbul, 2000)  
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could still be easily distinguished from the Turkish traditional big business relying 
on the state and its favors.125  
Consequently, MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD have differences in the organizational 
structure and ideological background. However, both of them are situated in a 
medium in which they are situated to handle with the upper hand of the state in 
economy, as they cannot challenge it. Moreover, despite MÜSİAD’s emphasis on 
Islamic moral values and traditional solidarity within community and TÜSİAD’s 
stress on democracy, both of them aim to get more from the state resources to their 
members. This structural character forms the main similarity, which make TÜSİAD 
as the association of the big tycoons and MÜSİAD as the association of KOBİs.   
5.4. Conclusion 
MÜSİAD has benefited from Islam functionally in providing a common 
bond for its members, a figure of motivation to win the markets in the Islamic world 
captured by non-Islamic forces and a way of moderating the labor. However, secular 
circles alleged MÜSİAD’s emphasis on Islam as they are backing the religious 
reactionism financially.  MÜSİAD’s close stand and parallel discourse with Milli 
Görüş parties bolstered this allegation. MÜSİAD’s reinterpretation of Islam was also 
heavily blended with reference to communal bonds similar to East Asian 
development model. Thus, 1997 has been a turning point for MÜSİAD with the 
erosion of its two ideological pillars, Islam and East Asian development model. 
First, the rise of MÜSİAD was severely cut off via the developments following the 
                                                 
125 Haldun Gülalp, “Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Refah Party” Muslim World, 
January 1999, Vol. 89, No. 1, p, 34.  
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28th February process. MÜSİAD could survive but changed its emphasis on Islamic 
discourse in an environment where political Islam is severely repressed. Second, 
MÜSİAD has also paid great attention to the East Asian development model as 
another ideological pillar. MÜSİAD used this model to justify its emphasis on moral 
and communitarian values while voicing the necessity of allocation of state 
resources to the KOBİs. However, following the economic crisis in East Asian 
countries, MÜSİAD’s emphasis on this model was severely damaged despite the 
anticipation that these countries would recover in a short time.  
The erosion in these ideological bases lessened the differences between 
MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD in their approaches beside the segments of business they are 
representing.  Although MÜSİAD stressed the “independent” character of its 
members by criticizing the dependence of Turkish great tycoons convened under 
TÜSİAD, both of them have to survive with the strong hand of the Turkish state in 
economy. As Turkish voluntary business organizations, they on the one hand 
criticize the “omnipotent” power of the state, and on the other hand, they aim to 
orient the state resources to their members. Thus, MÜSİAD followed the path of 
TÜSİAD in the method of interest groups politics despite its harsh criticisms.                
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CONCLUSION 
In this study, I have applied Truman’s “disturbance,” Olson’s “collective 
action” and Salisbury’s “exchange” theories to understand the formation and 
development of MÜSİAD as a case study. MÜSİAD emerged and developed as a 
result of the two variables of disturbances, first the transformation of Turkish 
political economy and the rise and fall of Islamist politics in the 1980s and the 
1990s. In its development the role of exclusive material selective benefits, i.e. 
periodicals, mass travels to foreign countries, conferences, panels and special 
interest-free owning system, karz-ı-hasen, and non-material benefits, i.e. Islamic 
morality, locality and the identity of being “outsiders” from state resources are 
noticeable. In addition, the Chairmen and headquarter professional staff led by 
General Secretaries have been quite successful in exchanging these material and 
non-material benefits with members in the development of the organization.  
I have benefited from the theories of pluralism, corporatism and clientelism 
to delineate the mixture character of Turkish interest group politics shaped within 
the dominancy of the state in which MÜSİAD emerged and developed. The 
liberalization of the Turkish political economy in the last two decades has not meant 
neither an overall disappearance of the state power nor the waning of the “strong 
state” tradition. The liberalization of economy and politics in Turkey led the 
development of civil society that accelerated through globalization and its 
repercussions on Turkey. However, this development of civil society could not 
challenge the historical omnipotent power of the Turkish state fostered with the 
strong state tradition. Thus, interest groups politics in this context did not transform 
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the state into a helpless victim of particular interests. Despite the fact that, I 
benefited from the “strong state” argument, it also challenged me to observe that 
interest groups were not helpless victim of the Turkish state, since they could adapt 
easily to the new conditions and benefit from them. Thus, Turkish business 
associations have been very dynamic and have developed strong adaptability vis-à-
vis strong state. So, the pragmatic, even opportunistic, standpoint of business 
associations could be evaluated through their flexibility fostering this strong 
adaptability capacity. TÜSİAD, for example, supported the 1980 military 
intervention and stood in the same side with the military bureaucracy in the February 
28 process while underlining democracy as the basis of free-market in 1990s. 
Similarly, MÜSİAD retreated from its previous stress on Islamic morality and 
communitarian bonds after 1997.  
The Turkish state with its historical legacy shaped and dominated the interest 
group politics. This dominance of the state resulted in the creation of a loyal 
business class through national(ization of) economy policies starting with the late 
Ottoman era and continuing in the early Republican period. Moreover, business 
activity within uncertain and unstable politico-economic environment under the 
uneven state intervention has always contributed to the vulnerability of the private 
sector vis-à-vis the ever-dominant state as a vicious circle. Ironically, the Turkish 
economic development strategy based on heavy interventionism and protectionism 
made the state as the major source of uncertainty for business activity. The domains 
of business activity and that of state intervention in Turkey remained ambiguous for 
a long time, which prevented the development of a self-confident bourgeoisie 
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enjoying a hegemonic position as a class. In such context, Turkish business 
community has always demanded to participate in the decision-making process with 
the government. However, business associations, either compulsorily or voluntarily 
established, could not be successful in promoting specific business interests since 
they pursued their demands largely through personal links with the political and 
bureaucratic elite. This, in turn, weakened business associations while strengthening 
the business community on individual basis and their dependency on the Turkish 
state. Thus, state authorities could undermine the meaning and significance of these 
associations for their members.1 
This framework provided the Turkish state the opportunity to refuse the 
consolidation of the public role of the business associations. Thus, the idea of 
representing particular, especially business, interests has not been socially 
acceptable in Turkey, which also prevented the development of neo-corporatist form 
of interest representation. Moreover, the Turkish governments have not aimed to 
develop neo-corporatist arrangements for fostering their legitimacy. On the other 
hand, the emergence of TÜSİAD in the early 1970s could be cited as the beginning 
of pluralism to some extent, however the cited historical legacy of the Turkish state 
and the chronic weakness of the business circles did not permit viable options to 
foster pluralism in Turkey. Thus, Turkish political elite chose to establish paternalist 
relations with the interest groups depolitizing them in this process. 
Starting with the transition to multi-party politics, the interest group 
representation in Turkey got complex through oscillating between different models; 
                                                 
1 Ayşe Buğra, State and Business in Modern Turkey: A Comparative Study (Albany, N.Y.: State 
University of New York Press, 1994), p. 229. 
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pluralism, corporatism and clientelism and keeping all three of them intact at 
different levels simultaneously in different combination of hybrid forms. Moreover, 
it would be misleading to define interest groups politics within a given society based 
on only one particular form of relations. Thus, this study does not invalidate the role 
and/or the importance of the state but it argues that the focus is to be shifted to 
historical background and the political economic environment in which both state 
and interest groups are embedded. Because studying interest group politics is the 
study of interaction determined by two sides and the historical environment shapes 
the horizontal side and the political economic environment puts the vertical side of 
this interaction.   
This study argues that no social entity could be evaluated without the 
environment in which it emerges and develops. There is always a mutual relation 
between the social entity and this environment composed of other social entities. 
Moreover, the historical background shapes the structure of the social entities. Thus, 
business associations as economic-oriented interest groups should be evaluated 
within this analytical framework of being shaped through the intensive role of the 
state. The formation, functioning and institutional relations of interest groups with 
the state are embedded in the surrounding political-economic structure. In this 
framework, the state, especially in the Turkish context due to its historical 
legitimacy, comes to fore as the most important variable to determine the 
institutional framework of interest groups. 
While evaluating the last two decades, one can easily observe that 1980 is a 
turning point in Turkish political economy that witnessed both the structural 
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adjustment program on 24 January and the military intervention on 12 September. 
The military rule during 1980-1983 shaped the institutional restructuring of Turkish 
political life with 1982 Constitution and the economic structure by backing the 
implementation of the January 24 Decisions. The liberalization of the Turkish 
economy in 1980s, the shift from a highly inward-orientated ISI model based 
economy to a significant exporter of manufactures, resulted in economic dynamism, 
rising entrepreneurship and the growing power of private capital integrated into 
global markets. Thus, the Turkish state started to regulate redistribution activities 
through substantial rents of export subsidies and high interest earnings associated 
with the rising PSBR.  
Towards the end of the 1980s, the annual inflation increased incrementally 
bringing further deregulation of financial markets with transition to full 
convertibility of TL in 1989. This process ended in speculative wealth accumulation 
with low propensities to invest and due to exchange rate policy Turkish economy 
became dependent on “Ponzi finance” of short-term capital “hot money” flows in 
1990s. The orientation of the largest industrial firms to finance the public debt in 
1990s resulted in investing on short-term financial assets and their aspiration to 
establish commercial banks inevitably generated “schizophrenic anomaly” of acting 
partly as “rentiers.” Thus, the deterioration of income distribution and the 
consequent social antagonisms in the last two decades developed within high 
inflation, high unemployment, corruption and social violence, which challenged the 
legitimacy of the political system.  
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The re-emergence of populist policies especially in the 1990s went hand in 
hand with the intensified political competition and the Turkish macroeconomic 
(dis)equilibrium based on low savings capacity and large fiscal gap deepened with 
the wage explosion. All in all, the post-1980 Turkish liberalization experience 
happened to be period of growth and crisis with unexpected changes in income 
distribution warranted by integration with the global markets. In sum, Turkey 
entered the new millennium with inconsistent rates of real growth and investment, a 
worsened income distribution, and a paralyzed fiscal apparatus. This situation 
worsened with the last economic crises in November 2000 and February 2001 and 
their effects are severely felt at the present writing. 
The liberalization of Turkish economy encouraged business activities and 
limited state interference, which opened the path for the establishment of relatively 
free political atmosphere. Moreover, since 1990s, the number and activities of 
voluntary associations have increased rapidly hand in hand with globalization and 
further integration of Turkey in the political and economic aspects of this process. 
Thus, the Turkish state was challenged by rival identities based on ethnicity and 
religion, fostered with globalization, reflecting economic resentment in 1990s. In 
short, Turkish political life in the 1990s also illustrated the importance of the 
fragmentation of the center from both left and right, which significantly helped the 
rise of Islamist politics, the electoral fortunes of the WP and the increasing visibility 
of Islam in the public sphere, and specifically MÜSİAD on the business side.  
The liberalization of economy and export-orientation policies transformed 
Anatolian capital to develop as a “strategical fit” in the integration process of Turkey 
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to the global markets. These highly dynamic businesses have accelerated the 
globalization of production in Turkey by facilitating the mobility of global capital by 
collaboration with the international system. Thus, KOBİs and the Islamic-oriented 
enterprises fueled with Islam and locality as Anadoluluk prospered. The 
establishment of MÜSİAD was a response to the needs originated with cited 
transformation of the Turkish political economy during the 1980s. Thus, these 
developments with the increasing pluralist tendencies in Turkey functioned as 
catalyst in the establishment of MÜSİAD to represent KOBİs and Anatolian petite 
bourgeoisie. Moreover, the public debt financing policies of the governments in 
1990s oriented large industrialists to fund the state by buying treasury bonds. This, 
in turn, further increased the importance of KOBİs and MÜSİAD dealing with 
production rather than treasury bonds. In short, MÜSİAD emerged and developed as 
a result of the intersection of the transformation in the Turkish political economy 
and rise and fall of Islamist politics in the last two decades. 
MÜSİAD, thus, with reference to the theme Müstakil (independent) in the 
name of the Association, underlined the necessity for independence of the business 
community from the state. In this context, MÜSİAD presented TÜSİAD as the 
business association composed of state-dependent businessmen and industrialists 
whose entrepreneurial success was fake even though they might have been the great 
tycoons of Turkey. MÜSİAD emphasized corporatist style of interest group politics 
in business-state relations with reference to the East Asian development model. 
Ironically, MÜSİAD’s close relations with the WP and the Refahyol government 
reflected the traditional nature of particularistic Turkish state-business relations 
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despite the association’s heavy criticisms of TÜSİAD. Moreover, the membership of 
MÜSİAD has shown a remarkable increase during the Refahyol government, which 
reflects the hopes of Turkish businessmen to get more shares from state resources, 
via MÜSİAD membership. 
In modern-day Turkey MÜSİAD observed the disproportionate power of the 
first generation, TÜSİAD members, in the domestic markets and in politics. 
MÜSİAD defined this as a handicap obstructing the survival and development of the 
group it represents. Therefore MÜSİAD’s identity developed along the critique of 
the first generation controlling the domestic markets. According to MÜSİAD 
members, the economic strength of the first generation was a result of their close 
links to the state, but not of their entrepreneurial skills. Despite these latent 
criticisms, neither of the two organizations entered into explicit polemics about the 
other. However, after the formation of a WP-led coalition government by Erbakan in 
1996, MÜSİAD’s increasing significance in the economy and in society seemed to 
culminate in a rivalry with TÜSİAD.2  
Erol Yarar, while defining the interest group politics in Turkey, claimed that 
the state protected some specific business conglomerates and they could form 
monopolies strengthened by doing business with state.3 MÜSİAD circles also 
frequently commented that these business conglomerates felt no need to improve the 
quality of their products due to their monopoly power in the Turkish markets. In this 
regard, MÜSİAD’s attribution to be independent, as in the name of the association, 
                                                 
2 Ayşe Buğra, “Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation By Two Turkish 
Business Associations” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 30, p. 524.  
 
3 Murat Çokgezen, “New Fragmentations and New Cooperations in the Turkish Bourgeoisie” 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, October 2000, Vol. 18, No. 5, p. 541.   
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is a protest against the industrial and commercial establishment dominating Turkey’s 
economy. MÜSİAD argued that a faithful Muslim and principled human being 
would never engage in such quick profit-seeking and speculative investment instead 
of qualitative industrial production. MÜSİAD underlined that Turkish state 
continued to support monopolistic capitalists instead of KOBİs that constituted an 
immense potential for Turkey’s development. Thus, MÜSİAD praised its members 
as the self-sacrificing, hardworking businessmen who are benevolent to the people in 
Turkey. In sum, MÜSİAD defined itself as the embodiment of the “Anatolian 
Lions,” who search for truth and justice, attract foreign currency to their country 
[and] give it back again what they get from society.4 
In the framework of state-Islam relations, Islam was relegated to the private 
sphere with the implementation of secularization policies during the early 
Republican period. However, the rise of Islamic-oriented Milli Görüş parties, WP 
specifically, in the relatively free political atmosphere of Turkish politics coincided 
with the rise of Islamic business and economic practices. Islam not only became the 
oppositional identity for the excluded segments of Turkish society but also increased 
its visibility in the public sphere with the growing manifestations of Islamic identity 
at the organizational levels as in the case of MÜSİAD. In this context, MÜSİAD’s 
slogan of “high technology and high morality” reflected the importance of Islamic 
moral dimension in the identity of the organization alongside with the economic and 
technological issues.  
                                                 
4 Karin Vorhoff, “Businessmen and Their Organizations: Between Instrumental Solidarity, Cultural 
Diversity, and the State” in Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism (İstanbul: Orient-Institut der 
DMG 2000), Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert Karin Vorhoff St. Yerasimos, G. Seufert, K. 
Vorhoff, eds., p. 167.  
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The role of Islam for MÜSİAD, however, has been quite functional. It 
provides a common bond for its members, motivation to (re)gain the markets in the 
Islamic world captured by non-Islamic forces and a way of moderating the labor. 
Thus, MÜSİAD represents the cultural and structural dynamics of the deepening of 
the process of development of capitalism and modernization in the Islamic context. 
Rather than a fundamentalist interpretation, MÜSİAD comprehension of Islam has 
been affected by Turkish nationalism with strong reference to the Ottoman imperial 
past. MÜSİAD’s reference to the East Asian model was also parallel to its Islamic 
discourse blended with its emphasis on moral and communitarian values. Thus, this 
functional approach provided MÜSİAD to step back from stressing on Islam 
following the February 28 process. 
1997 has been a turning point for MÜSİAD in its de-emphasis of its 
ideological pillars as Islam and East Asian economic development model. Following 
the economic crisis in East Asian countries and the February 28 process, MÜSİAD 
retreated from its references to both factors. MÜSİAD changed its emphasis away 
from an Islamic discourse in an environment where political Islam is severely 
repressed. The number of MÜSİAD members decreased sharply in 1999 due to the 
closure file against the association and the economic crisis that oriented the new 
coalition government to sign a new standby agreement with the IMF in this year 
following the elections.  
MÜSİAD has been very dynamic in adapting itself to the structural changes 
in Turkey while handling the problems of professionalization via changes in 
organizational structure. MÜSİAD could also develop its own identity among its 
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members by exclusive material and non-material benefits via publication activities 
and informing them about investment facilities both in Turkey and abroad as well as 
forming a public opinion. MÜSİAD’s foreign trips, international fairs and IBF 
meetings have also been affective to orient members for world markets by forming 
global network of Muslim businessmen. MÜSİAD’s emphasis on export-orientation 
and the success of KOBİs in this field empowered the organization to voice vis-à-vis 
the state that KOBİs must be rewarded with more credit. However, Turkish state was 
reluctant to hear these demands related to its superior position. 
Although MÜSİAD emphasized this non-interventionist rhetoric with the 
merits of competition, its relations with the political authority appeared to be hardly 
in conformity with the formal and impersonal type of market economy. The 
unhidden closeness of the WP-led coalition government with MÜSİAD circles 
reflected the traditional nature of particularistic Turkish state-business relations in 
the country even it was heavily criticized by the association itself. In fact, 
tremendous growth of MÜSİAD’s membership of during 1995-1997 went hand in 
hand with WP’s significant electoral success at the municipal elections of 1994 and 
at the following national ones. This was the result of expectations to have easy 
access to state resources through MÜSİAD’s connections with the WP. Thus, the 
role attributed to Islamic way of economic life reflected in the MÜSİAD’s 
publications seems to define an economic system, which requires a particular type of 
state involvement with an attitude of leniency and flexibility in the application of 
rules. 
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Functionality of Islam has been another anathema argued in this study. Islam, 
widely utilized for the legitimacy of the state during the Ottoman period, was 
relegated to the private sphere as the result of secularization policies during the 
Republican period. The important point here is the “functionality” determining Islam 
to be employed either inside or outside the public sphere for the sake of the state. 
This determination, in turn, led the state control the religion strategically. One can 
observe parallel functionality in MÜSİAD. Thus, MÜSİAD emphasized Islam as the 
common bond for the organization basis and de-emphasized its discourse following 
the February 28 period.   
The closeness between the association and the Refahyol government was 
especially obvious in their co-operation attempting to change the traditional pro-
western orientation of Turkish foreign policy. MÜSİAD supported the PM 
Erbakan’s efforts to enhance Turkey’s economic and political relations with Islamic 
countries and they participated in his trips to these countries. MÜSİAD paid 
attention to the significance of Islamic countries for Turkey with regards to the 
opportunities they presented for MÜSİAD members. Similarly, Erbakan’s speeches 
at MÜSİAD sponsored international meetings make explicit references to the 
opportunities of the Islamic business networks. 5  
Consequently, MÜSİAD’s approach to interest group politics was shaped 
with the general trend in Turkey despite its strong critics in this context. Some of the 
members joining in MÜSİAD during the Refahyol government have easily left the 
                                                 
5 For further information see, Başbakan Erbakan’ın Doğu Asya Gezisi ve MÜSİAD’ın Bosna-Hersek 
Gezisi Raporu (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1996) and MÜSİAD’ın Afrika ve İngiltere İş Gezisi Raporu 
[MÜSİAD’s Business Travel Report on Africa and England] (İstanbul: MÜSİAD, 1997) and 
MÜSİAD Bülten, 1997, Vol. 5, No. 18, pp. 50-61.  
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organization. They were disappointed about the realization of their expectations to 
get more from state resources through MÜSİAD membership due to the short-life of 
the Refahyol government. 
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